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CHAPTER ONE
TOWARD A STEINIAN ETHIC
INTRODUCTION
Edith Stein (1891-1942) was born of Jewish parents in Germany, studied
philosophy under the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, converted to Catholicism, and
spent the last nine years of her life in the enclosure of a Carmelite monastery as Sister
Teresa Benedicta of the Cross. She was arrested by Gestapo officers at a monastery in
Echt, Holland, on August 2, 1942, transported to German-occupied Poland, and killed in
Auschwitz seven days later.
Julias Marcan, an eyewitness at the Drente-Westerbork Detention Camp in
Holland, recalled that he saw Edith Stein calmly comforting children days before she and
her sister were gassed in the ovens of Auschwitz. Marcan, a Jewish member of the
Cologne business community, had opportunity to notice Stein, since he and his wife were
put in charge of the prisoners. He recounts:
Amongst the prisoners who were brought in on the 5th of August Sister
Benedicta stood out on account of her calmness and composure. The
distress in the barracks, and the stir caused by the new arrivals, was
indescribable. Sister Benedicta was just like an angel, going around
amongst the women, comforting them, helping them and calming them.
Many of the mothers were near to distraction; they had not bothered about
their children the whole day long, but just sat brooding in dumb despair.
Sister Benedicta took care of the little children, washed them and combed
them, looked after their feeding and their other needs. During the whole
1

2
of her stay there she washed and cleaned for people, following one act of
charity with another until everyone wondered at her goodness.1
Facing inevitable extermination, how could Stein remain calm? How could she comfort
others? What kept her from slipping into despair or insanity, seemingly reasonable
responses, given the futile circumstances of Nazi Germany in August 1942 and the more
immediately desperate conditions of the Drente-Westerbork Detention Camp?
Prior to this phenomenon of caring in the camp, Edith Stein had been one of the
first German women to complete a doctorate in philosophy. She had studied with the
founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), and received her degree
summa cum laude. She had actively participated in the group of phenomenologists
known as the Göttingen Circle, and she had worked as Husserl’s assistant for eighteen
months. But these outstanding credentials were not enough to overcome prejudice against
a woman academic, and she was denied teaching positions in the universities. Stein spent
eight years teaching novices and would-be teachers in the Dominican Teachers’ College
in Speyer. As a convert to Catholicism at age thirty-one, Stein became a prominent
speaker in the Catholic Women’s Movement. She worked as a lecturer and curriculum
planner at the German Institute for Scientific Pedagogy in Münster before laws against
non-Aryans forced her dismissal. Barred from her job at the Pedagogical Institute
because she was of Jewish ethnicity, Stein, at age forty-two, realized a long-time
aspiration and entered the Carmelite Order of Catholic cloistered women in Cologne. In
the cloister, Stein was able to work and pray as she gradually resumed philosophical

1

Qtd. in Teresia Renata de Spiritu Sancto Posselt, Edith Stein, trans. Cecily Hastings and Donald
Nicholl (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1952) 217. See also Emmanuel Charles McCarthy, Some Guiding
Reflections on the Icon of the Servant of Yahweh Blessed Teresia Benedicta of the Cross (Auschwitz,
1992) 5.
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work. However, the horror of Kristallnacht2 made her realize that she was jeopardizing
the safety of the Aryan sisters with whom she lived, and she asked to be transferred to
Holland. The German invasion of Holland in May 1940 necessitated another move for
Stein, but Nazi policies interfered with her transfer to a Carmelite monastery in Le
Pâquier, Switzerland. When the Dutch Catholic Bishops publicly denounced the
deportation of Jews, the Gestapo gathered up all Catholics of Jewish descent. Stein and
her sister Rosa, a tertiary of the Carmelites,3 were transported to the Drente-Westerbork
Detention Camp and eventually to Auschwitz, where they were gassed on August 9,
1942. The Netherlands Red Cross officially confirmed the Stein sisters’ deaths in 1950,
seven and a half years after the fact.4
When the Catholic Church moved to beatify Stein in 1987 and then again when
the Church canonized her in 1998, raising her to a preeminent status few achieve but
many admire within the Church, the floodgates of animosity broke. Members of the
Jewish community accused the Church of centuries of anti-Semitism, of appropriating the
Shoah5 to itself, and of using Stein as a model for the conversion of Jews to

2

Kristallnacht was an orchestrated night of intimidation of the Jewish people, initiated by the Nazi
officials on November 9-10, 1938, and so called for the smashing of glass and crystal during the destruction
of Jewish synagogues, businesses, and homes. John K. Roth and Michael Berenbaum, eds., Holocaust:
Religious and Philosophical Implications (St. Paul: Paragon House, 1989) xxi.
3
4

Pat Lyne, Edith Stein Discovered: A Personal Portrait (Springfield: Templegate, 2000) 83.

Noted in Edith Stein, Life in a Jewish Family (Washington: ICS, 1989) 432. Hereafter referred
to as Life.
5
Shoah is the name given to the disaster and chaos that Hitler and National Socialism wreaked on
the Jewish people. The word Shoah is used in preference to the word Holocaust which contains a
connotation of sacrifice. In his essay, “The Jews Did Not Want to Bring Burnt Offerings,” Ernst Ludwig
Ehrlich deems the use of the word holocaust inappropriate: “The Jews who had been plundered and
murdered by the Nazis did not want to bring a ‘sacrifice,’ neither a sin offering, a burnt offering, nor any
other kind of offering! These millions of murdered Jews wanted to live. If they were religious, they
wanted to serve their God as living Jews, not dead ones. If they called upon the name of God in the
extermination camps and prayed, they were not offering themselves to God as a sacrifice, but crying out
from instinctual piety.” Ehrlich’s essay is found in: Waltraud Herbstrith, ed., Never Forget: Christian and
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Catholicism.6 Others saw the act as yet another example of the Church’s flagrant
arrogance, triumphalism, and insensitivity. Some Jewish members of the Stein family
refused to attend the beatification ceremonies in Cologne, Germany; Stein’s niece,
Susanne Batzdorff, points out the irony that another aunt, Rosa, also a convert to
Catholicism, had been killed with Edith, but had been declared neither a martyr nor a
saint.7
This rancor is justified and deserves the attention given it in the works of the
Shoah scholar, Henry James Cargas; the critics, Garry Wills and James Carroll; Dr.
Eugene Fisher; Rabbi Daniel Polish; and others.8 However, this discussion of the
“problem of Edith Stein” detracts from the merits of Stein as a philosopher, teacher, and
lecturer who tried to live the “examined life” in a time when the Nazis’ focus on “the
Jewish Question” and “the Woman Question”9 stripped Jews of life, and women of their

Jewish Perspectives on Edith Stein (Washington: ICS, 1989) 130. In this study, Shoah will be used unless
Holocaust is used within a direct quotation.
6

Harry James Cargas, ed., The Unnecessary Problem of Edith Stein (New York: UPA, 1994) 13-

16.
7

Susanne M. Batzdorff, Edith Stein: Selected Writings (Springfield: Templegate, 1990) 117.
Batzdorff comments: “In my family the truth jumps out at me dramatically, because Edith was not the only
one of her family that was murdered in the Holocaust. With her was her sister Rosa (like Edith a convert to
Catholicism, like her, arrested in the Carmelite monastery of Echt, Holland, deported and killed in
Auschwitz on the same day as her sister, but rarely mentioned by the church) and besides these two, her
brother Paul and his wife, her sister Frieda, and her niece Eva were likewise slaughtered.”
8

In The Unnecessary Problem of Edith Stein, editor, Harry James Cargas presents ten essays
voicing different interpretations of the Catholic Church’s move to elevate Stein to sainthood. Cargas
pronounces the Church’s attempt “inappropriate”; Rabbi Polish accuses the Church of trying to appropriate
the Shoah to itself; and Dr. Fisher, in replying to Dr. Polish, denies any malfeasance on the part of the
Church. In his book, Papal Sin: Structures of Deceit, Garry Wills cites Stein’s canonization as a
“usurping” of the Shoah. Wills, however, pays tribute to Stein: “Edith Stein . . . lived one of the most
intellectually adventurous lives of the twentieth century. She is, by any measure, a giant— profound in
thought, dedicated in service, challenging in originality.” Garry Wills, Papal Sin: Structures of Deceit
(New York: Image Books, 2000) 47. See also the varied perspectives concerning Stein’s beatification
found in Herbstrith, Never Forget.
9

Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family and Nazi Politics (New York:
St. Martin’s, 1987) 22.
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dignity. Edith Stein considered herself a German woman of Jewish descent, and when
the Nazis applied these “questions” to her, she had to answer with no less than her life.
In this study, the term “ethical life” will be used in preference to the term
“examined life.” The ethical life refers to a human being’s conscious existence in the
physical world and an ongoing reflection on his or her actions, attitudes, and beliefs in
that world. It designates the manner in which a person conducts affairs within his/her
given life world. “Life world,” as used in this study, means “[t]he world inhabited by the
self . . . within which [one] immediately experience[s] the things around [him/her].”10
While a person might serendipitously lead a good life, it seems probable that
some sort of plan, no matter how formal or informal, is needed. For example, Socrates’
(469-399 BCE) examined life involved a method of inquiry that required a certain
reflection and dialogue: an examination of self, combined with the interplay of
questioning/being questioned by others, and always striving for truth. The German
philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) ethic appears more structured and takes into
account ideas of means, ends, autonomy, and duty.11 If a person’s living of the ethical
life presumes a plan, whether formally enunciated or not, there ought to be some
evidence in the person’s life of this structure (letters, lists, consistencies in actions, etc.).
Edith Stein did not leave a written or verbal ethic, per se, but she did leave a record
(albeit incomplete) of her lived experiences, and it is this body of writing — her personal
and autobiographical works — that this study seeks to link with her particular manner of
10

Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000) 6.
Sokolowski’s definition of life world is used here in preference to Husserl’s evolving meanings of
lifeworld.
11

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1997).
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living an ethical life. Stein’s philosophical writings both reflect and foster her ethical
stance toward life and contribute to an understanding of her actions.
In her doctoral dissertation, On The Problem of Empathy, Stein, echoing her
teacher, Edmund Husserl, states: “The averted and interior sides of a spatial thing are cogiven with its seen sides. In short, the whole thing is ‘seen.’ But . . . this givenness of
the one side implies tendencies to advance to new givennesses.”12 Through this study, it
is hoped that a careful reading of Stein’s writings will lead to “new givennesses” — to a
discovery of her interior side, or the impetus of her ethical life. By examining Stein’s
own comments, actions, and aspirations in her personal and autobiographical works and
linking them to her phenomenological understanding of the psychophysical human being,
this research will contribute to evidence of a lived ethic, showing Stein both as a
practitioner and promoter of the ethical life.
As a teacher and practitioner of philosophy, Stein studied the discipline of ethics.
As a student, she studied the work of Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and was especially
fond of his Ethics.13 Later, she was captivated by the lectures and writings of the
German phenomenologist, Max Scheler (1874-1928).14 Stein specifically mentions
studying Scheler’s works, Phenomenology and Theory of the Feelings of Sympathy and
Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, and she praises him for
presenting “topics of vital personal importance to his young listeners,” a trait that
endeared him to and energized his students.15 While informed by Catholic teaching,
12

Edith Stein, On The Problem of Empathy, trans. Waltraut Stein (Washington: ICS, 1989) 57.

13

Stein, Life 260.

14

Stein, Life 259.

15

Stein, Life 258-59.
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tradition, and literature, Stein seems also to be formed, in great part, by the “ethical
personalism” and “coresponsibility” advanced by Scheler. In her comments, Stein often
mentions the impact that others had on her; she seems fascinated by how others lived and
acted. The development of her own ethical scheme was within her scope and ability and
seems a likely project had she lived longer. Her philosophical works, especially those on
empathy, the human person, and community attest to this.
Within the Catholic Church, the term “saint” refers to those men and women who
“practiced heroic virtue and lived in fidelity to God’s grace” and who are recommended
to fellow believers as models and intercessors.16 Given Stein’s status as saint within the
Roman Catholic Church, it might be assumed that any ethic ascribed to her would be
based strictly on faith and reflect the tenets of the Catholic Church. Because of Stein’s
background in philosophy, however, I will suggest that her ethic relies as heavily on
reason as it does on faith and that to bracket either reason or faith in studying Stein is to
misrepresent her and her living of the ethical life.
This interplay of reason and faith is not new; Stein joins a rich tradition wherein
the two are combined, such as in the works of Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas —
philosophers who bear the Catholic Church’s designation of saint. While attracted by this
relationship of faith and reason, Stein’s affinity to reason and the study of philosophy
came first in time. Stein gives a uniquely phenomenological and feminine expression to
her linking of faith and reason, an expression that has its roots in as well as enriches the
twentieth century and beyond.
In addition to exploring Stein’s writings for evidence of a lived ethic, it will be
interesting to note how this living of the ethical life takes on different expressions when
16

Catechism of the Catholic Church (New York: Catholic Book Publishing, 1994) #828, 219.
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Stein moves through different phases of life, i.e., her pre-conversion and World War I
period, her teaching and lecturing period, and her time as a Carmelite. What, if anything,
of Stein’s ethic remains unchanged throughout these periods? It is proposed in this study
that the essence of Stein’s ethic, that which is “common to all possible instances”17 of the
living of this ethic, is the dynamic of searching for truth while in relationship with and
responsible to God, self, and others.
Edith Stein, whether heralded by Catholics, despised by Jews, dismissed by
philosophers, or simply ignored by the general public, deserves to be studied because of
her courage and persistence in living an ethical life.

THE RESEARCH QUESTION
This study begins with the premise that philosopher Edith Stein’s seemingly
praiseworthy action of comforting women and children signals her characteristic stance
toward the world. This caring for other human beings is not an isolated, meritorious act,
but rather the conscious effort to blend thought and belief, giving them concrete
expression in outward actions. The research project will investigate this “Steinian
stance” toward the world and elucidate other elements of this stance. Specifically, the
project seeks to answer the question: How did Stein live the ethical life? More than an
isolated act of kindness while facing death, Stein’s comforting of other human beings
points to a dynamic, ever-evolving ethic, based on reason and faith, and lived out in
relationship and responsibility to others.

17

Marianne Sawicki has done research on Stein’s hermeneutic theory and practices. She defines
the “essential” as that which is “common to all possible instances of this kind of object.” Marianne
Sawicki, Body, Text, and Science: The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of
Edith Stein (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic P, 1997) 20.
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Preliminary research points to a correlation in Stein’s ethic between relationship
and responsibility. Stein’s relationships can be traced in her writings and her comments
about relatives, friends, and other people, to reveal a connection or bond, first explored in
experience, and then more philosophically, in her dissertation on empathy. In addition to
realizing her own connection with others, Stein writes about the responsibility that people
have to God, self, and one another, precisely because of their connection.
Especially in her letters,18 Stein makes it clear that she considers her relationships
with others as sacred trusts which entail responsibility. In a letter to her friend and
former student, Sister Adelgundis Jaegerschmid, OSB, for example, Stein states that she
is “convinced that God calls no one for one’s own sake” (#262). She cautions Sister
Adelgundis about speaking to the dying Husserl about the last things in life (death,
judgment, heaven, and hell) unless she is fully aware that such discussion “heightens his
[Husserl’s] responsibility as well as our responsibility for him” (#52). Stein’s letters
confirm the fact that she deliberately maintains her responsibility to family, friends, and
colleagues.
After entering the cloister, Stein realized that when relationships are modified in
terms of physical proximity, the bonds intensify. Stein writes to Sister Callista: “[E]ven
in the contemplative life, one may not sever the connection with the world. I even
believe that the deeper one is drawn to God, the more one must ‘go out of oneself’; that
is, one must go to the world in order to carry the divine life into it” (#45). Stein comforts
the author, Gertrud von le Fort,19 who is afraid that Stein’s entrance into Carmel will

18
19

Edith Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters, 1916-1942 (Washington: ICS, 1993).

Gertrud, Baroness von le Fort (1876-1971) was a novelist and poet whom Edith Stein much
admired. Von le Fort converted to Catholicism in 1926, and Stein and she shared an appreciation of
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affect their friendship: “You must not believe that you will lose anything at all.
Everyone who has a place in my heart and in my prayers can only gain” (#156). And
Stein assures her friend and colleague, Fritz Kaufmann, from behind cloistered walls: “I
have other ways and means of keeping the bonds alive” (#93a).20 This
relationship/responsibility dynamic is a recurring theme in Stein’s life and writings.
While initially this bond might be thought of as stemming from faith, Stein envisions a
universal link that transcends race, culture, religion — a relationship that is the privilege
and thus the responsibility of human beings.21
As a phenomenologist, Stein appreciates the difference of each person’s
experience and she respects the different paths that individual persons follow in pursuit of
truth. For example, she tells Sister Adelgundis, who is taking care of the dying Edmund
Husserl: “I am not at all worried about my dear Master. It has always been far from me
to think that God’s mercy allows itself to be circumscribed by the visible church’s
boundaries. God is truth. All who seek truth seek God, whether this is clear to them or

Catholic and Carmelite traditions, as well as an interest in women’s studies. Von le Fort’s novella, Song at
the Scaffold (1933), which describes the martyrdom of sixteen Carmelite nuns during the Reign of Terror,
inspired writer Georges Bernanos (1888-1948), whose film script, Dialogues des Carmélites, in turn
influenced Francis Poulenc’s (1899-1963) opera, “Dialogue of the Carmelites.” See Josephine Koeppel,
Edith Stein: Philosopher and Mystic (Collegeville: Liturgical P, 1990) 78 and Gertrud von le Fort, The
Song at the Scaffold (Long Prairie: Neumann P, 1993).
20

Stein’s contemporary, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) expresses a similar view of the
existence and strength of nonphysical bonds. Bonhoeffer, a Lutheran minister who died for his role in
conspiring to kill Hitler, wrote to his fiancée from prison: “These will be quiet days in our homes, but I
have had the experience over and over again that the quieter it is around me, the clearer do I feel the
connection to you. It is as though in solitude the soul develops senses which we hardly know in everyday
life.” Qtd. in Malcolm Muggeridge, A Third Testament (Farmington: Plough P, 1976) 162.
21

Stein’s thoughts on relationship and responsibility reflect the influence of Max Scheler. This
connection between Stein and Scheler will be elucidated in Chapter Two.
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not.”22 When told of her mother’s deathbed conversion to Catholicism, Stein was
vehement in her response. In a letter to Sister Callista Kopf, OP, Stein writes:
The news of her [my mother’s] conversion was a totally unfounded rumor.
I have no idea who made it up. My mother held to her faith to the last.
The faith and firm confidence she had in her God from her earliest
childhood until her 87th year remained steadfast, and were the last things
that stayed alive in her during the final difficult agony. Therefore, I have
the firm belief that she found a very merciful judge and is now my most
faithful helper on my way, so that I, too, may reach my goal.23
Stein holds herself in relationship to and therefore responsible for others, but she allows
each person to find his/her own way to truth.
In her stance toward the life world, Stein likewise realizes a connectedness with
others and an attendant responsibility. In 1917, while Germany was engaging in World
War I, Stein considered her course of action. In a letter to her colleague and friend,
Roman Ingarden, she expresses an early version of this notion of relationship and
responsibility:
Peoples are “persons” who have life, who are born, who grow, and who
pass away. It is a life beyond our own, although it includes ours.
Therefore, one cannot reasonably inquire whether they “should” be great
or small; i.e., whether we ought to do something about it, for we have as
little power within that sphere as cells have in deciding whether the
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organism they constitute should grow or decrease. However, we are not
merely used up as cells are, but we can become aware of our relationship
with the wholes to which we belong . . . and can voluntarily submit to
them. The more lively and powerful such a consciousness becomes in a
people, the more it forms itself into a “state” and this formation is its
organization. The state is a self-confident people that disciplines its
functions.24
Stein would develop these ideas later in her essays on community and the state but the
content of this letter and her early writings indicate her recurring interest with these
themes.
Later, in 1932, while Germany headed toward World War II (after Stein had
become a Catholic but prior to her becoming a Carmelite nun), she again made reference
to this relationship/responsibility dynamic in words of advice to her former student, Sister
Callista Kopf, OP. Stein advocates communication and perseverance in an effort to
understand and help the youth. To Sister Callista, then teaching at College Marianum in
Münster, Stein writes: “[I]t is necessary to keep up contacts. Today’s young generation
has passed through so many crises — it can no longer understand us, but we must make
the effort to understand them; then perhaps we may yet be able to be of some help to
them.”25
While not all people would agree with or emulate Stein’s decisions or actions (nor
should they, if they are leading their own, respective ethical lives), it is the process of

24

Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 9, #7.

25

Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 123, #123.

13
engaging in life that is important and bears study. Stein’s philosophical works, especially
On The Problem of Empathy and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities,
elucidate her concepts of empathy and of the human person. Present day philosophers,
Kathleen Haney26 and Michael Andrews, see a link between Stein’s version of empathy
and an ethic. Haney considers Stein’s work on empathy to be a catalyst for moral action
and she writes: “The essential grasp of human nature, for which empathy provides
experience, suggests further ramifications for ethical theory. Empathy is a means to
knowledge of the human nature; knowledge of the human nature enlivens and encourages
empathy. On such a basis, ethics is possible.”27 Haney’s work supports my thesis that
Stein’s ethic involves relationship and responsibility. However, in this paper, I will stress
the origins of that relationship as coming from faith and reason, not solely from empathy.
Michael Andrews sees a paradox in Stein’s concept of empathy as it “supplies the
condition which gives me the Other while at the same time withholds the Other from
me.” 28 Andrews questions whether “the integrity of the Other”29 is violated in the claim
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to know an Other. This paradox will be considered in Chapter Three when I examine
Stein’s four levels of the psychophysical person.30
Marianne Sawicki31 posits that Stein’s writings are “texts” that help one to “read”
and interpret her. Hebrew literature scholar, Rachel Feldhay Brenner focuses on Stein’s
Life in a Jewish Family as containing her stance against National Socialism. In her work,
Writing as Resistance: Four Women Confronting the Holocaust, Brenner considers the
writings of Stein, Simone Weil, Anne Frank, and Etty Hillesum as deliberate actions
taken against Hitler and the Nazi government.32 Brenner’s exposition of Stein’s act of
resistance supports the claim made in this study that Stein lived an ethical life.
To date, however, there is no study linking Stein’s ethical system based on reason
and faith with the conscious choices she makes in her practical life. This study proposes
to show how Stein’s empathetic understanding of the other helped her to lead and to
promote an ethical life. A key dynamic of Stein’s ethic is the connection between
relationship and responsibility, which will be shown in her lived experience by using her
personal and autobiographical works, specifically, Life in a Jewish Family, Self-Portrait
in Letters, and Essays on Woman. In her classes, letters, lectures, and essays, Stein
encouraged others to lead ethical lives, mindful as a phenomenologist that each person’s
experiences would vary. Her own manner by which she decided upon a course of action
resonated throughout her life. It is this movement toward an ethic (found in her

30

Stein posits that a person can be known and understood on the physical, sentient, and mental
levels, but that the personal level of the psychophysical person is known only to that individual and to God.
31
32

Sawicki, Body, Text, and Science.

Rachel Feldhay Brenner, Writing as Resistance: Four Women Confronting the Holocaust
(University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1997).

15
philosophical works) and its lived reality of relationships and responsibilities (found in
her autobiographical works) that this study delineates.
It is proposed in this analysis that the seemingly insignificant action of comforting
a child in the face of death gives evidence of an ethic by which Edith Stein persistently
and resolutely lived. It is assumed that this action presupposes a system within which a
person acts and evaluates his/her actions (however formally or informally it is
enunciated), and that the process of forming an ethic is dynamic, i.e., it develops with the
growth of the individual as well as with the fluctuations of human life. Edith Stein’s
thoughts regarding a manner of action, based on empathy as found in her philosophical
works, On The Problem of Empathy and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities,
will be linked with the living out of this ethic, by using her autobiographical works, Life
in a Jewish Family and Self-Portrait in Letters; the essay, “How I Came to the Cologne
Carmel”; her 1933 Letter to Pope Pius XI; and Essays on Woman. It will be shown that
Stein personally valued the importance of relationships in her life and realized that her
association with others required an attendant response, thereby giving living expression
to her idea that a person is in relationship and is therefore responsible. This connection
between relationship and responsibility will be explored to ascertain the role that reason
and faith played in the shaping of Stein’s ethic.

PRESENT STATUS OF THE PROBLEM
Primary and Secondary Literature
As a philosopher, Edith Stein used her considerable talents in many ways. Early
in her philosophical career, she heard her professor and mentor, Edmund Husserl, explain
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that “an objective outer world could only be experienced subjectively, i.e., through a
plurality of perceiving individuals who relate in a mutual exchange of information.”33
Noting that Husserl was following Theodor Lipps in calling this experience of others
Einfühlung, she also realized that neither Lipps nor Husserl had fully explained this idea
of empathy.34 It is important to note that in her dissertation Stein uses the German
Einfühlung in the sense of “to put oneself in someone’s position”35 and not in the sense of
the English “empathy” that sometimes contains a stronger connotation of emotion or
“sympathy.”36 While Stein would develop her understanding of empathy and later deem
it impossible to physically take a person’s position, explaining that empathy comes at the
emotive and mental levels of the psychophysical person, she would favor the German
rather than the English definition of empathy. Thus, Einfühlung became the focus of
Stein’s dissertation, later published as Zum Problem der Einfühlung (1917).
After completing her doctoral degree, Stein worked as Edmund Husserl’s
assistant for eighteen months during 1916-1918, transcribing and compiling his notes for
eventual publication. She resigned from this position when she realized that Husserl’s
reworking of earlier projects to the neglect of new tasks frustrated her and hindered her
own philosophical work.37 Her attempts to secure a university teaching position were
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also in vain since few appointments were granted to women professors in Germany in the
early 1920s.38 Subsequently, Stein spent the rest of her life pursuing various
philosophical projects. She commented on works of Dionysius the Areopagite, lectured
on the nature of woman, taught philosophy to individual undergraduates, and translated
works by John Henry Newman and Thomas Aquinas into German. Stein’s work in
phenomenology, empathy, scholasticism, feminism, education, and other areas therefore
provides a rich field for exploration.
Since Stein’s canonization in 1998 and the subsequent translation of her works
from German to English and other languages, a greater population has had access to
Stein’s works. In order to understand better the literature that exists regarding Edith
Stein and her work, it is helpful to consider primary and secondary texts. A brief
overview of the primary texts, which include Stein’s personal, professional, and
philosophical works, followed by a review of major secondary texts, which include
literature about Stein and her philosophical works, will facilitate greater understanding of
Stein and of the resources available.

Stein’s Written Works — An Overview
For the purposes of this study, Stein’s literary legacy can be divided into her
personal, professional, and philosophical works. Stein’s personal works include her
memoirs, Life in a Jewish Family, her letters published posthumously as Self-Portrait in
Letters, an essay explaining her decision to enter the Carmelites (“How I Came to the
38
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Cologne Carmel”), and her letter to Pope Pius XI urging him to speak out against
National Socialism. Stein’s professional works consist of her lectures to women,
published as Essays on Woman. Of her philosophical works, Stein’s dissertation, On the
Problem of Empathy, and her habilitation treatises, “Sentient Causality” and “On
Community,” found in the work, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, will be
considered. While Stein’s theological and hagiographic writings and her translations of
works by John Henry Newman and Thomas of Aquinas are insightful, they are not
germane to the particular topic of Stein and her ethic.

Stein’s Philosophical Works
On The Problem of Empathy
Stein’s doctoral dissertation, On the Problem of Empathy, was her first published
work and in it she considers the possibility of entering into another person’s experiences
from a phenomenological perspective. Stein concludes that it is possible to “empathize,”
i.e., to “sense in” another person even though one does not experience primordially what
the other undergoes. Stein explains: “Empathy in our strictly defined sense as the
experience of foreign consciousness can only be the non-primordial experience which
announces a primordial one.”39
Stein presented her dissertation, “On the Problem of Empathy,” and was awarded
her doctoral degree summa cum laude in 1916, with her work being published in 1917.
The first chapter of Stein’s dissertation, which dealt with an historical presentation of
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empathy, was omitted in publishing and is no longer extant.40 In the remaining three
chapters, Stein considers the essence of acts of empathy, the constitution of the
psychophysical41 individual, and empathy as the understanding of spiritual persons.
In Chapter 3 of her dissertation, Stein delineates the constitution of the
psychophysical individual. Steinian scholar, Mary Catherine Baseheart posits that Stein
was convinced that phenomenology, the study and description of the essence of an object,
is “the most appropriate approach to the investigation of the structure of the human
person.”42 Noting that the philosopher Theodor Lipps had done important work on
empathy, but that he had not treated empathy as a problem of constitution, Stein sets out
to describe how empathy is constituted within the psychophysical individual.43 First,
though, Stein describes the psychophysical individual.
For Stein, the psychophysical person experiences self in two ways: directly and
indirectly. Self-perception is immediate. Stein defines “the Pure I” as the “indescribable,
quality-less subject of experience”44 that perceives itself primordially, i.e., immediately,
all at once. In an indirect way, an “other” helps the psychophysical person to perceive
him/herself, too. Michael Andrews points out that Stein, prefiguring Husserl’s later
student, Emmanuel Levinas, posits the subjective I as recognizing itself as another
individual or group of individuals faces it. Stein explains that the I is “brought into relief
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in contrast with the otherness of the other.”45 Thus, the “other” is needed in order to
know the self. 46
According to Stein, the Pure I does not experience an “other” psychophysical
individual in the same manner in which it perceives its own self. Rather, the “foreign”
psychophysical individual is always “other” than the Pure I and is not experienced
primordially.
In order to delve more deeply into this psychophysical constitution of the person,
Stein must first define the body. To describe body in terms of Körper is risky since
physicality includes outer perception that is limited, at best. The outward, physical body
is both perceiving and perceived, but never completely so. Regarding the physical body
as partial perceiver, Stein cites the example of viewing the moon: a person perceives the
moon as a whole, but never completely “sees” the entire moon since the other side is
always obscured from sight. Similarly, the subject as physical body is only partially
perceived. For example, the subject perceives himself/herself as a whole person while
only seeing parts or sides of his/her physical body.
In describing the body as Körper, Stein uses vocabulary similar to that of Husserl
as she explains the “zero point of orientation.”47 As a zero point of orientation, the
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physical body is a locus for the life world. Husserl begins Ideas II with a description of
how the physical “I” is situated in this surrounding life world. Husserl explains:
I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly
becoming and having endlessly become in time. I am conscious of it: that
signifies, above all, that intuitively I find it immediately, that I experience
it. By my seeing, touching, hearing and so forth, and in the different
modes of sensuous perception, corporeal physical things with some spatial
distribution are simply there for me, “on hand” in the literal or the
figurative sense, whether or not I am particularly heedful of them and
busied with them in my considering, thinking, feeling, or willing.48
Stein’s zero point of orientation is not a geometrically localized position but is at one
with the human body. She explains that “whatever refers to the ‘I’ has no distance from
the zero point, and all that is given at a distance from the zero point is also given at a
distance from the ‘I.’”49
The psychophysical individual is incomplete if only described as Körper, so Stein
adds the notion of Leib, or living body, to her definition of body. Leib refers to the locus
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of bodily sensations and the site of “unified givenness.”50 Thus, for Stein, there is a
“doubled givenness”51 of the physical body, Körper, and the living body, Leib; that is, a
body is perceived physically and also sensed as alive.
Having described the body, Stein continues with her description of the human
person as she introduces the soul. She states that “the soul together with the living body
forms the ‘psycho-physical’ individual.”52 She designates feelings and their attendant
expressions as signs of the connection of the body and the soul. Stein posits that feelings
and their expressions are related, not by physical causality, but by nature and meaning,
and are the result of the will.53 If feelings and their expressions were joined merely by
physical causality, Stein thinks that a person seeing another person blush would have
trouble rightly interpreting the noted coloration of the face. One can readily determine
that a person is blushing by detecting physical characteristics; however, one knows not
whether the blush is caused by anger, shame, or exertion. Thus, not only physical
causality but also meaning helps a person to rightly interpret the situation. Feeling
demands expression,54 according to Stein, and it is this display of feeling that provides
entry into the world of the psychophysical being.
Will is vital to Stein’s constitution of the psychophysical individual, and she
posits that the “whole” of an action, not each step of the action, is willed. Furthermore,
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the psychophysical person’s will is externalized in action. Stein concludes: “The will is
the master of the soul as of the living body.”55 Stein defines the human person, then, as
“a unified object inseparably joining together the conscious unity of an ‘I’ and a physical
body in such a way that each of them takes on a new character. The physical body occurs
as a living body; consciousness occurs as the soul of the unified individual.”56
Having described and defined the psychophysical individual, Stein considers how
human beings (subjects) perceive foreign psychophysical beings, that is, how subjects
perceive other subjects. Reflecting Husserl’s influence, Stein reiterates a basic tenet of
phenomenology: the object — in this case, the “other” subject or the foreign living body
— is given as a whole, while the subject only physically perceives parts of the whole.
[This one given angle or profile implies indirectly those other angles not perceived, so
that the subject perceives a whole through this one angle or profile.] Consciousness helps
to fill out the meaning that is given in partial views. Stein explains: “The averted and
interior sides of a spatial thing are co-given with its seen sides.”57 If the data that come
through a person’s senses help him to perceive a moon, his stream of consciousness
(memory of other moons, mental pictures of moons, knowledge that the moon is
spherical and not a one-sided stage prop, imaginings, etc.) enables the person to know the
object — moon. So, too, consciousness helps the observer of the blushing person to fill
out the missing meaning of the blush, enabling the onlooker to empathize with the
blusher.
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Experience and meaning unfold new horizons; the givenness of one side leads to
new givennesses. Thus, a psychophysical individual can perceive another individual
physically through the other’s expressions, comportment, etc. This physical perception
working in tandem with the Pure I’s own primordial experiences and powers of
consciousness (remembering, imagining, etc.) help the “I” to know “the other.”
The objection can be raised that according to Stein’s theory of empathy, a
subject’s perception of another subject can be flawed and thus the empathic act can be
inaccurate. For example, I can perceive another person coming late into the conference
room. Conscious of the double givenness of that person’s reddening face and my own
past experience of being embarrassed when tardy, I can empathize with that person in her
moment of embarrassment. However, it is possible that my perception of the lateness of
the other subject and the attendant blush are hastily linked with my experience of being
embarrassed when late. It could be that the tardy person is not embarrassed; the
reddening face might simply indicate the exertion of hurrying to the meeting. Stein
allows for this margin of error and posits that meaning clusters, combining physical
expressions and manifestations of will, help us to differentiate properly between
embarrassment and exertion.
Empathy is possible, says Stein, because sensual empathy or a “sensing-in” is part
of the makeup of the physical body and its members. Hence, one can “sense-in” in
another’s hand being caught in a door, for instance, what one would sense in his/her own
hand being caught, i.e., pain, although the empathizer does not primordially experience
the capture of a limb or a physical sensation of pain. Stein posits that this “sensing-in”
goes beyond understanding through analogy, to a real understanding of the other through
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the psychophysical self. Thus, even if an individual has never had the physical
experience of getting a hand caught in a door, that individual can “sense” the experience
of pain. Furthermore, Stein proposes that a person can only empathize with like types,
i.e., other human beings. As a psychophysical human being, a person can only truly
empathize with other human individuals, although a human person can “project” what a
dog, whose paw is caught in a door, is sensing.58
Of special importance in regard to Stein’s notion of empathy and her living of the
ethical life is the flow of knowledge that takes place between self and others. Knowledge
of self augmented by knowledge of others and their values enables a person to see his/her
values more clearly. Actions are perceived sides of these values. Echoing a theme
common in Max Scheler, Stein states:
By empathy with differently composed personal structures we become
clear on what we are not, what we are more or less than others. Thus
together with self-knowledge, we also have an important aid to self
evaluation. Since the experience of value is basic to our own value, at the
same time as values are acquired by empathy, our own unfamiliar values
become visible. When we empathically run into ranges of value closed to
us, we become conscious of our own deficiency or disvalue. Every
comprehension of different persons can become the basis of understanding
of value.59
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While the acquisition of values through empathy will be considered in more detail
in Chapters Three and Four, an example from Stein’s life illustrates this point. Prior to
Stein’s conversion to Catholicism, she and a friend, Pauline Reinach, went sightseeing in
Frankfurt60 and stepped into the Catholic cathedral. Stein had been introduced to fellow
students who professed Christianity and to the Catholic sensibilities expressed by the
phenomenologist, Max Scheler. Within the cathedral she experienced a new
phenomenon that gave her pause:
We stopped in at the cathedral for a few minutes; and, while we looked
around in respectful silence, a woman carrying a market basket came in
and knelt down in one of the pews to pray briefly. This was something
entirely new to me. To the synagogues or to the Protestant churches that I
had visited, one went only for services. But here was someone
interrupting her everyday shopping errands to come into this church,
although no other person was in it, as though she were here for an intimate
conversation. I could never forget that.61
Through her perception of the praying woman, Stein became aware of what she was not.
She realized that the woman had a personal relationship with God, a relationship that
Stein had consciously terminated when she was a young teenager.62 Stein’s own values
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became more visible through her observation of the praying woman and the selfexamination triggered by that perception.
Edith Stein’s dissertation, On Empathy, focuses on an examination of the
constitution of the “I” as a psychophysical individual. An individual, made up of
physical Körper and ensouled Leib, has the ability to perceive other human individuals,
and thus has a better understanding of self in contradistinction to the other. Moreover,
the other can be known to the psychophysical individual through experiences of empathy,
wherein one consciously participates in another’s experience, not primordially, but
through “in-feeling.” More than an analogy or a “putting oneself in that person’s shoes,”
empathy is an intentional act whereby a person allows another person’s experience to
occupy his/her consciousness. When a person is in relationship with another by virtue of
a psychophysical sameness, the experience of the other through empathy serves as a tool
for self-examination as well as for re-valuing.
In her doctoral dissertation, On Empathy, Edith Stein examines the interpersonal
as well as the intrapersonal aspects of empathy. She explains that “the ‘same’
meaningful experience could transpire within several persons, and that it would resonate
across all the phenomenal layers inside each person.”63 Stein admits: “I felt I needed to
sketch the composition of the human personality in broad strokes.”64 In her next
philosophical work, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, she sets out to
explore the role of causality and motivation within the human person in greater depth.
I took no thought of my future although I continued to live with the conviction that I was destined for
something great.” Stein, Life 148.
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Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities
Stein’s Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities was originally written as a
Habilitationsscrift, or a second dissertation, required to gain a teaching position at the
University of Göttingen, but as already noted, Stein’s academic bid was thwarted. Stein
contributed this work to the 1919 Jahrbuch and dedicated it to Husserl for his sixtieth
birthday, but economic factors prohibited the publication of this Festschrift issue until
1922.65 Stein’s second dissertation consisted of two treatises, “Sentient Causality” and
“The Individual and Community.” In these treatises, Stein refers to the “sensuous-mental
essence,” an idea she previously explored in her first dissertation, On the Problem of
Empathy. By this “sensuous-mental essence,” Stein identifies the human individual as
psychophysical, comprised of both Körper and Leib, physical body and ensouled
existence. In the first treatise, she considers the roles of causality and motivation within a
sentient (living, responsive) subject with a sensuous-mental essence and leads to the
second treatise, which investigates the sentient subject’s relation to “super-individual”
realities, i.e., community.66
Noting that the physical world depends on causality for its structure, order, and
predictability, Stein wondered if causality is the impetus for all that happens within the
human person as well. Her background in psychology and philosophy allowed her to
dismiss causality as the solitary and simple explanation of the actions of human beings,
however, and she sought to know the foundation for human actions and their meanings.
She wondered at the interconnection of the phenomenal realms that represented the layers
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of the human being, namely, the physical, sensory, mental, and personal realms.67 How
is it, for instance, that something physical, a bowl of soup, for example, nourishes the
body, but in given circumstances, renews the spirit as well? In her autobiographical
work, Life in a Jewish Family, Stein gives an example of this “sensuous-mental”
connection. Describing her mother, Frau Augusta Stein, Stein writes: “[E]ven on bitterly
cold winter days she would come home with hands so warm that with them she could
take the chill from mine. This always symbolized for me that all life and warmth in our
house came from her.”68 Frau Stein’s warm hands convey physical comfort as well as an
emotional sense of security. Stein explores this interconnection.
Drawing from the works of William Stern, Max Scheler, and Edmund Husserl,
Stein posits that causality and motivation operate together within the sentient subject to
generate both a sensuous and mental essence. By the description, “a sentient subject with
a sensuous-mental essence,” Stein does not refer to “consciousness” but to a broader
notion. She explains: “In this world, alongside material things and living organisms, we
also encounter human beings and beasts who, apart from what they have in common with
things and mere organisms, manifest certain peculiarities that they alone display. The
totality of those peculiarities is what we call sentience . . .”69 Sawicki notes that this
“sensuous-mental essence” is Stein’s attempt to mesh two of the opposing paradigms of
philosophy, empiricism and idealism, into a kind of working agreement.70 David Hume
(1711-1776) and the empiricists base epistemology, or the theory of how a person comes
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to know things, on experience. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) posits idealism as the
foundation of epistemology: a person knows, not exactly how a thing “is” but how it
“appears,” and this knowledge of the world of appearances depends, not on experience,
but on the constructs of the mind.71 Following Husserl, Stein combines the experience of
the real world with the constructs of the mental world, especially consciousness.
Stein’s notion of “a sentient subject with a sensuous-mental essence” also reflects
Max Scheler’s thought that the human being is made up of divisions of “phenomenal
realms”: the physical (matter), the sensory (sentience, the living, responsive body), the
mental (unindividuated mind), and the personal (unique personality).72 For Stein, “the
human body itself is the interface of matter, sentience, and mind,”73 and matter provides
the threshold by which individuals with sentient and mental characteristics communicate
and interact with one another.
Just as the physical world is constituted by causal relationships, Stein proposes
that sentience, or the living, responsive body, is constituted in “regulated coherences of
consciousness.”74 This coherence of consciousness is a “stream of consciousness” that is
made up of experiences that, in turn, are the “stuff” of psychology. The origin of this
stream of consciousness, this “one undivided and indivisible continuum,” lies in
obscurity, says Stein. But experiences stand out amidst the flow because of their
“classifications,” or fields, with objects of experience being able to diminish or intensify
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within classifications, but unable to transverse classifications. Thus, in Stein’s example,
a human person can remember a tone, and that tone may become louder or softer, but the
tone cannot change into a color.75 This stream of consciousness goes beyond the
immediate present moment: it “lives into the future out of the past . . . feels new life
bursting out of itself every moment . . . and . . . carries the whole trail of bygones with
itself.”76 Stein calls this stream of consciousness the “I.”
Stein pushed forward to find “the point within experience at which causality takes
hold.”77 In order to do this, though, she distinguished between the “pure ego” or “pure I”
(that point of radiation of pure experiences) and the “the sentient.” For Stein, the sentient
is “the bearer of its properties, as a transcendent reality that comes to givenness by
manifestation in immanent data but never becomes immanent [as data] itself.”78
Secondly, there is a distinction then between sensate causality and physical causality,
with physical causality permeating “the entire network of material nature,” while sensate
causality touches only the sensory parts of the individual.79
Stein concludes that the sentient is influenced, not merely by sensate causality,
but by motivation as well. Motivation she defines as that which “submits the psyche to
the dominion of reason.”80 Reason propels the individual to communicate and interact
with other individuals, thus providing the possibility of “community.” Stein’s work on
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empathy, the psychophysical person, and motivation will be explored in greater depth in
Chapters Three and Four.

Stein’s Personal Works
Life in a Jewish Family 1891-1916
In 1933, when Hitler became Chancellor of Germany and began promulgating his
plans for the extinction of the Jewish people, Edith Stein felt compelled to describe
Jewish life and culture as she experienced it. Her collection of memoirs, Life in a Jewish
Family, is phenomenological in the sense that in it she attempts “to give, simply, a
straightforward account of my own experience of Jewish life as one testimony to be
placed alongside others . . . It is intended as information for anyone wishing to pursue an
unprejudiced study from original sources.”81 In presenting reminiscences of her mother
and lessons she learned from her, Stein inevitably reveals something of herself; therefore
these memoirs are valuable in tracing her ethical thought and moral growth. Stein began
this work in 1933 after being dismissed from the German Institute for Scientific
Pedagogy because of her Jewish ancestry; the last entry describes the passing of her
doctoral exam in 1916. The chronology of events appended by the translator, Josephine
Koeppel, fills in significant facts of Stein’s life until her death in Auschwitz on August 9,
1942.

Self Portrait in Letters, 1916-1942
The personal correspondence of Edith Stein to friends, family, and colleagues,
found in the posthumously published Self Portrait in Letters, 1916-1942, complements
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Life in a Jewish Family and discloses a side of Stein not revealed in her memoirs nor in
her philosophical works. Collated by the Carmelite Sisters after her death, these letters
point to the importance Stein placed on relationships and on maintaining that sense of
“connectedness” that seems to be her hallmark. The reader can sense the tension between
Stein’s need to remain faithful to her own gifts of grace and vocation while fulfilling her
responsibilities to others, as her own plight and that of the Jewish people became
increasingly clear. The themes of gradual growth, relationship, responsibility,
connectedness to the physical world and “other worldliness” recur consistently in Stein’s
messages.
The letters written by Stein attest to her dedication to family members, friends,
and colleagues and indicate her serious commitment to fostering and sustaining her
relationships. The uncharacteristic pronouncement in her words, “one may not sever the
connection with the world,”82 indicates the gravity and reverence with which Stein
considered her relationships. While Stein’s words, “Come, we are going for our people”
— spoken to her sister while they were being led away by the SS officers — are often
interpreted pejoratively as expressing Stein’s condescending wish to “save” the Jewish
people, Stein’s many written words — especially those found in her letters — reveal her
solidarity with all peoples of the world, not only with those of Jewish descent.83
Essays on Woman
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As a teacher of young women at the Dominican teacher-training school, St.
Magdalena’s in Speyer, and as a lecturer for the German Institute for Scientific Pedagogy
at Münster, Edith Stein addressed women, especially in their educational needs. Stein’s
public addresses to women during the period of 1927-1933 are published in a volume
called, Essays on Woman. In this collection, Essays on Woman, Stein uses the
phenomenological approach to describe the “essence” of woman by reflecting on
woman’s many “sides.” Of particular importance for an investigation of Stein’s ethic are
these essays: “The Ethos of Women’s Professions,” “The Separate Vocations of Man
and Woman According to Nature and Grace,” “Problems of Women’s Education,” and
“The Significance of Women’s Intrinsic Value in National Life.” While these essays
initially address the need for better developed educational programs for women and seem
to follow a traditional Catholic understanding of woman as different from but equal to
man, there is evidence of Stein’s ethic of relationship and responsibility. Furthermore,
Stein seems to be using these particular essays as a vehicle to respond to some of the
Nazi propaganda being spread at the time, especially regarding the role of women in the
household, in society, and in the Vaterland.
One example of the growing opposition women faced as the Nazis came to power
was the presence of women in academic circles. Historian Jacques R. Pauwels, in his
work, Women, Nazis, and Universities, reports that after World War I, women made
measurable advances in academic areas:
In the years after the First World War, women had made impressive
inroads into the area of the academic professions. As of July 11, 1922, for
instance, women were admitted to the practice of law throughout the
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Reich, and the number of female lawyers quintupled between 1925 and
1933. Women flocked to the teaching profession, mainly at the level of
elementary and secondary schools but also at the universities; the first
female university lecturer made her appearance in Munich in 1919, and a
woman earned an appointment as full professor for the first time in 1923.
The number of women physicians mushroomed, rising from 195 in 1907
to 2,572 in 1925 and 4,395 in 1933. Comparable gains were made in
dentistry.84
Initially, Hitler and early National Socialist policies opposed the academic advancement
of women because universities were overcrowded, the unemployment rate among men
was high, and the birth rate in Germany was at an all-time low. Programs and
propaganda promoting church, children, and household chores were aimed at keeping
women in more traditional roles.
Aware of the Nazi glorification of woman as wife and mother, Edith Stein in her
speeches and classes for Catholic women from 1927 to 1933, also stressed marriage and
motherhood — but for different reasons. A Catholic at this time, Stein saw the natural
vocation of woman as “companion,” different from but equal to man. Man and woman,
thought Stein, were given a three-fold vocation by God: to be image of God, to bring
forth posterity, and to be stewards of the earth.85 The fulfillment of this goal would be
brought about by mutual help, respect, and use of one’s natural gifts. In the essay,
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“Problems of Women’s Education,” written in 1932 at Münster, Stein addresses the Nazi
idea of woman and the attempt to strip women of the academic advancements already
made. She writes:
The actual question which concerns us now is what we think about women
in contemporary society. Here as elsewhere we find vacillation or either a
duality or much divisiveness. There is still a multitude of thoughtless
people satisfied with hackneyed expressions concerning the weaker sex or
even the fair sex. . . . They do this without ever reflecting more
profoundly on the nature of the working woman or trying to become
familiar with already existing feminine achievements. . . . Curiously, this
romantic view is connected to that brutal attitude which considers woman
merely from the biological point of view; indeed, this is the attitude which
characterizes the political group now in power. Gains won during the last
decades are being wiped out because of this romanticist ideology, the use
of women to bear babies of Aryan stock, and the present economic
situation. The woman is being confined to housework and to family. In
doing so, the spiritual nature of woman is as little considered as the
principles of her historical development.86
Stein’s Essays on Woman show her ability to join philosophical reflection, theological
belief, and educational expertise with political commentary on the ideology and practices
of her time.
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Translations of and Literature about Stein’s Philosophical Works
Transcripts of Edith Stein’s works, her personal correspondence, and artifacts
have been collected and archived over the years due greatly to the efforts of Sister
Teresia Renata Posselt, OCD; Sister Maria Amata, OCD; Sister Waltraud Herbstrith,
OCD; Dr. Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz; and the Carmelite Sisters of the Cologne
Carmel in Germany. The Archivum Carmelitanum Edith Stein in Belgium once housed
the academic works of Stein that were published under the editorship of Dr. Lucy Gelber;
Romaeus Leuven, OCD; and Michael Linssen, OCD. This collection has been moved to
the Carmelite Carmel in Würzburg, Germany, where, in conjunction with Verlag Herder,
Edith Steins Werke continues to be studied and published. The Institute of Carmelite
Studies in the United States continues to promote the translation of Stein’s writings into
English and publishes these translated works.
Sister Mary Catherine Baseheart, SCN, an American pioneer in Steinian research
and founder of the Edith Stein Center for Study and Research at Spalding University,
Louisville, Kentucky, was one of the first translators of Stein’s works into English.87
Baseheart’s doctoral dissertation analyzed Stein’s attempt to link the phenomenology of
Husserl with the scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas.88
Sister Josephine Koeppel, Susanne Batzdorff, Mary Freda Oben, and Marianne
Sawicki have also contributed to the English translation of Stein’s works from the
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German. Carmelite scholar, Sister Josephine Koeppel, a native of Switzerland and
master of the nuances of the German language (her first language), brings added depth
and understanding to Stein’s writings, especially through her detailed notes. Koeppel’s
translations of Life in a Jewish Family, Self-Portrait in Letters, and The Science of the
Cross have informed much research to date on Stein. Carmelite Fathers Kieran
Kavanaugh,89 John Sullivan, and Steven Payne presently write about, lecture on, publish,
and promote the works of Stein.90 Susanne Batzdorff,91 niece of Stein, has been
especially helpful in preserving the integrity of Stein’s life and work through her
translations, writings, and lectures, as well as through her advice to researchers interested
in the legacy of her aunt. Grandniece, Waltraud Stein, translated Edith Stein’s doctoral
dissertation, On the Problem of Empathy, into English. Freda Mary Oben’s doctoral
dissertation was published in 1979 as the English translation of Stein’s Essays on
Woman.92 In 1982, Augusta Spiegelman Gooch completed a translation of Stein’s work,
Finite and Eternal Being, for her dissertation,93 and Kurt F. Reinhardt’s translation of the
same text was published in 2002.94 Sarah Borden relied on her own translation as she,
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too, wrote her dissertation on Finite and Eternal Being.95 Borden’s book, Edith Stein,96
offers one of the most lucid and comprehensive overviews of Stein’s life and works to
date.
Stein was always attracted by the idea of “truth,” and Chantal Beauvais made this
the focus of her dissertation, “Le Concept Steinien de Verité Transcendantale.”97 Sister
M. Regina van den Berg and June Verbillion have also contributed to the growing store
of literature on Stein, with van der Berg elucidating Stein’s ideas on community98 and
Verbillion analyzing Stein’s theories of education.99 Stein’s work has been included in a
textbook for educators, Ethics of Educational Leadership; her thoughts on the education
of women are found in the chapter, “The Issue of Gender and Educational Leadership.”100
Alonso Alfredo Vargas’ dissertation, “The Application and Validity of the
Phenomenological Method in Several Areas of Reality in the Thought of Edith Stein,”101
clarifies Stein’s thoughts on and adherence to the phenomenological approach to
philosophy. Antonio Calcagno examines the influence that Martin Heidegger and Edith
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Stein had on each other, especially regarding ontological questions;102 Calcagno has also
written on Edith Stein’s political philosophy.103
Steinian scholar Angela Ales Bello has lectured in the United States and Europe
and continues to contribute to Steinian research.104 Bello considers the important role
that empathy plays in Stein’s notion of community, a topic that she thinks came naturally
and was a motif of Stein’s: “In the research interests of young Stein, the concern for the
human world was already apparent in her openness to the comprehension of the other and
her attention to the role of the community, attitudes that she would later consider inherent
to the feminine aspect of the human, even while not referring specifically to herself.”105
While noting the evident influence of Husserl and Scheler, Bello emphasizes the positive
and original contributions Stein made, namely, her regard of the human individual as a
psychophysical being, capable of interaction on a physical plane, but more importantly,
able to converse on a psychic or spiritual plane, as well.
Bello explains how Stein makes the transition from empathy to intersubjective
relationships and then to the larger world-view of solidarity. First, empathy for Stein is a
sui generis act that is unlike any other human action. By this act of empathy, the
psychophysical person is aware of another psychophysical being who is undergoing an
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experience. This initial act of empathy can be the basis for other attendant acts such as
association, sympathy, or analogy, but empathy remains sui generis, of its own kind, and
must remain so, if the empathic person is to maintain his/her individuality. Bello
explains:
When someone I see or meet feels joy or sorrow, I can understand what
the person feels. Certainly, I cannot feel the person’s joy or sorrow; I can,
however, have a lived experience, an Erlebnis, of either emotion. I am
aware that I am not experiencing the emotion personally — and that it is,
therefore, not an “originary” experience — yet what is originary for me is
the feeling that the person is experiencing that emotion.106
Empathy, therefore, allows a psychophysical being to meet another psychophysical being
beyond mere physical boundaries, as a physical, concrete experience serves as the
impetus for a psychic or spiritual meeting. Thus, a person sees a grief-stricken mother
and notes the physical pain etched in her face, hears her sobs, etc., but the onlooker
experiences the woman’s pain on a psychic level through the act of empathy. Empathy
may be triggered by the physical encounter but only begins when the empathizer
consciously acknowledges his/her separateness and “wills” to “understand” the woman’s
grief. Empathy, an act that confirms personal identity and the alterity of the other, is
motivated by the will and results in some concrete action, either positive or negative.
This action, in turn, is perceived and understood by the other, with the possibility of the
founding, or the destruction, of community. For example, the onlooker may be affected
by the mother’s pain and move to console her in an embrace. If the action is perceived
and accepted as genuinely solicitous, then an understanding between the individuals is
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“struck” and the possibility of community is created. Conversely, the onlooker can
perceive the woman’s crying as weakness and remain unmoved physically and
emotionally; the possibility of a mutual understanding, the forging of a communal bond,
is ignored.
Research on Stein as a teacher of young women, a lecturer on the essence of
woman, and a promoter of the advancement of women through more appropriate
educational programs, is growing and adds to the consideration of Stein as a contributor
to feminist studies. Judy Miles, Jane Kelly Rodeheffer, Sister Mary Anselm Madden,
Sister Mary Catherine Baseheart, and Linda L. McAlister have all dealt with Stein’s
analysis of woman and have contributed to women’s studies. Miles’ dissertation,
“Simone de Beauvoir and Edith Stein: A Philosophical Analysis of Feminism,”107
compares both philosophers while contributing to an understanding of Stein’s concept of
the essence of woman. In her lectures to women, Stein stressed the importance of
physical and spiritual motherhood, and Rodeheffer explores this theme in her article, “On
Spiritual Maternity: Edith Stein, Aristotle and the Nature of Woman.”108 Madden
compares Stein’s educational views with Augustinian themes109 and considers Stein’s
inclusion of the importance of divine grace in education as a continuation of Saint
Augustine’s (354-430) approach. Baseheart associates Stein’s early interest in feminism
with her ongoing commitment to the improvement of women’s education in her article,
“Edith Stein’s Philosophy of Woman and of Women’s Education,” published in Linda
107

Judy Miles, “Simone de Beauvoir and Edith Stein: A Philosophical Analysis of Feminism,”
diss., Claremont Graduate U, 1991.
108

Jane Kelley Rodeheffer, “On Spiritual Maternity: Edith Stein, Aristotle and the Nature of
Woman,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1998): 285-303.
109

Mary Anselm Madden, “Edith Stein and the Education of Women: Augustinian Themes,”
diss., St. Louis U, 1962.

43
Lopez McAlister’s Hypatia’s Daughters: Fifteen Hundred Years of Women
Philosophers.110 In her own article, “Edith Stein: Essential Differences,”111 McAlister
encourages feminists to reconsider Stein’s idea that women are equal and different from
men, not as a denial of equality, but an allowance of individual differences.
On the subject of empathy, Edwin E. Gantt’s doctoral dissertation, “Struggling
to Empathize: A Theoretical Reflection on the Meaning of Human Empathy,”112 makes
use of Stein’s dissertation, as does Debra Lynn Pughe’s “The Space Between Us:
Empathy and Understanding.”113 In his master’s thesis, “Versions of Empathy:
Comparing the Intersubjectivities of Edith Stein and Jean-Paul Sartre,”114 Brian Glen
Barnes traces Stein’s and Sartre’s differences on intersubjectivity to their varying
interpretations of Husserl’s idea of the human subject. Barnes proposes that Stein’s
version of empathy forms a greater basis for social associations than does Sartre’s since
Stein allows for the “subject’s” recognition of another person as “subject.” Jean-Paul
Sartre’s “subject” sees the other person only as “object,” and Barnes concludes that this
objectification of the other by Sartre makes social associations impossible. In
juxtaposing Stein and Sartre’s theory of “the other,” Barnes highlights Stein’s connection
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between empathy and the creation of a sense of community, a notion that is germane to a
discussion of Stein’s sense of relationship and responsibility.
Stein’s work on empathy has also been appropriated in areas of the medical field,
such as clinical medicine and physical therapy. In the article, “The Role of Empathy in
Clinical Practice,” S. Kay Toombs applies Stein’s understanding of empathy to clinical
medicine, with the hope that physicians will better appreciate and understand patients’
self-expression of their problems. Toombs posits that there is an important correlation
between empathic understanding and “first-person reports of bodily disorder.”115 Carol
Marjorie Davis also employs Stein’s ideas in a clinical setting within her dissertation, “A
Phenomenological Description of Empathy as it Occurs within Physical Therapists for
their Patients.”116
Michael Andrews, Kathleen Haney, and Mette Lebech have done the most
research to date on Edith Stein’s ethic, and their work is especially helpful in showing the
link between empathy, an understanding of the other, and the ethical relationship
involved. In his dissertation,117 Michael Andrews creates an ethical dialogue between
Husserl’s earlier student, Edith Stein, and his student later in life, Emmanuel Levinas.
Within Stein’s philosophical works, especially her work on empathy, Andrews detects a
modification of Husserl’s epistemology that, he asserts, prefigures Levinas’ notion of
“the other.” Andrews suggests that epistemology and ethics “co-constitute” the
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experience of empathy, but that they also testify to the impossibility of knowing the
“other.” Andrews posits that it is impossible to understand another human being since
another person is beyond the limits of comprehension and deserves the autonomy of
being “self.”118 While the present research project focusing on Stein’s personal living of
the ethical life and her plan for doing so is different from Andrews’ comparison of Stein
and Levinas along epistemological and ethical lines, Andrews’ research is enlightening
and challenging.
Present day Husserlian and Steinian scholar, Kathleen Haney119 emphasizes
Stein’s identification of empathy as “a unique faculty of perceptual intuition” that is sui
generis, i.e., of its own kind, enabling the conscious subject to “read” others via observed
behaviors. It is this empathic attention to another person’s gestures, tone, and silences,
for example, which enables the subject to identify with another individual, who is not
understood as “identical self” but is understood, to varying degrees, nonetheless. Haney
agrees with and reiterates Stein’s claim that empathy is not an understanding of another
based on analogy since this would strip the other of personhood and would render
empathy as an exercise in self-projection. Haney writes: “I may know myself, but to
presume an other like me is to beg the question of knowing the other, since the other
person imagined in this fashion is not really other but merely subject to the same
motivations and interpretations as I am.”120
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In addition to being sui generis, empathy is different from and performs a
different function than the traditional five senses. Empathy holds out the possibility of
understanding the other by way of a bond, a relationship. Haney describes how empathy
can form this human bond: “Empathy does not reveal the brute otherness of the other;
rather, it overcomes the separation between subjects.”121 Moreover, when empathy is
met with a reciprocal empathic response, Haney posits that there is a “mutual overlap of
meanings.” She writes: “The members of the pair find themselves overtaken by a shared
world in which they can dwell in the space of things against the mutual horizon extending
now to the others of the other and their spaces and meanings.”122 Believing this empathic
understanding that opens up new horizons of meaning is the basis of ethical life, Haney
concludes: “Empathic experience, and the rational sympathy derived from it, represent
ethical value and moral responsibility since we are each one among others in the world
we share with others.”123
In her work involving human dignity, Mette Lebech124 agrees with Stein’s
acceptance of Scheler’s emotive a priorism in which he posits that a human being feels
values before he cognizes them. Lebech suggests that Stein’s concept of empathy,
whereby a person can “feel with” and understand another person’s experience, supports
the recognition of a dignity that is uniquely human in self and others. The question of
whether values are preferred or constituted is not answered by Lebech but she contends
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that the “value of human dignity stand[s] out as among the highest of the values, or as the
highest”125 because it fulfills and even exceeds Scheler’s five criteria which comprise the
hierarchy of values: durability, divisibility, foundation, depth of satisfaction, and
relativity.126 Lebech’s work supports my search for Stein’s ethic; however, Lebech views
an ethic founded on human dignity while I posit that Stein’s ethic is founded on a human
being’s sharing of pure essence, or soul. In Chapter Three I will propose that Stein’s
ethic, founded on this sharing of pure essence or soul, binds a person’s psychophysical
being together and also binds that person inextricably to God, the source of pure essence,
and to other persons who are sharers in this essence.
In her published doctoral dissertation, Body, Text and Science: The Literacy of
Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein, Marianne Sawicki
contributes to an understanding of Edith Stein’s philosophy in a three-fold way. First,
Sawicki gives a detailed, historical description of the advent of phenomenology from
Munich to Göttingen, from Husserl to Stein. Secondly, she delineates Stein’s writings,
especially her dissertation On the Problem of Empathy, in the light of the
phenomenological movement and with a strict eye to what Stein gleans from other
philosophers, and what she contributes, usually anonymously, to the common fund. Stein
is indebted, for instance, to Husserl and Scheler, but Stein, who worked as Husserl’s
assistant in collating his works, receives credit only rarely. Finally, Sawicki contributes
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to Steinian research by her hermeneutical explanation of Stein as author in three distinct
but related periods of her life.
Sawicki classifies Stein’s written works as anonymous, autographed, and
autobiographical. Among Stein’s anonymous works are her editorial efforts for Husserl,
Reinach, and others. Stein’s autographed works are personally signed and include her
philosophical and theological writings. Stein’s autobiographical works reveal her
identity via “types” and include her Life, Letters, and Essays.127 Sawicki explains Stein’s
use of empathy in her writings: “The authoring i, laying out a path of thinking, offers
itself as the guide for readers to follow — even the vehicle for readers to ride —along
that path.”128 Noting, too, that “Stein elicits affection and an uncanny sense of rapport”
with casual readers and serious researchers alike, Sawicki cautions that this “infectious
rapport” is created through Stein’s intentional use of “type” (the sharing of social
stereotypes between author and readers, thereby portraying herself as the “right kind” of
German, Jew, educated woman, etc. to the reader).129 Sawicki posits that this rapport can
lead the reader into two misguided assumptions: 1) that to know Stein’s life is to know
her philosophy, and 2) that Stein’s philosophy is “authoritative and beyond question.”130
Regarding Stein’s autobiographical works, Sawicki further explains how Stein
acts as a “guiding author,” bringing readers of her Life, Letters, and Essays into her
empathic “flow” and leading them through expositions to conclusions. Sawicki writes:
“She is not writing about herself, but she is exhibiting the flow of her own thinking. She
127
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offers her own reasoning as a map for the coherent flow of thought. The authorial i
blazes the trail, and the reading i follows. The reader is thus afforded a live experience of
reaching the conclusions that the author has first reached.”131
Sawicki, in arranging Stein’s literary work, indicates a direction for future
research: “[M]y [Sawicki’s] intention is to argue that this way of arranging Stein’s
literary works will enable a very fruitful scholarly appreciation of her contributions to
philosophy and to theology. It is beyond the scope of my study, however, actually to
carry out that interpretive work here. I merely suggest a beginning.”132 Cognizant of
Sawicki’s reading of Stein, then, and mindful of the pitfalls of Stein’s “infectious
rapport” that can handcuff researchers to autobiography and can blind them to Stein’s
errors, I use the autobiographical writings as a tool in deciphering Stein’s manner of
living the ethical life. My intent is to follow the “blazing, authorial Stein,”133 not so as to
imitate her actions, but rather to ascertain how she achieved a coherence of her thoughts
and beliefs with her actions.

SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY
This dissertation, “Edith Stein: Toward an Ethic of Relationship and
Responsibility,” is a qualitative study that combines a phenomenological, a biographical,
and a hermeneutical approach. These collective approaches help in ascertaining the
essence of Stein’s ethical method and the application of that method in her lived
experience.
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A phenomenological approach seeks the essence of a phenomenon by “relying on
intuition, imagination, and universal structures to obtain a picture of the experience.”134
The phenomenon that initiated this study is that of Stein comforting a child in the
concentration camp, an action that seemingly indicates an essential structure — Stein’s
ethical stance in the life world. Hence, the central question of this study is: What was
Stein’s manner of living ethically?
Asking “how” Stein lived an ethical life leads to a search for a “structure” or an
“ethic,” a coherent plan by which Stein navigated life. Attention to Stein’s philosophical
works, specifically On the Problem of Empathy and Philosophy of Psychology and the
Humanities, facilitates the search for the “essence” of Stein’s ethical structure. The
analysis of Stein’s concepts of empathy and the human person will necessarily include a
study of the influence of Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, who contributed
significantly to Stein’s own use of the phenomenological method (Husserl) and her
analysis of the human person (Scheler).
This study is biographical in that the search for the essence of Stein’s manner of
living an ethical life involves information gleaned from her personal writings. In a
biographical study, life documents are used to “describe turning points in an individual’s
life.”135 In this study, Stein’s memoirs, letters, and her account of her entrance into
Carmel are used to show how she herself perceived certain phenomena in her life.
Biographical episodes help in describing the essence of Stein’s ethic and in distinguishing

134

John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions
(London, Sage P, 1998) 52.
135

Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design 48.

51
key components of her phenomenological method to action, namely, consciousness of a
relationship with “the other” psychophysical individual and an attendant responsibility.
As phenomenological and biographical approaches necessarily lead to some
interpretation on the part of the researcher, this study also incorporates a hermeneutical
approach. This hermeneutical approach implements a straightforward presentation of
persons, places, and things mentioned in Stein’s autobiographical writings that gives
evidence of her development of an ethic. While the focus on certain selections from
Stein’s autobiographical works is subjective and reflects my interaction as a reader with
the “authorial” Stein, every effort is made to let the experiences of Stein’s life “speak for
themselves” as she reveals them through her own words.
Thus, Stein’s On The Problem of Empathy, Philosophy of Psychology and the
Humanities, Life in a Jewish Family, Self-Portrait in Letters, and Essays On Woman will
provide the groundwork for this phenomenological, biographical, and hermeneutical
study. Information gleaned from Claudia Koonz’s Mothers in the Fatherland: Women,
the Family and Nazi Politics136 will shed some perspective on Stein’s comments to
women. Stein’s comments and actions support the theory that Stein addressed problems
of the contemporary world, thereby giving evidence of living an ethical life in the
twentieth century.
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LIMITATIONS FOUND IN THE STUDY
Two problems present themselves in this study: the definition of the term
“ethic” and the reliance on autobiographical sources. First, “ethic” is defined through
Stein’s own writings, as a matching of internal thoughts, intentions, and beliefs with
external actions. This “matching” presumes self-examination, self-knowledge, and effort
because, according to Stein, human nature left to its own devices can become unruly or
remain untapped. Stein proposes that the most effective unfolding of the person’s natural
gifts takes place when nature is blended with divine grace. In her brief biography of the
life of Saint Elizabeth of the Trinity,137 Stein explains this unfolding and blending of
nature and grace:
Those who avow an “unspoiled human nature” assume that people possess
a molding power operating from the inside undisturbed by the push and
pull of external influence, shaping people and their lives into harmonious,
fully formed creatures. But experience does not substantiate this lovely
belief. The form is indeed hidden within, but trapped in many webs that
prevent its pure realization. People who abandon themselves to their
nature soon find themselves driven to and fro by it and do not arrive at a
clear formation or organization. And formlessness is not naturalness.
137
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Now people who take control of their own nature, curtailing rampant
impulses, and seeking to give them the form that appears good to them,
perhaps a ready made form from outside, can possibly now and again give
the inner form room to develop freely. But it can also happen that they do
violence to the inner form and that, instead of nature freely unfolded, the
unnatural and artificial appears. . . . [T]his inner shaping power that is in
bondage strains toward a light that will guide more surely, and a power
that will free it and give it space. This is the light and power of divine
grace.138
While this definition of ethic as a matching of internal thought, intention, and
belief with external action may seem vague, it reflects the recurring influence of Thomas
Aquinas and Max Scheler in Stein’s writings. Aquinas posits that the soul is the life
force or formative power of the body.139 Reminiscent of Aquinas, Stein proposes “an
inner shaping power”140 in the psychophysical person. Scheler’s theory of hierarchical
values incorporates a striving among human beings for unity and fulfillment seen in a
progression from lesser to higher values. Scheler expresses this idea in Formalism in
Ethics when he writes:
We expect an ethics first of all to furnish us with an explicit determination
of “higher” and “lower” in the order of values, a determination that is
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itself based on the contents of the essences of values — insofar as this
order is understood to be independent of all possible positive systems of
goods and purposes.141
As will be shown in the following chapter, Stein had concrete experience of what Scheler
calls “bearers of value”142 or persons who exemplify the hierarchy of values.
Kurt Reinhardt, a translator of Stein’s Finite and Eternal Being, agrees with this
definition of ethics. In the Preface to his work, A Realistic Philosophy, Reinhardt
stresses the need to synthesize theory and practice as he states:
The philosopher as we envisage him [in these pages] must be able to
demonstrate that philosophy is a theoretical science (theoria) which is
rewarding in a dual sense: it is a pursuit of knowledge and wisdom as
ends in themselves; and it is simultaneously a theoria which is pregnant
with practical consequences of vital concern to each and all. Any
philosophical response contains implicitly certain directions for specific
courses of individual and social behavior, and impulses affecting the
future course of human civilization.143
Thus, while not corresponding to traditional definitions, describing an “ethic” as a
matching of inner thoughts, intentions, and beliefs with external actions rings true to
Stein’s understanding of ethic.
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This definition of a matching of internal thoughts and beliefs also presumes a
movement directed by the search for truth.144 A person is capable of having bad thoughts
and trying to match his thoughts with harmful actions. The definition of truth in this
study will rely on the search for truth calling forth good thoughts and subsequently good
actions. While it is recognized that bad thoughts engender bad actions, the definition as it
is used in this study, moves towards truth.
In essence this study asks: How did Stein’s thought and beliefs inform her
actions? Since Stein never formally published an ethical system as did Kant and Hegel, it
was clear to me that the appropriate question to ask was: “How did Stein live the ethical
life?” The project is limited, therefore, to a study of Stein’s life and the manner in which
she lived. Her background as a philosopher and a religious informed her living of the
ethical life, and this focus leads to the second limitation in method: a reliance on
autobiographical sources.
This biographical study uses Stein’s autobiographical works as resources for
ascertaining her manner of living. As a phenomenological study, it seeks the essence of
Stein’s ethical life by describing her self-reflective life, and as a hermeneutical study, it
relies on a subjective interpretation of information. The study is thus limited in that it is
doubly subjective: it relies on Stein’s words about herself, which may be skewed, as well
as on my choice of particular episodes in Stein’s life to the exclusion of others.
Regarding the first subjective limitation, Stein’s words about herself, Marianne
Sawicki posits that Stein’s autobiographical works deliberately draw the reader in by her
use of “type”:
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I [Sawicki] suggest that rapport with Edith Stein is engineered through the
skillful use of “type” as a hermeneutic device. Type is the means of
production of rapport . . . . Stein’s autobiography — as a self-conscious
work of self defense against the racist policies of National Socialism —
deliberately constructed her “self” as a cultured middle-class German Jew,
adamantly portraying “the right kind of Jews” to be “the right kind of
Germans.” Stein derived the notion of “type” from Dilthey, and in her
dissertation she accorded to it a key function in human communication.
Like Dilthey, she believed that the individual “genius” served as the
paradigm of his age and revealed its identity. She also believed that
understanding and learning could occur only between persons of “the
same type.” “Type” is a pernicious notion when it usurps the category of
humanity and demotes people of “other types” to subhuman status.145
I do not find Stein demeaning people in this way. Rather, Stein uses types, as do other
writers, in a more general way, in order to draw distinctions. Types can be used in a
beneficial way, and it is in this manner that I think Stein employs them. For instance, her
work on the differences between man and woman “types” woman as geared toward the
living and the personal while man is “typed” as preferring the abstract and impersonal.146
While these seem narrow boxes within which to place man and woman, Stein
characterizes in order to distinguish assets and needs. In a lecture given to the
Association of Catholic Academics in 1930, Stein questions the topic about which she is
145
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asked to speak: “The Ethos of Woman’s Professions.” Stein queries: “What need was
there for a special category of women’s professions? Besides, why are there such
frequent discussions on women’s professions but hardly any on men’s professions?”147
Stein ends her lecture by promoting a synthesis of qualities. She states:
I believe that it would be very worthwhile if at some time these questions
would be considered seriously and thoroughly. For a wholesome
collaboration of the sexes in the professional life will be possible only if
both achieve a calm and objective awareness of their nature and draw
practical conclusions from it. God created humanity as man and woman,
and He created both according to His own image. Only the purely
developed masculine and feminine nature can yield the highest attainable
likeness to God. Only in this fashion can there be brought about the
strongest interpenetration of all earthly and divine life.148
In Chapter Three we will see how Stein’s understanding of creation contributes to this
vision of men and women as companions who learn from one another. Sawicki’s strict
understanding of “types” neglects, I think, Stein’s confidence in every human being’s
ability to contribute to a cosmic community wherein people, sharing their gifts, contribute
to a redeemed order.
Stein also attests to the ability of humans to move beyond types. In the previously
mentioned essay, “The Ethos of Women’s Professions,” Stein states: “Only subjective
delusion could deny that women are capable of practicing vocations other than that of

147

Stein, “The Ethos of Women’s Professions” in Essays On Woman, 57.

148

Stein, “The Ethos of Women’s Professions” in Essays On Woman, 57.

58
spouse and mother. The experience of the last decades [1910-1920, specifically] and, for
that matter, the experience of all times has demonstrated this.”149 Philosopher Janet E.
Smith agrees with Stein’s positive use of typing. Smith cites Stein’s insistence, while at
the Pedagogical Institute in Münster that educational instruction needed to be better
suited to woman’s unique nature: Stein used “type” to design this alternate curriculum.
Smith explains:
Many who pick up Stein’s writings on women may be initially shocked by
her generalizations about males and females. Our age doesn’t much like
generalizations for it generally thinks that generalizations are unjust! We
don’t like racial or ethnic or sexual “profiling.” Yet an antipathy to
generalizations also jeopardizes our ability to use our critical faculties. It
is difficult to make the distinctions we need to make about reality, it is
impossible to identify the unique and unusual, unless we have the typical
and usual against which to make our comparisons or judgments. We
should reject stereotypes if by that we mean we are so fixated on
generalizations that we don’t allow for individuals who do not fit the
stereotype.150
In this work, I will allow for a liberal interpretation of Stein’s use of types.
Furthermore, I reject Sawicki’s judgment that Stein used her writing to
manipulate her audience. I admit, with Sawicki, that Stein is a “persuasively guiding
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author,”151 and I will reiterate this point when considering Stein’s letter to Pope Pius XI
urging action against the Nazis. But I propose that Stein used the power of authorship to
persuade rather than to manipulate. The intention of Stein’s authorship is positive, not
negative or deceitful. When Stein “types” people, I believe that she reflects the unfolding
and maturation of her own person, influenced by human nature, culture, and education.
Stein’s niece, Susanne Batzdorff, agrees that Stein’s work shows traces of prejudice:
Edith’s frequent references to the non-Jewish appearance of various
persons shows that that was a definite advantage and something
thoroughly desirable. Aside from that, it unfortunately also shows that
while herself a Jew, she had taken on the prejudices of the population at
large to a certain degree. She herself emphasized proudly: “By the way,
this (the fact that I was Jewish) used to astound people since no one took
me to be Jewish.”152
Mindful of the pitfalls mentioned by Sawicki and the prejudices pointed out by
Batzdorff, I suggest that Stein, had she lived, would have edited Life in a Jewish Family
to reflect her own growth and change. I base this conjecture on the words of Stein
herself, who mentions times when she consciously changed, as in this passage from her
memoirs:
We [Hans Biberstein and Edith Stein] never again had a falling-out such
as we sometimes had during our student years. This was because I had
completely changed my attitude towards others as well as toward myself.
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Being right and getting the better of my opponent under any circumstances
were no longer essentials for me. Also, although I still had a keen eye for
the human weaknesses of others, I no longer made it an instrument for
striking them at their most vulnerable point, but rather, for protecting
them.153
A conversion to a higher value that more closely matched her internal formative power
would be in keeping with Stein’s living of the ethical life — an active response to a
greater truth.
While this project defines “ethic” in a new way, and although it relies on
autobiographical resources, subject to differing interpretations, it does advance the study
of Stein’s ethical stance toward the life world.

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS
An overview of the following chapters gives the reader a concise plan for
considering the manner in which Edith Stein lived the ethical life.
The second chapter, “Influences on Stein’s Stance,” emphasizes the fact that the
philosophies, teachings, and actions of other persons impacted Stein’s philosophy and
ethic. Specifically, studying under philosophers Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, and
delving into the philosophical works of Thomas Aquinas broadened Stein’s background
and informed her philosophical stance. The search for clarity and truth present in Stein’s
friends and colleagues, Anna and Adolf Reinach, and also the faith-in-action approach of
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the sixteenth century mystic, Saint Teresa of Avila, are likewise considered significant
influences on Stein’s ethic.
Chapter Three, “From Phenomenological Method to Action,” focuses on how
Stein uses phenomenology and faith to weave an ethical approach to life. Stein’s
consistent search for truth is the foundation of her ethical stance. The description of
influences on Stein’s philosophy and of events in her life (Chapter Two) helps to
elucidate key elements of her ethic. Stein’s ethic is characterized by a constant search for
truth as well as by four intertwining movements: 1) a perceiving of the phenomenon of
truth; 2) an honoring of relationships; 3) a responsibility to unfold one’s ontic blueprint;
and 4) openness to new horizons.
Stein’s blending of phenomenology and faith enrich her ethical life as is seen in
Chapter Four, “Evidence of a Steinian Stance.” Within this chapter, events in Stein’s life
during 1933, which she herself registers as significant, are recounted. Stein’s writing to
Pope Pius XI urging him to speak out against National Socialism, her decision to enter
the Carmelite Order, and her writing of an account of Jewish life are all incidents that
contribute to an understanding of the way Stein lived her life and provide proof of her
ethical stance to the world.
Finally, Chapter Five, “The Problem and Promise of a Steinian Ethic,”
reconsiders the influences, essences, and evidence of Stein’s ethic. This work concludes
with a word about the promise of new horizons in Steinian research. Edith Stein’s
manner of living the ethical life holds out the promise that truth is available and
recognizable to a person continuously willing to examine his/her life.
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CONCLUSION
This investigation of Stein’s philosophical and autobiographical works links her
empathy-based ethic with her conscious attention to the life world, thus moving her
toward an ethic of relationship and responsibility. This dissertation therefore contributes
to the ongoing research on Edith Stein in particular, and to the study of philosophy and
the humanities in general.
First, this dissertation provides a bridge between existing studies on Stein that
focus on her ethic and studies based on her literary legacy. Existing research by Haney
and Andrews examines Stein’s work for contributions to an ethical discourse; Sawicki
searches Stein’s writings and concludes that Stein’s use of personality “types” is a
literary device for influencing the reader. However, research to date has not explored the
lived reality of Stein’s ethic, an ethic that seemingly developed and strengthened as her
studies in philosophy progressed and as she professed a life of faith. Stein has been
correctly described as a “student of Husserl” and a “translator of Thomas Aquinas”;
nevertheless, her concepts of empathy and the human person, as well as her resilience in
living the ethical life, merit Stein a place of her own. This investigation into the
“essence” of Stein’s ethic and the evidence of that ethic, found in her personal,
professional, and philosophical works, adds to the growing body of research on Stein and
places her firmly within the phenomenological tradition.
Secondly, the circumstances of Stein’s life, a study of her ethic, and her living of
the ethical life necessarily force a reconsideration of traditional philosophical themes,
such as the distinctions between theology and philosophy, reason and faith, and universal
and relativistic norms. Studies to date have delineated Stein’s philosophy in terms of her
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concepts of person, woman, education, phenomenology, and scholasticism; biographic
and hagiographic researchers have effectively set forth the events of Stein’s life and
death. However, there seems to be buried within Stein’s philosophical and literary legacy
her own personal attempt to answer the thorny questions regarding how to live. It is
precisely Stein’s personal struggle to be true to what was revealed by faith and to honor
what was gained by reason that makes her philosophy and her life so compelling. Stein
offers no answers by way of structured “systems” defining what “ought” to be done or
how one is to act, but her personal attention to her relationships with God, self, and
others, as well as her lived response (responsibility) to those relationships, allows her to
live with this tension between faith and reason. Stein’s life personifies that “love of
wisdom” that perseveres in the search for truth. This dissertation will enrich the field of
philosophy by offering the ethic and life of a twentieth-century philosopher who resolved
the age-old tension between faith and reason by embracing and living the reality of that
struggle in her own life.
Finally, this dissertation will contribute to the humanities because it focuses on
the philosophical thinking and life of a philosopher who was acutely aware of
humankind’s interrelatedness. Stein studied, taught, and revered the richness of the
humanities, that branch of science which investigates the nature of humankind and
studies humankind’s varied effect on the world. Stein’s training in the liberal arts
(philosophy, theology, literature, psychology) and her appreciation of the fine arts
(music, art, dance, drama) positioned her to promote the humanities from the certainty of
her own lived experience. She did this by stressing the existential yet transcendental
qualities of human life, thus presenting a cohesive yet other-worldly synthesis.
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This dissertation examines the process of Stein’s attempt to live ethically, that is,
to live in concert with her reason and with her faith. By delineating Stein’s
phenomenological method to action, it is hoped that this study will contribute, not to “the
problem of Edith Stein,” but to the recognition of the infinite possibilities Stein offers as
a philosopher, practitioner, and promoter of the ethical life.
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CHAPTER TWO
INFLUENCES ON STEIN’S STANCE

ETHICS AS STANCE
In this chapter, the major influences on Stein’s theory (Husserl and Scheler) and
the influences on her ethical practice (the Reinachs and Teresa of Avila) will be
considered. An examination of Stein’s writings shows Husserl, Scheler, the Reinachs,
and Teresa of Avila to be significant influences on Stein’s ethical life.

In his work,

Cartesian Meditations, Edmund Husserl writes: “Philosophy — wisdom (sagesse) — is
the philosopher’s quite personal affair. It must arise as his wisdom, as his self-acquired
knowledge tending toward universality, a knowledge for which he can answer from the
beginning, and at each step, by virtue of his own absolute insights.”1 While this work
was not published until 1931, years after Edith Stein had listened to Husserl’s lectures as
a student at Göttingen, an author-signed copy among Stein’s books2 suggests the fact that
she might have been familiar with this recurring Husserlian stance: wisdom is a selfacquired as well as an intuited personal affair which moves toward the universal. While
the concept of the philosopher’s wisdom as self-acquired knowledge and also as a
product of absolute insights seems contradictory, Stein found in Husserl’s rigorous
1
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method a process for pursuing truth. It was this Husserlian spirit of self-sufficiency and
relentless radical pursuit of truth that fueled Stein’s imagination and prompted her to
write in 1914: “[W]hat I had learned about phenomenology, so far, fascinated me
tremendously because it consisted precisely of such a labor of clarification and because,
here, one forged one’s own mental tools for the task at hand.”3
Stein eagerly used Husserl’s phenomenological method as her preferred way of
philosophizing. Her philosophical works are replete with examples of the
phenomenological method as will be shown throughout this work. However, Stein also
effectively used the phenomenological method in the more immediate tasks of daily life.
While seeking the truth or essence of things by relying on her own subjective experiences
and attention to consciousness, she also respected the experiences of others in their search
for truth. Stein consistently integrated the example of others (especially the example of
her mother, Frau Augusta Stein), her own insights, and what she had learned from her
scholarly pursuits. In fact, Stein’s autobiographical works show that she studied and was
influenced by the works of Spinoza and Kant as well as Husserl.
Stein studied Spinoza’s ethic early in her university days. She writes: “I had
just finished my first semester [at the University of Breslau] and had brought along
Spinoza’s Ethic to read during that vacation. I was never found without the small book.”4
The rationalist philosopher, Baruch Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677), had tried to devise an
ethic that balanced the rigor of the sciences with the freedom inherent in human nature.
As a rationalist, Spinoza saw the human mind as participating in the infinite intellect and
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unity of God. As a humanist, Spinoza stressed that happiness is intertwined with the
individual’s ability to choose freely to act in accordance with reason. Rather than
suggesting a formal set of rules by which to act, Spinoza relied on a person’s ability to
know him/herself and to decide on a course of moral action which matched the person’s
true advantage. Spinoza posits that the person who seeks after what is truly
advantageous, knows and understands personal freedom. The person who seeks to
preserve himself by means of external forces and goods is not free, according to
Spinoza’s “ethical egoism,” but is bound by his passions. Spinoza’s consideration of the
human person’s needs, his emphasis on freedom, and his stress on the person’s ability to
choose his/her own path appealed to Stein.
Stein also read the works of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and referred to Kant’s
idealistic schema as his “conceptual thinking apparatus.”5 Stein studied Kant’s ethic
during a natural philosophy course with Professor Richard Hönigswald at the University
of Breslau, and also in classes and during “at home” discussions conducted by Professor
Edmund Husserl in Göttingen.
While Stein fleetingly mentions Kant in her works, she was aware of his attempt
to broach the ever-growing rift between idealism and the empiricism of the British
philosophers. In his moral schema, Kant considered all human beings to possess the
same innate ability to “will the good.” According to Kant, this good will, good in and of
itself, enables the human being to recognize the need to act out of a sense of duty rather
than from a desired outcome. Thus Kant posits his famous categorical imperative: “I
ought never to act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a
5
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universal law.”6 Put negatively, Kant’s categorical imperative advises against personally
choosing an action that should not be done, in similar circumstances, by all. A person
should lie, for example, only if he is willing to allow all other persons to lie. Kant
believed that this categorical law is synthetic a priori — that is, the law is universal and
necessary, but it starts with experience. Any human being, free of self-seeking and fear,
would arrive at the same imperative by use of his/her innate good will.
Stein, like Kant, sought to honor the ideal of truth and to recognize the reality of
the life world. She is critical of herself and those persons who embrace the idea of the
good without making it manifest in the concrete Lebenswelt (life world). In her
autobiography, Stein tells of her disillusionment with idealism as well as with her own
behavior. When she was leaving the University of Breslau for phenomenological studies
at the University of Göttingen, a peer said to her: “Well, I wish you the good fortune of
finding in Göttingen people who will satisfy your taste. Here you seem to have become
far too critical.”7 Stein’s response gives insight into her evolving ethical schema and to
the role that others can play in the examined life:
The words stunned me. I was no longer accustomed to any form of
censure. At home hardly anyone dared to criticize me; my friends showed
me only affection and admiration. So I had been living in the naïve
conviction that I was perfect. This is frequently the case with persons
without any faith who live in exalted ethical idealism. Because one is
enthused about what is good, one believes oneself to be good. I had
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always considered it my privilege to make remarks about everything I
found negative, inexorably pointing out other persons’ weaknesses,
mistakes or faults of which I became aware, often using a ridiculing or
sarcastic tone of voice. There were persons who found me “enchantingly
malicious.” So these words of farewell from a man whom I esteemed and
loved caused me acute distress. I was not angry with him for saying them.
Nor did I shrug them off as an undeserved reproach. They were for me a
first alert to which I gave much reflection.8
Stein was so engrossed in her idea of good that she neglected to examine her practice of
the good. In Chapter Three, Stein’s manner of addressing this dilemma through a
synthesis of the ideal of truth and the reality of the life world will be examined.
While Stein knew and appreciated the ethical works of Spinoza and Kant, the
persons who most influenced her ethic were not ethicists but phenomenologists. The
phenomenologists Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Max Scheler (1874-1928) provided
the major theoretical influences on Stein’s ethic whereas Adolf Reinach (1883-1917),
Anna Reinach, and Saint Teresa of Avila (1515-1582) contributed significantly to Stein’s
practice of the ethical life. Phenomenology and faith provided the structure by which
Stein meshed the theoretical pursuit of truth with an active and reasoned participation in
her life world.
A brief survey of how Stein came into contact with these five most influential
persons will facilitate an understanding of their respective importance. First, the
influence of Husserl and his phenomenology will be considered, with an emphasis on the
essentials of his phenomenological method. Next, Scheler’s influence and his application
8
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of the phenomenological method to the area of ethics will be explored. Finally, the
Reinachs’ and Teresa of Avila’s valuations of truth within their respective life worlds
will be considered. To etch her phenomenological ethic, Stein used theoretical tools
provided by Husserl and Scheler as well as practical tools supplied by the Reinachs and
Teresa of Avila.

EDMUND HUSSERL’S INFLUENCE
Stein first met the “Father of Phenomenology,” Edmund Husserl, when her friend,
Dr. Georg Moskiewicz, handed her the second volume of Husserl’s Logical
Investigations, saying: “Leave all that stuff aside and just read this; after all, it’s where
all the others got their ideas.”9 Stein read the text while on Christmas vacation in 1912,
and impressed by Husserl’s phenomenological method, she quickly made plans to attend
summer courses at the University of Göttingen, where Husserl was teaching. By the fall
semester, Stein had left her study of psychology at the University of Breslau and had
become a matriculating student of philosophy at Göttingen. Stein completed her
dissertation (Zum Problem der Einfuhlüng, 1916) under Husserl’s direction and
continued to work as his assistant for eighteen months.
Throughout her life, Stein always acknowledged the influence of “the Master.”
When her dissertation, On the Problem of Empathy, was published in 1917, Stein wrote
in the Foreword: “Of course, the statement of the problem [empathy] and my method of
work have grown entirely out of intellectual stimuli received from Professor Husserl so
that in any case what I may claim as my ‘spiritual property’ in the following expositions
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is most questionable.”10 In Finite and Eternal Being (1936), Stein uses words of Husserl,
(who always refers to himself as a beginner,) to describe herself, again showing his
influence. In the Preface of this work, Stein refers to herself in the third person, and
while she implies other philosophical influences, she explicitly mentions her first teacher
in phenomenology:
This book was written by a beginner for beginners. At an age when others
may confidently call themselves teachers the author was compelled to start
all over again. She had been intellectually formed in the school of
Edmund Husserl and had been using the phenomenological method in
several philosophic treatises published in Husserl’s Jahrbuch.11
But Stein’s words signal a move away from phenomenology toward a greater
understanding of and appreciation for scholasticism. For several years after converting to
Catholicism in 1922, Stein was engrossed in training teachers and put aside her
philosophical pursuits. Her translation of Thomas Aquinas’ Questiones diputatae de
veritate (1932) enabled her to learn more about her new faith as well as to resume
philosophical work. When explaining her attraction to Thomistic philosophy, she credits
the influence of Husserl on her thinking, again using a third person reference to herself:
St. Thomas found a reverent and willing pupil. Her mind, however, was
no longer a tabula rasa: It [had] already received the firm impress of her
philosophical training, which could not be ignored. Her reason had
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become the meeting place of two philosophic worlds which demanded a
dialectic elucidation.12
In Stein’s last written text, The Science of the Cross (1942), a scholarly work on John of
the Cross, she was still employing the phenomenological method, as she explains in the
Preface: “In the following pages, an attempt will be made to grasp John of the Cross in
the unity of his being as it expresses itself in his life and his works — from a viewpoint
that will enable us to see this unity.”13 This work is more than a synthesis of St. John’s
work; it is a systematic description of his writings in search of the essence of the mystic’s
message. Stein found suffering to be the essence of St. John of the Cross’ message.
Stein was so convinced of the validity of the phenomenological method that she
employed it not only in her scholarly work, but in her personal dealings as well, as will
be seen in Chapter Four.

Husserl’s Legacy: Phenomenology
Phenomenology, the philosophical attention to consciousness that so fascinated
Stein, was Husserl’s philosophical legacy.14 Husserl began his academic career as a
mathematician, having been awarded his doctorate in mathematics at the University of
Vienna in 1883.15 Influenced by philosopher Franz Brentano and psychologist Carl
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Stumpf,16 Husserl began to study philosophy and psychology while continuing in the
field of mathematics. Brentano’s personal example and his thoughts on intentionality
gave Husserl the courage to “choose philosophy as the vocation of my life.”17
In his habilitation18 thesis, later published as The Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891,
the year Stein was born), Husserl notes that a person intuits the first numbers in the
numerical series when counting. However, when a person deals with larger numbers, he
uses symbols for those numbers that were first intuited. In this work, Husserl dabbled in
“psychologism” when he tried to explain mathematics in terms of psychology. Later,
convinced that philosophy was not reducible to science or to the scientific method,
Husserl rejected psychologism and began to fashion a new method of philosophizing.
Husserl’s interests in logic, psychology, and philosophy complemented his mathematical
pursuits as he served as Privatdozent19 at the University of Halle under Carl Stumpf.
Husserl’s work on a prolegomena and six investigations concerning the theory of
knowledge was later published in two volumes as Logical Investigations (1900-01).
Because of this seminal work in phenomenology, he was appointed Extraordinarius
Professor at the University of Göttingen in 1901, where he remained until 1916.20
Husserl held the chair of philosophy at the University of Freiburg in Bresgau from 1916
to 1930. Gradually, Nazi policies made it impossible for the Jewish-born Husserl to
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teach in the university or to use the university library. Despite the tragic loss of his son in
World War I, the ever-encroaching governmental restrictions on his scholarship, and the
diminishment of his body with the advancement of age, Husserl continued to “think as he
wrote.”21 He died on April 27, 1938, leaving behind six published books and thousands
of pages of unpublished manuscripts. Herman Leo Van Breda, a student of Husserl’s, is
credited with saving his teacher’s manuscripts. The safekeeping of these manuscripts at
the Husserl Archives at the University of Louvain in Belgium makes Husserl’s thoughts
accessible today.22 Van Breda’s foresight also helped to save Edith Stein’s manuscripts
from being ruined during the Allied Forces’ bombardment of Cologne.23
The tenets of phenomenology can be problematic, especially since Husserl had a
penchant for “starting over again.” Phenomenologists often themselves disagree on
certain aspects of this method of doing philosophy.24 In essence, phenomenology differs
from other philosophical methods because it emphasizes: 1) a “return to the things
themselves,” 2) the intentionality of consciousness, and 3) access to essences via
21
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particulars. While other differences also exist between phenomenology and other
methods of philosophy, these phenomenological tenets are highlighted since they are the
ones that directly influenced Stein as a philosopher.

A Return to the Things Themselves
As previously mentioned, Husserl, a student of mathematics and an advocate of
the rigor of logic, was determined to set philosophy on a firmer foundation. Advances in
the sciences seemed to eclipse philosophy. In the 1800s, the physical sciences feasted on
success as progress was made in the field of technology, and the social sciences,
especially psychology, promised further advancement. But Husserl judged the late
nineteenth century’s reliance on the physical sciences as a symptom of the “natural
attitude” that presumed the validity of the sciences. While scientists used logic in their
inquiry and arguments, they failed to see philosophy as a logical foundation for their
investigations.
Unreflective acceptance of the sciences, thought Husserl, unwittingly numbed the
human being to the exhilarating search for truth, that “love of wisdom” that gave
philosophy its name. Husserl recalled the wonder and awe of the early Greeks, who
delighted in the newness of discovery and who were relentless in their search for wisdom
and in their quest to learn the “essence” or the intuitive meaning of things. But the
scientific community of the late 1800s turned to empirical evidence rather than intuition
and essences. Husserl did not reject the rigor of science, but he questioned the reliance
on the deductive method of the sciences to the exclusion of intuition. He argued that
science is not absolute; rather it must be based on an absolute foundation — philosophy.
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Noting the wisdom inherent in meaningful questioning and deep reflection, Husserl
proposed a different approach to philosophy — a “phenomenology” that allowed for the
rigor of science as well as the intuition of essences.
Husserl, in a summary of five lectures given in 1907, states: “Philosophical
thinking is circumscribed by one’s position toward the problems concerning the
possibility of cognition.”25 Therefore, his initial philosophical project focused on a
theory of cognition wherein he sought to go beyond the confining labels of empiricism
and idealism. He envisioned a new method that had as its catch phrase, “a return to the
things themselves” — a method that sought the “essence” of the object of cognition by
first attending to how that object appears to consciousness. He sets the standard for this
new, presuppositionless phenomenology with his “first methodological principle”:
It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving
toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on
accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence,
from “experiences” in which the affairs and affair-complexes in question
are present to me as “they themselves.” Indeed, even then I must at all
times reflect on the pertinent evidence; I must examine its “range” and
make evident to myself how far that evidence, how far its “perfection,” the
actual giving of the affairs themselves, extends. Where this is still
wanting, I must not claim any final validity, but must account my
25
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judgment as, at best, a possible intermediate stage on the way to final
validity.26
Husserl’s phenomenological method allows the self-reflective subject to use experiences,
or phenomena, to move toward genuine knowledge. However, Husserl cautions that
these experiences have limits, and to reach beyond the range of what is given to the
subject in experience is detrimental to the epistemological project.
In proposing the phenomenological tenet of “back to the things themselves,”
Husserl credits the French philosopher and mathematician, René Descartes (1596-1650),
with placing knowledge of the world in radical doubt. Descartes writes: “I realized that
once in my life I had to raze everything to the ground and begin again from the original
foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences.”27 Husserl
desired to get back “to the things themselves,” i.e., to how objects of cognition, or
phenomena, appear to consciousness. Instead of radically doubting the world, Husserl
suggests an epoché, a bracketing of, or a suspension of belief in, the existence of the
world that would allow reflection on how things in the life world appear to
consciousness. By examining and describing the object as it appears to consciousness
without entering into a discussion of the object’s existence, Husserl could look for limits
of that object. With limits set, Husserl could then look for the essence, or for that which
pertains in every instance of the consciousness of that object.
A “return to” the phenomenon of an apple, for example, allows me, the conscious
meditator, to consider the apple as it appears to my consciousness. I bracket all thoughts
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concerning the existence or non-existence of the apple in order to focus more clearly on
how the apple appears to my consciousness. I can describe the sensually perceived red
skin, the round shape, and the sweet smell. But consciousness of the apple also reveals a
memory of white pulp inside the red skin, or instances of the apple being yellow or green.
I can imaginatively vary the shape or use of the apple. Husserl uses a simple object such
as apple to find the essence of a perceived object in general. Whatever the sciences may
add about this apple is grounded in intuited subjective consciousness of the apple itself,
described in phenomenological terms. In this manner, phenomenology serves as a basis
or foundation for all of the sciences.
This phenomenological step of attending to things in the life world appealed to
Stein. Husserl’s method did not advocate a break with science, but rather encouraged a
re-examination of the life world and how it appeared to consciousness. Stein, schooled in
the humanities, including psychology, welcomed a method centered on the intuition of
essences. A self-proclaimed seeker of truth, Stein endorsed Husserl’s methodology and
wholeheartedly embraced philosophy as her personal affair.

The Intentionality of Consciousness
Rekindling the fervor of the early Greeks in their search for wisdom and truth,
and imitating the spirit of Descartes, who longed to be free of any and all presuppositions
in order to rebuild philosophy on his own, Husserl forged the way for his new
phenomenology. As he reflected on the way the world appears to consciousness and the
way the conscious mind constitutes the world, it became apparent to Husserl, through the
influence of Brentano, that every “intention” is directed toward an object and that each
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object holds an intended meaning for the intending subject. This is true in all forms of
cognition, such as perception, memory, and imagination. For Husserl, the mind is made
up of consciousness that can gaze “inwardly” at the act of consciousness (noesis) as well
as “outwardly,” at the object of consciousness (noema). (Even the act of gazing at
consciousness has its own noesis, the act of gazing, and its own noema, consciousness.)
Intentionality provides the link between consciousness of a phenomenon and its meaning.
Upon investigation, Husserl observed that consciousness registers a
“phenomenon”; for example, consciousness notes the appearance of a physical object,
another person, or a cultural event. While only perceiving sides or partial aspects of the
object (adumbrations), consciousness grasps the “whole” of the object, and the subject
“intuits” or immediately grasps meaning. By examining the object pole of the
phenomenon (noema) through a noematic analysis in which the different perspectives are
described and analyzed, the phenomenologist can come to the “essence” of that
phenomenon, i.e., an eidos or a form of that phenomenon.28
The phenomenologist could also focus on the subjective side in trying to
understand the phenomenon. He could turn his gaze inward and examine acts within the
stream of consciousness, thus describing the action of the subjective consciousness in a
noetic analysis. According to Husserl’s schema, descriptions of the noema and noesis,
linked by intentionality, enable the subject to understand more fully the phenomenon
presented to consciousness, as well as to understand consciousness itself.
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Access to Essences via Particulars
According to Husserl, it is possible to inspect the manifold or the many
apperceptions of the object of cognition as well as the act of cognition itself. The
investigation of the noetic and noematic poles enables the phenomenologist to explore the
limits and possibilities of the phenomenon. Such an investigation also allows the
phenomenologist to describe that which remains the same or the essence of that
phenomenon.
In Lecture IV of The Idea of Phenomenology, Husserl advances this idea by
linking particulars with universals. Husserl summarizes this phenomenological move by
describing an intuition such as “redness” perceived in a piece of red blotter paper:
“And now I fully grasp in pure ‘seeing’ the meaning of the concept of redness in general,
redness in specie [in the act of seeing], the universal ‘seen’ as identical in this and that.
No longer is it the particular as such which is referred to, not this or that red thing, but
redness in general.”29 Husserl allows for the subject, through consciousness, to go
beyond the particular to the meaning of red as a universal.
Husserl’s reliance on intuition, on the ability of consciousness to see immediately,
was innovative but risky. How could phenomenology, which relies on intuition, be the
basis of the empirical sciences which rely so heavily on fact?

Furthermore, Husserl’s

bracketing of the world and his move to consciousness seemed too narrowly turned in on
self, bordering on solipsism.30
29
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Husserl answered the charge of solipsism in his lectures and personal letters,
formally addressing this criticism when his lectures were published as Cartesian
Meditations (in French) in 1931. He states:
When I, the meditating I, reduce myself to my absolute transcendental ego
by phenomenological epoché do I not become solus ipse; and do I not
remain that, as long as I carry on a consistent self-explication under the
name phenomenology? Should not a phenomenology that proposed to
solve the problems of Objective being, and to present itself actually as
philosophy, be branded therefore as transcendental solipsism?31
Husserl goes on to stress that his method of exploring the limits of consciousness is not
turned inward exclusively since the intentional quality of consciousness necessarily turns
outward in search of the object of cognition. When the transcendental I turns its gaze
outward, the subject encounters “the Other” in “straightforward consciousness.”32
Awareness of another “I,” that is, cognizance of another reflective subject who is
likewise the locus of his own thinking, willing, etc. removes the threat of solipsism.
Moreover, Husserl defends his transcendental turn inward as he states:
[W]e must discover in what intentionalities, synthesis, motivations, the
sense “other ego” becomes fashioned in me and, under the title,
harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and
even as itself there in its own manner. These experiences and their works
are facts belonging to my phenomenological sphere. How else than by
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examining them can I explicate the sense, existing others, in all its
aspects?33
Husserl notes that there is a pairing of the individual I “here” and the other I
“there,” and while the two may perceive the world in similar ways, they are not one
being, but rather they contribute to a “community of monads,” who in turn constitute one
identical world.34 Husserl explains further that the subject also avoids solipsism because
of its capacity to know another subject through “empathy.” This understanding of
another person through empathy has the potential to shatter any threat of solipsism.
Husserl writes:
[E]very successful understanding of what occurs in others has the effect of
opening up new associations and new possibilities of understanding; and
conversely, since every pairing association is reciprocal, every such
understanding uncovers my own psychic life in its similarity and
difference and, by bringing new features into prominence, makes it fruitful
for new associations.35
Husserl’s idea of empathy would become the topic of Stein’s doctoral dissertation, and
she would experience new associations and new possibilities of understanding expressly
through her encounters with others.
Husserl’s phenomenological method gave Stein a specific means of
philosophizing and helped to define her approach to life. It was precisely this method,
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the analysis of essences, given in immediate evidence, which fueled Stein’s imagination
and assuaged her thirst for a way of ascertaining truth. Max Scheler, a philosopher of
“practical phenomenology” offered Stein a way to apply the phenomenological method to
her life world.

MAX SCHELER’S INFLUENCE
Max Scheler was born in Munich, Germany. He received university training in
the city of Jena, where he met Edmund Husserl, who was then a Privatdozent at the
University of Halle.36 In 1906, Husserl helped Scheler to transfer to the University of
Munich where he came into contact with the group of phenomenologists known as the
“Munich Circle.” While at the University of Munich, personal matters led to Scheler’s
dismissal from teaching.37 He supported himself and his new wife by publications and
unofficial lectures. Writing treatises on empathy and the anthropology of the human
person engaged Scheler from 1912 to 1918, and it was during this period that Edith Stein
met him. After public attention regarding Scheler’s personal life subsided, he was
appointed Chair of Philosophy and Sociology at the University of Cologne. Poor
eyesight restricted Scheler’s military involvement in World War I, but he contributed to
the war effort by giving propaganda speeches and by serving as a diplomat in Switzerland
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and the Netherlands. He was named to a post at the University of Frankfurt in 1928, but
died of a heart attack before assuming his assignment.
Stein never formally studied philosophy with Max Scheler because her time at the
university coincided with the period when personal matters kept him from maintaining
his status as a professor. However, Stein learned from Scheler, in theory and practice,
when he visited Göttingen as a guest speaker for the Philosophical Society to which she
belonged. Whereas Husserl introduced Stein to the phenomenological method, Scheler
introduced her to a phenomenological view of ethics. Stein was convinced of Scheler’s
place in the history of ethics, and in her autobiography she writes: “That summer [1913]
the Philosophical Society chose the second major work in the current Yearbook as the
subject matter for our discussions. It was Max Scheler’s Formalism in Ethics and NonFormal Ethics of Values [Ethics] which has probably affected the entire intellectual world
of recent decades even more than Husserl’s Ideas.”38 Stein’s judgment that Scheler’s
Ethics might eclipse Husserl’s Ideas never came true, but this statement shows her strong
endorsement of Scheler and his philosophy of ethics.
Scheler was interested, as was Husserl, in setting philosophy on a firm foundation
and repositioning it as the bulwark of all of the sciences. Scheler’s emphasis, however,
was not on consciousness, but rather on the person, specifically “the being of Man, here
and now, in his biological, social, ethical, metaphysical, and religious dimensions — and
ultimately, man as the bearer of love.”39 Scheler envisioned an integration of the logical
(mental) and alogical (emotional) spheres of the human person and he rejected all
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treatments of the person as an object or a thing. In Ethics he states: “For the person is
not a thing; nor does the person possess the nature of thingness . . . ”40 Schelerian
scholar, Manfred Frings further explains Scheler’s focus:
All these notions [of man] designate only single aspects from which man’s
being is understood. None of them [Nietzsche’s Dionysian man, Freud’s
libido man, Marx’s economic man] is adequate to man’s extreme
flexibility as well as the complexity of the whole of his spiritual, social,
voluntary and emotional being. All these notions are, for Scheler, ideas of
things, but man is not a thing.41
Stein affirmed Scheler’s emphasis on the human person, by making this the focus of her
study on empathy and later, on the psychophysical person.
Scheler’s work, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (1916),
gives evidence of his intent to write a foundational philosophical system, but this text is
the only one of the four projected works that Scheler completed before his death. In
Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, Scheler has two objectives: 1) to
provide a basis for philosophical ethics42 and 2) to critique Immanuel Kant’s ethical
theory. In critiquing Kant’s work, Scheler pays tribute to Kant’s genius, which he
admired and respected, but contra Kant, he makes a case for “emotional a priorism,”43
demonstrating the interconnection between a priori essences and feelings. Scheler
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sought to present an ethics based on “non-formal” or value-laden content, as opposed to
Kant’s ideal, concept-laden content. Scheler’s non-formal ethic is centered on the human
person whom he considers a locus of the rational, emotional, and spiritual spheres and
therefore the bearer of love. Scheler bases his concept of a priori emotionalism on the
fact that human beings are comprised of both matter and spirit. As spirit, the human
being goes beyond the drives and urges of lower levels of being (animals, plants) in order
to manage, shape, and change his environment. Independent of environment, this
spiritual being is capable of ideation which Scheler defines as “a specific act of spirit . . .
a cancellation of the reality of objects, resulting in the comprehension of essence.”44 This
spiritual dimension allows the human person to know “things,” as well as self and others,
in different ways. Frings elaborates: “For example, a rock is comprehended by an artist
from an aesthetic aspect, whereas it may have very different meanings for a hunter or a
geologist.”45 It is noted that while Scheler refuses to define the human person as an
object, a human person, because of his spiritual nature, can objectify things, self, and
other persons. Scheler’s person is not an object but can objectify as part of his/her
spiritual nature.
According to Scheler’s hypothesis, the human person is able to distance himself
from his environment; he is superior to other creatures, and able to grasp pure essences.46
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This ability of the human person to objectify things, self, and others for further reflection
and examination, cannot, Scheler thinks, come from anything in the objective world.
This ability to go beyond the material has its source in and reflects the primordial force of
the cosmos, which Scheler names love.
Love, or “ordo amoris” as Scheler calls this life force, evidences itself in human
beings as a constant disposition. Via this primordial force or constant disposition, the
human person establishes immediate contact with the world and others in the world, prior
to all thinking. Scheler posits that there is a hierarchy of values that can be immediately
intuited by the human person and that value-components are “already given in a manner
that is perfectly clear and distinct.”47 According to Scheler’s schema, a priori
emotionalism precedes Kant’s a priori idealism.
One way in which the human person evidences this spiritual quality is the
recognition of an absolute, a priori ethical system. This ethic stems from Scheler’s view
of love as a creative life force, concentrated in persons who are bearers of love and agents
of value, perpetually seeking to reflect the love of the Creator, God. Scheler envisions
the human person soaring upward to God and outward to others in contrast to what he
considers “Kant’s empty and barren formalism and the one-sidedness of its idea of
duty.”48
While Scheler recognizes universal values, he posits that these values are
subordinate to the values of the person since the human person is capable of knowing and
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choosing “absolute good for one’s own self.”49 Scheler clarifies his idea of
individualism:
Every false so-called individualism, with its erroneous and pernicious
consequences, is excluded in my ethics by the theory of the original
coresponsibility of every person for the moral salvation of the whole of the
realms of persons (principle of solidarity). What is of moral value, in my
view, is not the “isolated” person but the person originally and knowingly
joined with God, directed toward the world in love, and feeling united
with the whole of the spiritual world and humanity.50
Schelerian scholar, John Raphael Staude regards Scheler’s interest in community as a
reflection on his disjointed personal life rather than as a humanitarian trait. Staude
explains: “Scheler’s personal desire to belong to a unified group and to heal the political,
sociological, and ideological divisions of his country stemmed, in part, from the divided
nature of his family background. His personal life reflected and reinforced the disunity
and disorder of the society in which he lived.”51 Whatever Scheler’s reasons for stressing
the responsibility of each individual to society, Stein would incorporate this sense of
relationship and responsibility into her own life.
In addition to instilling a sense of personal responsibility for the community, three
concepts of Scheler’s ethic influenced Stein. In her writings and in her life she included
Scheler’s ideas regarding an intuited a priori value system, a hierarchy of values, and
also persons throughout history who exhibited these values.
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An Intuited a priori Value System
Scheler agrees with Kant that human beings know certain things a priori but
Scheler asserts that human beings can also feel values a priori, without reflection and
before any experience or judgment. The a priori of all philosophical investigation for
Scheler is the value that appears to a human being prior to all reason. For Scheler, the
emotive sphere, i.e., feelings, makes it possible for human beings to intuit the whatness or
the higher and lower values and to prefer, reject, love, and hate, according to an inner,
universal law or ethic.
This concept follows from Scheler’s insistence that human persons, as spiritual
beings, transcend their environment and are therefore capable of grasping essences.
Scheler rejects Kant’s notion of the a priori as a product of the understanding, a synthesis
of objects and states of affairs. Scheler’s use of the a priori points to the interconnection
between objects and states of affairs that are intuited, grounded in essences, and have
their seat in the emotive sphere of the human being, not in reason.52 Scheler builds his
ethical system upon the human ability to intuit the valuable, calling his position
“emotional intuitionism” and “non-formal a priorism.”53

A Hierarchy of Values
Scheler posits that the human person, as a spiritual being independent of
environment, naturally comprehends essences such as values. The human person is
naturally attuned to an inner law or an ethic. Scheler writes of “a depth in us where we
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always secretly know what the case is with respect to the relativity of experienced
(erlebten) values.”54 The emotive sphere has its own lawfulness and is able to grasp the a
priori values given in acts, objects, and persons. The value content is found in ethics, not
in logic.
Scheler’s system incorporates an “ethical absolutism” whereby there is an ordered
hierarchy of values given a priori in immediate intuition to the human person via the
emotive sphere. From lowest to highest, the value states that comprise Scheler’s system
are: values of the senses (pleasure/pain), values of life (the noble/the common), values of
the spirit (beauty, justice, truth/unattractiveness, injustice, untruth), and religious values
(values of the holy/unholy.)55 The values are qualitatively “higher” based on criteria that
include endurance of the value, ability to share the value with others, and inner
satisfaction. Scheler posits that the human person intuits value and the hierarchy of that
value by virtue of his spiritual being.
According to Scheler’s schema, a human being naturally and immediately intuits
the higher value, despite any social or cultural norms that might favor the lesser value.
Thus, Scheler distinguishes between absolute values that the human person can arrive at
intuitively, and valuations that are relative to a person’s cultural and social milieu.
Scheler’s human person as bearer of love is naturally drawn to recognize and to strive for
the highest value.
So, according to Scheler’s ethical schema, when confronted with the choice of
calling in sick in order to enjoy a round of golf versus going to work, a person can intuit
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that it is better to go to work. Telling the truth and fulfilling one’s obligation are values
of the spirit that produce a greater satisfaction and feeling of integrated well-being than
do the values of the senses and the attendant pleasures. Conversely, a different person,
overstressed by work, will also intuit the higher value of going to work, but might opt for
the golf outing and be perfectly ethical in Scheler’s schema. The value of life, in this
case, preserving one’s sanity through relaxation and exercise, supersedes the pleasurable
values of the senses. In the first scenario, appropriate love of self prohibits the person
from calling in sick for pleasurable satisfaction. In the second scenario, appropriate love
of self compels the golfer to make the sick call. The human person’s ability to intuit
value is absolute in Scheler’s ethical framework, while the personal choice regarding that
ethical absolute is relative to the person’s situation and relies on the personal freedom of
the individual to choose a particular action.
Scheler’s ethical system allows for spiritual beings not tethered to the material
world, who immediately intuit values and their hierarchy. However, Scheler’s ethical
system also allows for personal and communal “moralities” whereby a person’s or
community’s choices and actions show a preference for certain values. For example, a
person is free to choose the higher value of life (health) rather than the value of the senses
(pleasure) as is seen in the action of the person who quits smoking. However, in a
society that emphasizes consumerism and corporate profit over individual health, massmedia advertising may be permitted to promote acceptance of a lesser value. Frings
explains this distinction between ethical absolutes and relative moral choices: “Scheler
holds that historical variations of both valuation (Schätzsungsweisen) and rules of
preferring between values take place on the background of an evident order of values,
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which is as objective as mathematical truth.”56 Whatever society accepts or promotes as
the preferred value, the person is ultimately free to and responsible for choosing the
highest good.
If ethical values and their hierarchy are a priori absolutes, then why do some
people and societies choose different values? Scheler’s answer lies in his concept of life
force or love. “Ordo amoris” is the term Scheler gives to rightly ordered love that prefers
the agreeable to the disagreeable. He conceives these ordered values and their
hierarchical structure not as posited by the human person but “borne” by him/her as a
bearer of love.57 For Scheler, human persons exemplify these universal values by virtue
of their psychophysical makeup. However, Scheler realistically allows for persons who,
rejecting a hierarchy of values, refuse to acknowledge the immediate givenness of the
valuation of acts. Echoing Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and prefiguring Jean-Paul
Sartre (1905-1980), Scheler defines Ressentiment as a reversal or downfall (Umsturz) of
values present to human consciousness that “causes deception in the comprehension of
the order of the values and their realization in life and history.”58 The ressentimentsubject always feels threatened by and incapable of acquiring things of higher values and
therefore settles for a lesser value. Scheler characterizes the person “fraught with
ressentiment” as impotent and unable to incline toward the higher good, saying: “All of
this is nothing. It has no value. These are things of no importance.”59 However,
explains Frings, “the genuine order of values always remains transparent throughout such
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ressentiment values of illusion constituting a moral world in a ressentiment-subject.”60
For Scheler, a person who recognizes his/her dignity as a bearer of love and embraces
ordo amoris by acknowledging values and their hierarchy, ultimately fulfills his/her ontic
destiny — holiness.
An interesting question arises about Scheler’s personal involvement in the making
of propaganda speeches during World War I. In his position of German citizen
promoting the policies and practices of his country, is Scheler a bearer of love or a
ressentiment subject? Outward appearances can be deceptive and would have to be
viewed in the light of Scheler’s total life: Edith Stein might posit that while the actions
of another human being can be interpreted and understood, they should be judged in light
of self-reflection, i.e., by asking: “What would I do in a similar circumstance?”
According to Scheler’s schema, the propagandist can be viewed as a hero who embraces
love of family, of country, and heritage but not a saint who seeks to love all humankind.
Scheler might also add that a person may perhaps change as a result of personal
development as well as changes within society itself.

Personality Types throughout History
Scheler posits that human persons immediately intuit an ethical system through
emotional a priorism and are free to embrace and live at their own chosen valuation level.
Although universal values (truth, goodness) are accessible to each person, cultural and
social ideas about these values can be harmonious — exhibiting ordo amoris, or the
reverse — exhibiting value deception or ressentiment. Convinced that people have the
ability to reach for the highest good, Scheler was also persuaded that values are not
60
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taught by any moral authority, but rather they are intuitively grasped as present in the
actions of others.
Certain persons, exemplifying different levels of values, are able to draw others
toward specific values because of their comportment and way of acting.61 These
exemplars of values correspond to the order of values; from least to greatest they are: the
master of enjoyment (value state of the senses), the hero (value state of life), the genius
(value state of the spirit), and the saint (value state of the holy).62 Whereas certain epochs
may be influenced by strong individuals or may be forced to adopt specific moral
systems, Scheler conceived of an eternal ethical system as the backdrop for moralities
influenced by history and society. Scheler envisions a time when the thought-driven
Western European morality will merge with the feeling-driven Eastern morality and
human persons will live in ordo amoris. Chapter Four will examine how Scheler’s ordo
amoris fits in with Stein’s vision of redeemed humanity.

Principles Learned
It is possible that Stein heard earlier versions of Scheler’s ethical system when he
spoke to the Philosophical Society to which she belonged in Göttingen (1913-1916). It is
certain that she read Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (1926)
because she speculated that Scheler’s work on ethics would have a greater impact on
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philosophy than Husserl’s Ideas.63 Scheler’s concepts concerning the nature of
humankind and the importance of love as a life-force attracted Stein as she herself attests:
His [Scheler’s] influence in those years affected me, as it did many others,
far beyond the sphere of philosophy. I do not know in which year Scheler
returned to the Catholic Church. It could not have been long before I met
him. In any case, he was quite full of Catholic ideas at the time and
employed all the brilliance of his spirit and his eloquence to plead them.
This was my first encounter with this hitherto totally unknown world. It
did not lead me as yet to the Faith. But it did open for me a region of
“phenomena” which I could then no longer bypass blindly. With good
reason we were repeatedly enjoined to observe all things without
prejudice, to discard all possible “blinders.” The barriers of rationalistic
prejudices with which I had unwittingly grown up fell and the world of
faith unfolded before me.64
The content of Scheler’s ideas allowed Stein to bracket her preference for reason and
logic and to consider the alogical and the emotive sphere as having a valid voice in
ethical actions. Stein’s phenomenological method as influenced by Husserl and Scheler,
then, incorporated intuition and emotion in the investigation of essences.
While Stein was both fascinated by Scheler as a person and annoyed at his
seeming disregard for Husserl,65 she was nevertheless, by her own admission,
63

Stein, Life 258.

64

Stein, Life 260.

65

Stein, Life 259. While Scheler never studied with Husserl, Stein reports that Husserl always
thought that Scheler was dependent on him. Stein, always loyal to “the Master,” had her own interpretation
of Scheler’s boast that he had discovered the phenomenological method for himself: “Everyone who is

96
transformed by him. Having renounced prayer and her practice of Judaism as a teenager,
Stein felt herself drawn to people within her academic circle who professed faith.
Scheler’s theory of the hierarchy of values and human exemplars of these values made
Stein more open to matters of faith. In fact, Scheler initially personified for Stein the
value of the spirit.
Stein also seemed to appreciate Scheler’s concept of coresponsibility and his idea
that love is “the foundation of all being-in-the-world and the relation to death.”66 Stein
would later embrace the belief — “Suffering and death have their origin . . . in love”67 —
as a principle of the Catholic faith and as her special mission as a Carmelite. In a lecture
entitled, “Ethos of Women’s Professions,” given to a group of Catholic women, Stein
strongly echoes Scheler’s thoughts: “The innermost formative principle of woman’s soul
is the love which flows from the divine heart.”68 Stein’s message follows Catholic
thought and specifically mentions “divine love,” but one can decipher, I think, a reference
to Scheler’s idea of ordo amoris, the formative and uniting power of love.
While Stein retained Scheler’s hierarchy of values and his concept of the human
person as the bearer of love, and later built upon it, she rejected Scheler’s idea that values
cannot be taught. Her years spent in Speyer as a teacher of young women verify her firm
conviction that values are taught first in the home within the family unit, and then in
society through the school systems. Her lectures to women attest to her concern that
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values be transmitted, especially through education. Stein urged parents to exemplify
rightly ordered value judgments in their own actions as well as to be guides for children
in making value judgments. Stein thought that it was especially the woman’s role in the
family to impart values, thus incorporating Scheler’s notion of exemplars of values who
concretely apply these values to life situations. After her conversion to Catholicism,
Stein held Mary, Mother of God, as the supreme example of a human being who reached
up in love to a personal, Creator God and outward to all of humankind.
Stein would come to understand firsthand Scheler’s idea that there are exemplars
of values whose very comportment to the world draws others to seek higher values. This
was the case for Stein when she encountered Adolf Reinach and Anna Reinach, and
Teresa of Avila.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE REINACHS
Husserl introduced Stein to the phenomenological method and to the notion of
empathy; Scheler employed the phenomenological method in his work on ethics; but it
was Adolf Reinach, who first exemplified for Stein a philosopher whose thought
conformed to his actions. Noting the influence that Adolf and his wife Anna had on
Stein, Koeppel states: “Both Reinachs impressed Edith and confirmed her in the search
for truth which began at the time she met them in Göttingen. If Scheler introduced her to
Christian thought, then the Reinachs lived what Scheler taught.”69 Dietrich von
Hildebrand (1889-1977), a contemporary of the Reinachs and Stein, attests to Adolf
Reinach’s quest for truth and his clarity as a teacher. Hildebrand writes: “I met the
philosopher [Reinach] who impressed me the most deeply with his unconditional love of
69
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truth, his intellectual power, his thoroughness, and his quite unique clarity. The many
discussions of philosophical questions I had with him were a great gift to me. In
Göttingen he came to be my only teacher.”70
As Hildebrand affirms, it was Adolf Reinach, who, in a sense, “translated”
Husserl for Stein and many other students through his lectures and the discussions he
held in his home, and also through his personal assistance. Reinach was able to clarify
many of Husserl’s more obscure thoughts, and his lively presentation of material stood in
stark contrast to Husserl’s dry delivery. Reinach’s clear explanations and enthusiasm are
evident in his writing. At a lecture to neo-Kantians in Marburg in 1914, for example,
Reinach described the tenets of phenomenology, explaining how a person perceives
objects in the natural attitude as well as in the phenomenological mode. Reinach states:
Taking the case where I see a material, colored object in the world, the
object — with its properties and modalities — is then something physical;
but my perception of the object, my turning to it and attending to it, the
joy which I feel over it, my admiration and, in short, all that presents itself
as an activity or state or function of the ego — all of that is psychical.71
Once, when struggling with her dissertation, Stein again took the advice of the
previously mentioned Moskiewicz and consulted Reinach. When she told Reinach about
her struggles, dejectedly admitting, “But it’s all still so unclear,” Reinach answered:
“Well, one certainly ought to be able to clarify anything that’s not clear.” 72 She later
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wrote: “By one magic word, he seemed to have transformed the monstrous offspring of
my poor brain into a clear and well-organized whole. I was completely confident that his
verdict was reliable.”73 Although Stein never disclosed what Reinach’s magic word was,
his ability to clarify intricate thoughts by a reduction to simpler parts and a reconstruction
of the complex solved Stein’s difficulty with her dissertation and impressed her for life.
In her intellectual work, her own quest for truth, and her dealings with others, Stein
embraced this goal — to clarify anything not clear — just as Reinach did.
Stein thoroughly enjoyed classes taught by Reinach because he seemed so
animated and so thoroughly in command of the material. As a member of the advanced
class that met in the Reinach home, Stein appreciated the seemingly effortless way in
which Reinach conducted the class: “It was, then, not a matter of lecturing and learning
but rather of mutual searching similar to what we had done in the Philosophical Circle,
except that now a reliable guide was present.”74 She was later amazed that every word of
his classes was scripted, up to his parting line.75 While Stein would later rely
predominantly on lecture in her classes to high school girls and prospective teachers, her
writings are full of clear descriptions and lifelike examples, and she reveals a desire for
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“mutual searching” with students, members of the audience, or, as Marianne Sawicki
mentions, with her readers.
Not only did Reinach influence Stein’s scholarly life, but he and his wife were
also partially responsible for leading Stein away from her earlier decision to forsake
prayer toward her eventual conversion to the Catholic faith. Reinach and his wife Anna
had converted from Judaism to Lutheranism shortly before the outbreak of World War I.
After Reinach was killed in Flanders in 1917, his widow asked Stein to come to their
home to put her husband’s papers in order for eventual publication. Stein hesitated;
coping with her own loss and sorrow, she felt unable to face the young widow’s grief.
Upon arriving, however, Stein found Anna Reinach strong and faith-filled. When Stein
questioned her, Frau Reinach replied that hers was the power of Christ’s cross. This was
the first time, Stein was to say, that she came face to face with the power of the cross.76
While the phenomenological method of Husserl and the personalism and nonformal ethic of Scheler had major impacts on Stein’s thought, it was Adolf and Anna
Reinach, who made a personal impression on her. In them, Stein first glimpsed the
pursuit of truth combined with the living of the ethical life, a combination which she
sought to emulate throughout her life. This pursuit of truth was even more dramatically
portrayed to Stein when she encountered the autobiography of the Catholic mystic, Saint
Teresa of Avila.
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THE INFLUENCE OF SAINT TERESA OF AVILA
Edmund Husserl, noting that many of his students and associates embraced some
form of religion while engaged in phenomenology, once quipped that upon his death, he
should be canonized for leading so many to the acceptance of Christianity.77 This would
seem especially true in the case of Stein but her introduction to Christianity, specifically
Catholicism, came through the lectures of Max Scheler, the living witness of Anna and
Adolf Reinach, and, on a different level, through her own translation of Thomas Aquinas’
De Veritate.78 While it is true that many, especially in the Göttingen Circle, became
practicing members of Christian denominations, Stein credits Teresa of Avila, not
Husserl, as the major catalyst in her acceptance of the Catholic faith.
In the summer of 1922, while spending time with her philosopher friends, Adolf
and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Stein read Teresa of Avila’s The Book of Her Life.
Reading all through the night, Stein finished the autobiography in the first light of dawn
and declared, “This is the truth.”79 Reflecting upon Stein’s conversion, Jude Dougherty
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notes: “[I]t wasn’t Thomas alone who prepared her for her reception of the Catholic
faith. Husserl and Thomas both opened the way. Husserl’s realism opened her to theism;
from Thomas she acquired a Christian outlook. Yet it was Teresa of Avila who led her to
the final step.”80 Teresa of Avila altered the course of Stein’s life by bringing her to the
gateway of a new truth and ultimately to the doors of Carmel.
Teresa of Avila appealed to Stein as someone who lived the truth. Examining
herself and her life within a Carmelite convent in Spain, the young Teresa found that she
was neither holy nor trying to live a holy life. In an endeavor to change that, she initiated
a spiritual regimen of personal conversation with God, dialogue with spiritual directors,
and personal efforts to make her actions reflect her love of God. As a result, Teresa left
her convent to start a stricter religious order of nuns, who were “reformed” or who sought
to follow the original rule of the Carmelite Order. Politically, Teresa’s founding of the
“Discalced” Carmelites81 was unsettling to the “unreformed” nuns who were afraid that
Teresa’s renewal would force them to change. But Teresa’s example gave hope to those
Carmelites who sought to express their relationship with God more genuinely.
Stein found Scheler’s exemplar of the value of holiness in Teresa of Avila. The
reformer’s determination to live a better life brought some of the Sisters with whom she
lived to the recognition of a higher value, a lesson not lost on the then-questioning Edith
Stein. In her autobiography, the sixteenth century mystic writes: “What I advise strongly
is not to abandon prayer, for in prayer people will understand what they are doing and
win repentance from the Lord and fortitude to lift themselves up. And you must believe
80
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that if you give up prayer, you are, in my opinion courting danger.”82 It is easy to
imagine Stein, who consciously gave up praying as a teenager, being captivated by
Teresa of Avila’s direct approach. Teresa’s candor in speech, her reflective approach to
her own personal experiences, and her sharing through vivid description appealed to
Stein.
Besides finding in Teresa an outstanding exemplar of holiness, Stein promoted the
saint as an example of courage and faith for others. In 1934, one year after Hitler had
risen to power in Germany, Stein writes in an essay: “In our time, when the
powerlessness of all natural means for battling the overwhelming misery everywhere has
been demonstrated so obviously, an entirely new understanding of the power of prayer, of
expiation, and of vicarious atonement has again awakened.”83 Stein offered a written
synopsis of Teresa’s life and her intent was clear: Teresa and her writings could be a
guide for the people of the twentieth century. Stein continues: “One would like to bring
into our times also something of the spirit of this great woman who built amazingly
during a century [16th] of battles and disturbances.” Stein encourages the readers of this
essay: “[W]hoever has learned to draw from these sources will never tire of gaining
courage and strength from them again and again.”84 In 1934, a time when uncertainty
threatened to envelop Stein and when Germany dwelt in chaos, she was intuitively drawn
to the lived values embodied in Teresa of Avila.
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CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the philosophical influences of Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler
have been explored. While it is beyond the scope of this work to trace Husserl or
Scheler’s many contributions to Stein, a consideration of the phenomenological method
and the theory of non-formal ethics has provided an opportunity to appreciate their major
influences on Stein’s ethic. Stein realized that Husserl’s phenomenological method
provided a tool by which she could search for truth with confidence. Scheler reaffirmed
what she knew from personal experience: that essences and values are available and
accessible through the emotions. Husserl’s phenomenological approach and Scheler’s
emotional intuitionism fueled Stein’s drive for truth and allowed her to use both her
rational and emotive powers. The Reinachs and Teresa of Avila augmented that
reasonable search for truth with their examples of faith in action. Stein began to blend
spiritual, emotional, and rational resources into a synthesis of a lived ethic.
Husserl insists that phenomenology is the philosopher’s “quite personal affair”
which leads to universal truths and that provides the basis of philosophy and all of the
sciences. Commenting on Husserl’s radical grounding, Maurice Natanson writes:
“Husserl’s struggle for philosophical certitude begins with the recognition that it is only
at the granite base of mundane knowledge and belief that a proper foundation is to be
found for erecting a veridical philosophy.”85 Husserl’s phenomenological method that
linked a “quite personal affair” with the universal, Scheler’s emotive a priorism, Adolf
Reinach’s insistence on clarity and a mutual search for truth, Anna Reinach’s embracing
of faith amidst suffering, and Teresa of Avila’s determination to live in truth — all of
85
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these helped Stein to reach the bedrock of her own thoughts and beliefs. But after her
initial encounter with Husserl, Scheler, the Reinachs, and Teresa of Avila, and after her
conversion to Catholicism, Stein came in contact with the works of the scholastic
philosopher, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). While Stein was convinced that truth could
be arrived at by way of reason, the writings of Aquinas introduced her to the possibility
of universal truth available through faith. The next chapter will show how Stein wove
her own ethical edifice using a foundation of phenomenology and faith.

CHAPTER THREE
FROM PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD TO ACTION
INTRODUCTION
As a student of Husserl, Scheler, the Reinachs, and Teresa of Avila, Edith Stein
could in a sense be called “daughter” of all five, for she mirrors the influence of her
intellectual and spiritual “progenitors” in her writings as well as in her actions. Stein
reflects their influence amidst her own social and cultural surroundings and asserts her
independence; she cuts a unique path using what she has gleaned from her predecessors
to develop her own insights.
Stein also reflects the influence of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), whose
work she read, translated into German, and commented on. Aquinas wrote his
masterwork, Summa Theologiae, for novices, or young men studying theology in
preparation for becoming priests and brothers, but the work is replete with systematic
argumentation and is even today studied as a model of scholastic philosophy. Aquinas
distinguishes between reason and faith, philosophy and theology, but he incorporates the
wisdom of Aristotle, the Neoplatonists, and other philosophers with the teachings of
Scripture and the Church Fathers while adding his own “I answer that” in proposing
solutions to questions on the nature of man, the soul, and other topics. Confident that
theology and philosophy, while different, are not opposed, Thomas gives testimony that
faith and reason complement each other in the search for truth.
Stein claims this blending as part of her own philosophical lineage. In Finite and
Eternal Being, she refers to this sharing between philosophy based on natural reason and
theology founded on revealed truth, calling it “Christian philosophy.” Stein attests to the
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influence of Aquinas and perhaps discloses something of her own struggle to
accommodate philosophy and faith as she writes:
A Christian philosophy will regard it as its noblest task to prepare the way
for supernatural faith. This is the precise reason why St. Thomas was so
deeply concerned with the problem of how to build a pure philosophy on
the basis of natural reason. He knew well that this was the only way of
finding some common ground with unbelieving thinkers. If the latter are
willing to join us at least part of the way, they may perhaps subsequently
allow themselves to be guided farther then they originally intended to go.
From the point of view of Christian philosophy, there should then be no
misgivings about a common effort. Adhering to the principle, “Examine
everything, and retain the best,” Christian philosophy is willing to learn
from the Greeks and from the moderns and to appropriate for itself
whatever can meet the test of its own standards of measurement. On the
other hand, it can well afford to display generously what it itself has to
offer and then leave to others the task of examination and selection.1
By examining everything available in her life world and retaining what she deems to be
best, Stein includes philosophy and faith, and more specifically, phenomenology and
Catholicism in her legacy.
Staunch philosophers who perceive a solid wall separating faith and reason would
reject Stein’s mixed influences and would prefer that she stay on the side of reason.
Ardent theologians would propose that Stein hold onto the course of faith based on
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Scripture, tradition, and revealed truths. Stein, ever the seeker after truth, recognizes that
both philosophy and theology move her closer to truth; thus she relies on the power of
reason as well as the power of faith to bring her to that truth. In this chapter, I will show
how Stein fashions her ethical stance to the life world by blending phenomenology and
faith.
How can an ethic be attributed to Edith Stein, Saint Teresa Benedicta of the
Cross, if she never wrote a system of moral action? To posit that Stein would have
proposed an ethic had she not died in the concentration camp would be speculative. But
given Stein’s philosophical and personal writings, her incessant search for truth, and her
own actions, I posit that an ethic, an attempt to match internal thoughts and beliefs with
external actions, can be found. Stein penned the outline of her formal ethic with her life.
Stein speaks specifically of ethics in light of philosophy and theology in Finite
and Eternal Being. She agrees with the Neo-Thomist, Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), that
ethics must be based on theology and philosophy. Stein writes:
As regards human action, Maritain has pointed out that it must be
considered in the light of the revealed truths of original sin and redemption
and that therefore no system of ethics can be complete if it rests
exclusively on a purely philosophical basis. It can be completed only if,
acknowledging its dependence on the supernatural (i.e., on theology), it
supplements its own basic truths with the truths of revelation. This
statement, it seems to me applies — with some modifications and
additions — to all finite existence and also to the whole of philosophy. In
the light which the fundamental truths of the Christian faith — the truths
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of creation, original sin, redemption, and supernatural perfection — throw
upon the totality of existence, it appears impossible for a pure philosophy
(i.e., a philosophy based exclusively on natural reason) to perfect itself or
to perform a perfectum opus rationis. It needs for its completion the aid of
theology without, however, becoming itself a theology.2
In order to recognize Stein’s blending of phenomenology and faith in her ethical schema,
it is important to understand her thoughts and beliefs. In Chapter Four, I will show how
Stein expresses these thoughts and beliefs in ethical decisions and actions. Before
proceeding to those actions, however, we must understand Stein’s philosophical and
theological concepts, specifically her realism, her concept of the soul, her schema of
creation, and the levels of the psychophysical person. I will then reconstruct Stein’s
ethic, proposing that it includes four components: a search for truth in the world
(realism); recognition of relatedness or connection with God, self, and other human
beings (relationship); a responsibility to unfold one’s ontic blueprint (responsibility); and
4) openness to new horizons (grace). We begin with a consideration of Stein’s adherence
to realism.

STEIN’S REALISM
Before delving into Stein’s ethical stance to the life world, it is important to make
one distinction between her phenomenology and that of Husserl. Initially, Stein found
that Husserl embraced realism, but starting with Ideas Pertaining to a Pure
Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (Ideas I, 1913), he moved away from
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realism to a more idealistic treatment of the world and the things of the world. Stein,
distinguishing herself from Husserl, maintains a realism3 whereby she accepts the
existence of the world and claims to have access to knowledge through being in the
world. Husserl does not reject knowledge of things in the world; however, he favors an
ideal constitution of things in consciousness to a partial knowledge gained through
perception of things of the world.
Stein’s acceptance of realism dates back to her first introduction to
phenomenology in late 1912. At the bidding of a colleague, Georg Moskiewicz, Stein
read Husserl’s second volume of Logical Investigations (1901). Stein must have sensed,
at the very least, an intellectual affinity, if not a kindred searcher for truth in Husserl, for
she immediately made arrangements to study at the University of Göttingen during the
1913 summer session. In Husserl’s Logical Investigations, an early version of his
phenomenology, the phenomenologist proposes a realistic stance. Husserl writes in
Logical Investigations:
We do not wish to lose ourselves in the erring paths of such a
metaphysics. For us what is “in” consciousness counts as real (real) just
as much as what is “outside” of it. What is real (real) is the individual
with all its constituents: it is something here and now. For us temporality
is a sufficient mark of reality. Real being and temporal being may not be
identical notions, but they coincide in extension. We do not, of course,
suppose that psychical experiences are in a metaphysical sense “things.”
3
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But even they belong to a thinglike unity, if the traditional metaphysical
conviction is right in holding that all temporal existents must be things, or
must help to constitute things. Should we wish, however, to keep all
metaphysics out, we may simply define “reality” in terms of temporality.
For the only point of importance is to oppose it to the timeless “being” of
the ideal.4
Husserl’s sense of the individual and its constituents as real resonated with Stein’s
search for truth. She was convinced that the “here and now” contained its own veracity.
In her dissertation, On Empathy, Stein seems to follow this realistic move as she
describes how acts of empathy appear to consciousness. In describing the constitution of
the real outer world in intersubjective experience, Stein writes:
The world I glimpse empathically is an existing world, posited as having
being like the world primordially given. The perceived world and the
world given empathically are the same world differently seen. But it is not
only the same one seen from different sides as when I perceive
primordially and, traversing continuous varieties of appearances, go from
one standpoint to another. Here each earlier standpoint motivates the later
one, each following one severs the preceding one. Of course, I also
accomplish the transition from my standpoint to the other’s in the same
manner, but the new standpoint does not step into the old one’s place. I
retain them both at the same time. The same world is not merely
presented now in one way and then in another, but in both ways at the
4
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same time. And not only is it differently presented depending on the
momentary standpoint, but also depending on the nature of the observer.5
In Ideas I, Husserl confirms a turn that he had been considering for some time. In
a move that surpasses his initial turn from the natural, unreflective acceptance of the
world to a more reflective consideration of how things appear to consciousness, Husserl
posits a bracketing of the existence of the world and a move to an investigation of the
transcendental object of consciousness. In Ideas, Husserl explains this stronger concept
of bracketing the existence of the world:
We put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of
the natural attitude; we parenthesize everything which that positing
encompasses with respect to being: thus the whole natural world which is
continually “there for us,” “on hand,” and which will always remain there
according to consciousness as an “actuality” even if we choose to
parenthesize it. If I do that, as I can with complete freedom, then I am not
negating the “world” as though I were a sophist; I am not doubting its
factual being as though I were a skeptic; rather I am exercising the
“phenomenological” epoché which also completely shuts me off from any
judgment about spatiotemporal factual being.6
Stein, cautious of this “transcendental turn,” later comments on her reticence as she notes
in her reminiscences:

65.
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All the young phenomenologists were confirmed realists. However, the
Ideas included some expressions which sounded very much as though
their Master wished to return to Idealism. Nor could his oral interpretation
dispel our misgivings. It was the beginning of that development which led
Husserl to see, more and more, in what he called “transcendental
Idealism” the actual nucleus of his philosophy and to devote all of his
energies to its establishment.7
Husserlian scholar, Harrison Hall explains Husserl’s move to idealism as he
writes:
Husserl chose to express the difference as that between the real and the
ideal, the contents of empirical consciousness are real mental states and
processes, caught up in the causal network that ties all of natural reality
together and forms the subject matter for empirical scientific
investigations. The meanings which mediate natural experience are not
part of this reality at all, are ideal rather than real, and the laws governing
their relations are of a completely different kind. The study of these laws
of meaning is the legitimate function of philosophy, and so philosophy is
an idealism, a study of the ideal intentional correlates of conscious acts
rather than a study of their empirical reality.8
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While working as Husserl’s assistant in 1917, Stein records again her unease with
this turn away from realism. To fellow realist and friend, Roman Ingarden, she writes:
Recently I laid before the Master, most solemnly, my reservations against
idealism. . . . [F]or two hours there was a heated debate — naturally
without either side persuading the other. The Master is of the opinion that
he is not at all disinclined to change his viewpoint if one demonstrates to
him such a necessity. I have, however, never managed to do that.9
Nearly two months later, Stein writes again to Ingarden: “I will write out in neat format
my reservations about certain points of the Ideen in preparation for a common discussion.
I began today with ‘Idealism.’”10
Steinian scholar Sarah Borden confirms Stein’s stance as a realist:
Individual experiences or objects may turn out to be dubious, erroneous,
or illusory, but only against the backdrop of an awareness of the truly
existing world. Our consciousness is always already involved with objects
and existing entities, and any attempt to reach a purified consciousness
(that is, purified of all “prejudices” concerning existence and dedicated
solely to the study of ideal structures) must fail.11
While Stein never persuaded the “Master” that realism grants access to truth, Husserl
never convinced Stein that idealism is a prerequisite for reaching truth.
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Embracing the life world, Stein thinks that the inconsistencies of the world help
us to come to truth. Stein’s realism and her rejection of Husserl’s study of the laws of
meaning are significant and point to an essential part of her philosophy. While she agrees
with Husserl’s move away from a naive acceptance of the natural world to a more
reflective seeing of things as they appear to consciousness, she does not want to
emphasize the constitution of the world in consciousness to the exclusion of the world.
This is seen not only in her philosophy but stems from her own life experiences. In her
dissertation, Stein expresses this realism: “[T]he appearing world — which is the same,
however and to whomever it appears — is made independent of consciousness. Were I
imprisoned within the boundaries of my individuality, I could not go beyond ‘the world
as it appears to me.’”12 Stein considered the life world as a touchstone, a point of
reference, and a clarifying factor for her, both philosophically and existentially.
Stein’s acceptance of the “world as it appears” gave her partial access to the truth
but her search continued. Her understanding of the psychophysical person would at first
contain a philosophical treatment of the soul but eventually, she would include a
theological interpretation of the soul. We turn from Stein’s realism to her understanding
of the soul, which informed her concept of the psychophysical person.

THE SOUL
Stein mentions the soul in her dissertation, On Empathy. She describes the
psychophysical person as an “I” in possession of a soul, a soul that is the “bearer of the
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stream of experience.”13 But Stein does not separate the body from the soul, and she
encourages her readers to think of the psychic in terms of the physical and vice-versa as
she writes: “Our proposed division between soul and body was an artificial one, for the
soul is always necessarily a soul in the body.”14
In her philosophical work, Finite and Eternal Being, Stein develops more fully her
understanding of the soul. To do this she uses the writings of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas,
and her friend and fellow philosopher, Hedwig Conrad-Martius. The soul forms the basis
of Stein’s threefold relatedness — the relatedness between a created human person and
its creator, between the human person and other human beings, and between the human
person and him/herself.
Drawing on the metaphysics of change, specifically the act and potency
distinction of Aristotle and Aquinas, Stein understands the creator of human beings and
of the world to be pure being or actuality; she calls this creator “God.” As pure being, the
Creator God “differs from the being of every created thing.”15 Created beings possess the
potential to act, but composed of matter, they are neither pure beings nor pure act.
Through a “divine creative act,” the Creator bestows on human beings a life power, the
soul. The soul invigorates the material body (Körper), making it a living body (Leib).
For Stein then, the soul is this life power that issues from the divine, infinite, and creative
power of God. Stein acknowledges her debt to Aristotle, Aquinas, and the scholastics as
she writes:
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Living beings are capable of transforming and “incorporating” in
themselves foreign material elements and of bringing forth new structures
of their own species. The formal principle which commands such a
superior formative power is called the soul by Aristotle and the scholastic
thinkers, while the material structure that is molded by this form is
designated as the body.16
Stein thus speaks of a “besouled body” within which the soul, or “vital center” of the
body, functions as the form; the body is the matter that is being formed.17 This besouled
body has the ability to sustain itself18 and to procreate.
While Stein relies on scholastic thinkers for her understanding of the soul, she
also knew that Husserl had a similar understanding of the body and soul as one entity.
She worked on the manuscript that became Ideas II wherein Husserl describes the
relationship between the Body19 and the soul. Summarizing the way in which he
characterized the living body as constituted, Husserl stated:
[The Body] viewed from “within” — in the “inner attitude” — it appears
as a freely moving organ (or system of such organs) by means of which
the subject experiences the external world. Furthermore, the Body appears
as a bearer of sensations, and thanks to their intertwining with the rest of
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the psychic life in its totality, it appears as forming, with the soul, a
concrete unity.20
Stein’s understanding of the psychophysical person, body and soul, draws from
scholasticism and phenomenology alike.
In addition to calling the soul the “life power” of the human person, Stein also
refers to the soul as the “universal essence” that issues from the pure essence of God the
Creator. All human beings possess this essence or life power of the soul, which is
therefore “universal.” In Finite and Eternal Being, Stein explains: “Now the universal
essence is not something existing aside from nor something external to the individual
thing, but the universal essence is that which can be conceived as a universal in the
individual.”21 Since this universal essence issues from the pure essence, God, and since
all human beings share this essence as a common factor of their makeup, Stein
understands all human beings to be related and made in the image and likeness of God.
There is a double sense of common descent, however, since human beings share this
essence in common as a species as well. This relationship, first to God and then to others
by virtue of a sharing in the universal essence or soul is another key component of Stein’s
ethical philosophy.
By virtue of this sharing of the universal essence or life power, Stein develops her
concept of “common descent.” In Finite and Eternal Being she states:
Each living being has its specific determinateness — which is the “same”
for all the members of “its species” — and it owes its specificity to the
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fact that it belongs to that “whole” which as such has a common
determinateness of the essence, because it stands within a relationship of
common descent.22
Understanding the besouled body to be related to God through a sharing in the universal
essence, Stein conceives of an added relationship among all human beings through a
shared common descent.
Related to God because a divine creative act bestows the soul and thus enlivens
the body, and related to other human beings because each person shares this common
descent, the individual person also possesses a third relationship — an unfolding
relationship within oneself. As a besouled human being who shares in a community of
common descent, each individual has a specific function, a particular ontic destiny
whereby potential attributes can become actual attributes expressed in actions. In a
passage from Finite and Eternal Being, Stein elucidates this concept of the human being
as contributing a unique part to the whole community of human beings:
The species steps into existence, receives its formal impress, evolves, and
is transformed — in individual beings. Owing to the fact that each of
these individual beings efficaciously actuates beyond itself and its own
existence, all of them are linked together by a causal and existential chain.
But each and every link of this chain is rounded off (gerundet) and
founded in itself, and with each and every one of them a new existence or
a new life begins. Each of them is nonetheless also “overt,” [manifest] for
each of them releases new individual beings and transmits — by
transformation or variation — the particularity of the species. With the
22
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first individual being of a species there begins simultaneously the
existence of the species as a comprehensive wholeness in which all those
individual beings that are interrelated by common descent
[Abstammungszusammenhang] inhere as “links” or members. The
wholeness is actualized in the juxtaposition and temporal sequence of its
specimens.23
Each individual human person has a unique role to fulfill in sustaining and generating not
only his/her own life, but also the life of the community. Each person is free, posits
Stein, to procreate physically as well as psychically in unfolding his/her ontic core. Each
person, then, possesses within him/herself a unique “ontological map” or blueprint by
which the person, in maturation, comes to know self and his/her role in the development
of the worldwide human family. The soul — giving the human being the ability to
unfold this ontological map, which Stein refers to as a “kernel”24 — enables the
psychophysical person to actualize his/her potential as a fully individuated human being.
The soul, the universal essence that issues from the creator to the created, that
links individuals to others, and that unfolds the ontological map of each human person, is
the source of the relatedness of human beings to God, others, and self. In order to realize
more fully Stein’s unfolding of human potentiality into actuality, it is important to be
aware of how she understands the created order and the human person. We turn first to
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Stein’s understanding of the order of creation which includes phenomenological
description and theological themes.

STEIN’S SCHEMA OF CREATION
In her 1931 essay for Catholic women entitled “The Separate Vocations of Man
and Woman According to Nature and Grace,”25 Stein explains her schema of creation by
beginning with a literal interpretation of the creation story. Found in Genesis,26 the first
book of scriptures or sacred writings of both the Jewish and Christian religions, this
mythical creation story reveals the power and goodness of God the creator, who brings
life out of nothingness. Stein uses the story to elucidate her concept of the order of
humanity, which encompasses created, fallen, and redeemed humanity.
Initially, explains Stein, man and woman were each created as recipients of the
divine breath of God, even though, according to the creation story, man was created first.
In the first or “Created Order,” man and woman are given the same tasks of reflecting the
image of God, bringing forth posterity, and being stewards of the earth,27 they are equal;
however, man and woman accomplish these tasks in different ways. By nature, Stein
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describes woman as tending toward the whole, the personal, and the living.28 The
feminine soul also strives to mesh theoretical views with practical actions. Lastly, Stein
describes woman as inclined toward sharing life as a companion, which she does through
listening and ministering to another. Stein types man as naturally tending to the abstract
and theoretical. While woman tends to the whole, man is able to focus his attention on
one enterprise to the exclusion of others; Stein judges that “it is difficult for him to
become involved in other beings and their concerns.”29 Rather than as a companion,
Stein defines man by nature as a leader.
Stein’s typecasting of man and woman as equal but different comes very close to
stereotyping woman as “helpmate” and man as “leader.” In her writings, Stein also
delineates certain professions, such as teaching, healthcare, and social work as
“feminine.” Stein states:
In using the term “feminine profession” significantly, it can only denote
those objective tasks assigned by the feminine nature. This would mean
all vocations depending on sympathetic rapport such as nursing,
education, and social work; consequently also included would be the
vocation of doctor and nurse, teacher and governess, housemaid, and the
entire range of contemporary social services.30
Stein’s stereotyping seems to support Sawicki’s claim that Stein “types” people, and, in
this case, men and women, into neat and narrowly defined roles with clear and easily
28
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identifiable characteristics. Stein’s vision, though, is always of the fully developing and
acting human person who contributes to the community. So while stereotyping women
as caretakers, Stein clearly states that women can perform any job that man can perform.
In the same essay, Stein writes:
Individual gifts and tendencies can lead to the most diversified activities.
Indeed, no woman is only woman; like a man, each has her individual
specialty and talent, and this talent gives her the capability of doing
professional work, be it artistic, scientific, technical, etc. Essentially, the
individual talent can enable her to embark on any discipline, even those
remote from the usual feminine vocations.31
While both man and woman share equally in the universal essence or soul, Stein
posits that woman’s soul is different from man’s soul in that her attributes are different.
In the essay, entitled “The Ethos of Women’s Professions,” Stein writes: “[I]t follows
from the Thomistic principle of anima forma corporis [soul (is the) form of the body]
that such a spiritual characteristic does exist [in woman]. . . . [W]oman shares a basic
human nature, but basically her faculties are different from men’s; therefore a differing
type of soul must exist as well.”32 In Stein’s schema, the body, made for the soul, reflects
this differentiation. This schema follows the teaching of Thomas Aquinas who explained
in the Summa Theologiae:
Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we
must gather from the form the reason why the matter is such as it is; and
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not conversely. . . . But nature never fails anyone what is necessary, and
therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power
of understanding, but also with the power of sensing. Now the action of
the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore the
intellectual soul had to be united to a body which could be the fitting
organ of sense.33
Stein reiterates Aquinas’ teachings: not only is the “matter for the form” in terms of the
human body being for the intellectual soul, but the male and female bodies, different but
equal, reflect the differing but equal male and female souls.
While Stein’s descriptions and typecasting of man and woman are problematic,
her vision of blending feminine and masculine qualities, both within the individual and
within the community is important. According to Stein’s schema, each individual must
come to know and to recognize his/her own gifts and to develop them for the good of all.
Stein maintains:
For a wholesome collaboration of the sexes in professional life will be
possible only if both achieve a calm and objective awareness of their
nature and draw practical conclusions from it. God created humanity as
man and woman, and he created both according to His own image. Only
the purely developed masculine and feminine nature can yield the highest
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attainable likeness to God.34 Only in this fashion can there be brought
about the strongest interpenetration of all earthly and divine life.35
Man and woman, different but equal and both charged with the same “vocation,”36 are
called to be image, progenitor, and steward, 37 and are to help one another in fulfilling
these tasks. Cognizant of and willing to share their gifts, man and woman fulfill their
ontological mission.
Stein’s analysis and description of the different but equal natures of man and
woman are important because they point to a third basic theme in her ethical philosophy:
the responsibility of humans to work together to achieve harmony — harmony that Stein
considers to be the birthright of all human beings. Stein agrees with traditional
theological teaching that harmony, within self, with God, and with others was lost
through sin. She suggests that human beings strive to regain this threefold harmony with
God, self, and others through responsible reflection and action. Examination of an
individual’s life world and natural gifts directs that individual to an acceptance and
appreciation of his/her uniqueness and an awareness of his/her ontic destiny, moving the
individual toward actions that contribute to the original state of harmony.
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According to Stein’s schema, at the beginning of the creation of human beings,
“the faculties in each individual were in perfect harmony; senses and spirit [were] in right
relation with no possibility of conflict.”38 Stein, echoing an Augustinian theme,
conceives of the first humans as beings in right relationship with God, with each other,
and within themselves. However, Stein considers that the original order was obliterated
after the Fall, that is, after the turning of man and woman away from God through sin.39
This turning of man and woman away from God signals the second order of
humanity that Stein calls the “Fallen Order.” She writes: “After their Fall, the
relationship between them [man and woman] is transformed from a pure partnership of
love to a relationship of sovereignty and subordination. The difficult struggle for
existence is allocated primarily to the man and the hardship of childbirth to woman.”40 In
this fallen order, tension replaces a spirit of cooperation, and man and woman see
themselves in competition rather than as sharers in a common descent.
In the third order, the “Redeemed Order,” each individual recognizes the dignity
of his/her being made in the image and likeness of God. In addition, the individual is
able to unfold his/her unique qualities that contribute to harmony within him/herself,
within the community, and within the universal family. The individual strives to reflect
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this uniqueness, this divine image in his/her dealings with others. This recognition of
being made in the image of God comes from an awareness that the human person is made
of body and soul.
In the first order of creation, Stein describes a harmony that exists between creator
and created, between man and woman, and within one’s self. Man and woman,
manifesting God’s creative act differently but equally, work together in reflecting God’s
creative image, bringing forth posterity, and taking care of the earth. The harmonious
order was disrupted, however, and Stein cites the tension between man and woman as
proof of that fallen order. In the redeemed order, Stein envisions a restoration of
harmony through recognition of personal gifts and responsible sharing of these gifts for
the good of all. A spirit of cooperation replaces the existing spirit of dominance and
submission.
Stein suggests that the redeemed order can only occur if individual persons
recognize their human dignity and contribute to a universal harmony that radiates beyond
self. Human dignity is fostered, posits Stein, by an understanding of the psychophysical
person. We consider, then, Stein’s four levels of the psychophysical person.

FOUR LEVELS OF THE PSYCHOPHYSICAL PERSON
Stein gradually develops her concept of the psychophysical person, and as is the
case for Scheler, the study of the human person is a recurring theme in her works. We
have mentioned Stein’s concept of the soul as found in Finite and Eternal Being. In a
previous work, her dissertation, On Empathy, Stein describes the psychophysical person
as comprised of four phenomenal levels of activity which, though distinct, influence one
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another: physical, sentient or emotional, mental, and personal.41 These four levels of the
psychophysical person work together in helping an individual to understand phenomena.
In her habilitation treatise, “Sentient Causality,” Stein, elaborating on her initial
dissertation, considers the effects of causality and motivation on each level of the
psychophysical person. These four levels intertwine to form the life stream of the person
which is supported by the soul, and which finds expression in valuation and action.
The Physical Level
The physical layer of the psychophysical person is comprised of the physical
body, Körper, which takes up physical space in the life world and is ruled by laws of
causality. By causality, Stein means a mediated effect, that is, a causal process is
enacted, either from the outer world onto the person or vice-versa.42 Using Stein’s
examples, an actor may make an onlooker cry; a person perceiving a stone coming
toward him can deflect the stone. The physical layer is affected by causality. The
physical level is the most apparent level and the level at which an individual interfaces
with the life world and with others in that world. The physical level is also the most
basic level at which the things of the world are in contact with the human person.
The Sentient Level
Building on and related to the physical level is the sentient or feeling level of the
human person. This level is also ruled by causality. It is at this second level that the
effect of the universal essence is perceived. The physical body, manifesting a share in
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the universal essence (imparted by the Pure Essence), is alive and sensing. A “life
power”43 that courses through the human body is especially evident at the sentient level.
The sentient level finds expression at the physical level: excitement, for example,
registers in a person’s eyes or manner of talking.
Marianne Sawicki connects Stein’s use of the term life power with the evolving
technology of electricity in 1919 that so fascinated Stein.44 This life power, like electrical
current, can be drawn on, exhausted, and replenished by life experiences, thus showing a
flow between all four layers. For example, a person may be tired on a physical level after
a full day at work, but an invitation to dinner, registering on the sentient level, may cause
an upsurge in energy within the psychophysical being. Conversely, a physically fit
person who is enthusiastically looking forward to taking a walk with a friend may feel
her energy wane while waiting impatiently for the friend to get ready.
The Mental Level
The third level of the psychophysical person, the mental level, is the locus of
intellect and meaning. This is the level, thinks Stein, where motivation is important. At
this level, meaning, and not causality, holds sway. The meaning that is received through
music or works of art at the mental level can affect the sentient level and thus replenish
the life power. Reflection on an artwork or a beautiful musical piece can replenish life
power on the physical as well as the sentient levels. Meaning has a direct impact on
motivation, too. Reading a difficult text, for instance, can drain a student’s energy and
motivate the student to pack up her books and go to another, easier task. Poring over a
43
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difficult text and persevering until some understanding occurs, however, can spur the
reader on to tackle more difficult concepts.
The Personal Level
The personal level or personal core is the realm of freedom expressed in the
personality and actions of the individual; of the four levels, the personal level most
distinctly manifests the relationship between the individuated soul and Pure Being. It is
at this level that the “unchangeable kernel”45 can be found and unfolded. Stein’s
ontology is clear: “[W]e see the meaning of life to be this unfolding of the person.”46
This level, which affirms the human person’s individuality, would seem the locus of the
“soul”; however, Stein considers life power or that which emanates from the soul as
running through and connecting all four levels of the psychophysical person.
Connected with the physical, sentient, and mental levels, the personal level retains
its own source of life power, as if possessing a private reserve. Though conditioned by
sentient causality and influenced by motives, the personal core remains independent.
Borden explains that the personal level is “relatively independent”47 as she writes:
Influences flow directly between the physical and the sentient realms and
between the sentient and the mental realms. In addition, Stein claims that
the fourth realm, the personal layer, retains its own reserve of life power
regardless of the state of the other three realms. The fourth realm, the
center of the will, always has the power to make a resolve, even though
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the physical, sentient, and mental reserves may be low or exhausted. The
personal realm, Stein claims, is properly the center of the person and the
center of free choices and, although conditioned by sentient causality and
directed by motives, it nonetheless retains its distinctiveness. The
personal realm is not utterly independent of the other levels (they provide
conditioning influences); it is nonetheless relatively independent.48
It is at this personal level that the human will is evident. Because of this will,
Stein deems that a range of possible, reasonable actions can emerge, but never be
determined in advance. Though the human person gathers information through all four
levels and knows the effects of both causality and motivation, he/she is free to choose
action. It is this freedom of the human will that leads Stein to conclude that deliberate
human action can never be predicted. In her final work on Saint John of the Cross, The
Science of the Cross, Stein states this idea succinctly: “The soul has the right to make
decisions that concern herself. It is the great mystery of personal freedom, before which
God himself comes to a halt.”49 For Stein, personality, a unique expression of an
individual person, emanating from the personal level, manifests free will and the dignity
of each human person. This free will is seen in the action that the person chooses.
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An Example
Marianne Sawicki suggests thinking of the phenomenal levels as “porous and
blending into one another.”50 Sarah Borden gives a concrete example of this blending
causality, motivation, and will operating within the four levels. Borden explains:
Suppose that I slice my finger with a knife while preparing a salad. The
cut itself occurs on the physical level. When I register the event a few
moments later as I see blood glistening on the blade of the knife, I gasp
and shudder quickly. The cut has registered on the sentient level. I may
then think to myself, “You knew that this knife was too sharp to use for
this, and especially when you are in a hurry.” I would thus register the
event on the mental level, making intelligible how and why the event
occurred. And, finally, I might make the free decision to sit for a minute,
calm myself down, find a bandage, and continue making dinner with a
different knife. The final decisions were not necessary ones — I could
have cried and abandoned the meal — but rather decisions arising from
the personal realm.51
The physical and sentient levels operate under the laws of causality. On a physical level,
the law of causality ordains that a knife drawn against skin cuts; broken skin bleeds.
Causality on the sentient level leads to a gasp and shudder; the injured person feels pain.
But while causality on the physical and sentient levels leads to the thought of using a
smaller knife, meaning — and not causality — holds sway at the mental level. The
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rational motivation on the mental or intellectual level can lead to an action on the
personal level, but action on this level is not predictable causally, is not absolutely
determinable — until the person acts.
Reflecting the influence of Scheler, Stein posits that an act at the personal level,
made through an individual’s free choice, displays a value essential to that individual’s
soul. Thus, the person who cuts him/herself while preparing a meal can either quit or
continue after getting medical attention. [The person who continues to prepare the salad
unaware of the hurt may be limited, for whatever reasons, on the physical and/or sentient
levels. Perhaps the chef has nerve damage to his/her hand or is engrossed in thought and
unaware of what he/she is doing.] The physically and emotionally sound person who
continues to prepare the salad, ignoring the wound and not stopping the flow of blood,
seems “unreasonable,” and his/her action can be deemed beyond the bounds of rational
behavior. The person “conditioned by sentient causality and directed by motives”52 is
able to choose, and his action of quitting can show his choice of the value of
pain/pleasure; if he continues, he shows the value of spirit and determination.
Stein’s idea that an act reveals a value of one’s personal essence will be
considered in Chapter Four. For now, we recognize that an “act” of the person emerges
from the interplay of physical, sentient, and mental influences in conjunction with free
will at the personal level. These four phenomenal layers are intertwined in what Husserl
and Stein refer to as the “life stream.”
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THE CURRENT OF THE LIFE STREAM
Stein describes, in Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, a person’s
move from perceiving the sensuous world to constituting the world in consciousness.
We note Stein’s confidence both in the world as a touchstone for truth and in the ability
of consciousness to clarify truth, as we find it, in the life world. Evidencing her training
in phenomenology, Stein writes:
We are led back from the thing of nature that is one and the same for all
individuals who encounter it, toward the thing as it presents itself to the
individual encountering it at the moment. We can separate from the fully
material thing the “phantom,” the sensuously filled-in spatial pattern
without real-causal properties, of which in turn the bare sight-thing, the
purely visual, is constituted. Multiple “adumbrations” correspond to this
according to the placement of the viewing subject. Each visible quality —
color, shape, and so forth — represents itself in adumbrations, to be sure.
Finally, as the bottom layer of the correlates of consciousness, we find the
data of sensation, which aren’t yet interpreted as characteristics of a
thingly carrier. To all these “noematic” manifolds correspond “noetic”
ones: the life proper of consciousness. Consciousness occupies itself
(“occupation” understood in a very broad sense) with each step in a
different manner. Owing to this busy-ness of consciousness, the noematic
unities of the lower steps turn into manifolds in which the unities of the
higher steps are constituted. If we keep on going back, we come finally to
an ultimate constituting consciousness that doesn’t busy itself anymore
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with constituted unities: the original current of consciousness or
experience-current. With that we want to start our reflections.53
As Stein states, a “thing of nature,” a tree, for the purpose of illustration, presents
itself in “multiple adumbrations . . . according to the placement of the viewing subject.”
This thing of nature “is one and the same for all individuals who encounter it.” Through
the phenomenological reduction, there is a move from the outer, natural world to the
inner world of consciousness as these sensuous qualities of color and shape give way to
acts of consciousness. Just as the “thingly thing” (the tree, for example), is one and the
same for individuals who encounter it, the process of constituting the object in
consciousness is the same, too. We see in Stein, then, a double confidence: 1) a
confidence that the world is real and a touchstone for how things really are, and 2) a
confidence in the ability of the human person to constitute objects in consciousness that
clarify and augment the natural world. This is precisely where Stein remains a
phenomenological realist and refuses to make the transcendental move of Husserl. In
Finite and Eternal Being, Stein speaks of this acceptance of the world:
In human sense perception, the things and events of the external world are
given in order to be accepted. It is in people’s power to move closer and
closer toward these things and events and also to use other means which
may aid them in acquiring more exact knowledge. But when we use the
word “acceptance” we think not so much of the efforts connected with
gaining exact sense knowledge, but rather of what is implied in the word
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assent or belief (in the broadest, non-religious sense of the term, such as
the English word belief has): I am to believe or give credence to what I
see or hear. And in view of the inescapable obtrusiveness with which the
things and objects of our immediate environment urge themselves upon
us, it appears hardly possible to refuse assent to what is “given” in this
manner.54
Stein’s phenomenology, founded on the natural world, accesses truth which is confirmed,
understood, and enhanced by consciousness, while Husserl founds his later
phenomenology on transcendental consciousness which constitutes the world.
Turning her regard from the noematic, meaning-side to the noetic, or actively
constituting side of consciousness, Stein follows Husserl in defining consciousness in
terms of a “current” or a “flow” that is pure becoming; experiences or phases within this
flow move together and form “one undivided and indivisible continuum.”55 Experiences
within this current are “unities in the current that start up new in one phase, propagate,
remain alive while they are running, reach an end at last, yet preserve themselves after
that conclusion.”56 These experiences can come about simultaneously so that a number
of experiences occur at the same time. Stein gives the example of hearing a tone, seeing
a color, and feeling contentment at the same time.
Yet what distinguishes and joins these different kinds of experiences? Each
person, each “I” possesses a stream of consciousness. Stein states that the “I” is the unity
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of this stream of consciousness and that the soul is the “bearer” or sustaining support of
this consciousness and the experiences of which it is made. Recall the concept of soul,
described previously in this chapter, as a sharing in the pure essence that permeates all
levels of the human person. While the soul connects individuals to God and other
ensouled individuals, the soul also unifies the physical, sentient, mental, and personal
levels that structure the psychophysical individual. It is the soul that supports the stream
of experiences within the life stream.
As Stein’s life developed, so did evolve her thoughts on the soul. In her first
phenomenological work, On the Problem of Empathy, Stein describes the “I” as the unity
of the stream of consciousness. After her conversion to Catholicism, Stein describes the
soul in scholastic terms: the soul is the substantial form, the animator, of the body.
Later, in her last phenomenological work, Stein refuses to separate the body and soul,
viewing the distinction as artificial. For Stein, the soul permeates all layers of the
psychophysical human being.
In unfolding the ontic core, a blueprint known to God but discovered at the
innermost depths of a person while in relationship to God, self, and others, it seems as if
there is limited freedom. God has determined the ontic blueprint and it is each person’s
responsibility to discover it and live it out, thus bringing about a redeemed order. Stein’s
understanding of creation plays a significant answer in addressing this riddle. Stein,
recognizing herself as created, identifies God as creator. Made in God’s image and
likeness by virtue of a share in the pure essence, Stein considers each individual person as
a co-creator with the ability to bring about the redeemed order. Thus, while God may
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have a design for each person, that person has free will to co-create with God, in a loving
relationship. Steinian scholar Sarah Borden explains:
Because our individual form lies at the level of soul, Stein in no way
denies human freedom. She says, “[t]he human being is a spiritual person
because he stands freely opposite not only his body but also his soul
(Seele), and only so far as he has power over his soul has he also power
over his body.” We are free because, although having a particularly
formed soul, we also have power over our souls, and we may choose
which psychological (seelische) traits and tendencies to act upon. We can
refuse, for example, to entertain envy or we may cut short an aggressive
action or thought. Our traits – both bodily and psychological ones – need
not dominate our being. We retain an independence and power, albeit not
complete, over them. The freedom to choose among the possibilities
available to us, is central to all personality.57
Stein’s posits the body, soul, and mind as weaving together to form the life stream.
Though created by God and directed in part by God, Stein asserts the freedom of each
ensouled body.
This exposition emphasizes Stein’s concept of the current of the life stream. Stein
writes: “You can say the current is one because it streams forth for one I. Because what
lives into the future out of the past, what feels new life bursting out of itself every
moment, what carries the whole trail of bygones with itself — that’s the I.”58
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It is within this current of consciousness — this life stream — that Stein’s
phenomenological realism, understanding of the soul, and four levels of the
psychophysical person mesh. The psychophysical person comprised of body and soul,
perceived as and perceiving as physical, sentient, mental, and personal being, carries past
and present experiences together as it unfolds its ontic blueprint. From this synthesis
come actions that reflect the human person’s values which in turn shape an ethical life.

A RECONSTRUCTION OF STEIN’S ETHIC
Stein tried on several occasions to connect the scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas
with the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. In a 1929 special issue of the Jahrbuch für
Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Stein’s tribute to the seventy-year-old
Husserl took the form of an imagined meeting, captured in her written gift, “What is
Philosophy? A Conversation between Edmund Husserl and Thomas Aquinas.” Because
the editor of the special edition, Martin Heidegger, asked Stein to tone down the
imaginative conversation, she reworked the dialogue into standard paragraph form. The
revised work, “An Attempt to Contrast Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St.
Thomas Aquinas” changed in format but not in intention.59 Stein’s attempt to unite
scholasticism and phenomenology surfaced again in 1931 when she tried unsuccessfully
to gain a university position. In her Habilitationsschrift for the University of Freiburg,
“Potency and Act,” Stein again attempted to show the compatibility of the two
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approaches. Six years later, from within the walls of the Cologne cloister, Stein
submitted a much expanded version of the former Habilitationsschrift, now called “Finite
and Eternal Being” for publication. This work treated “the fundamental ontological
questions in the comparison between scholasticism and phenomenology.”60 Perhaps it is
not in these published attempts but in Stein’s ethic, never written but suggested and lived,
that she most clearly meshes scholasticism and phenomenology. Stein’s adherence to
Aquinas’ theory of body and soul and natural law as well as Husserl’s privileging of the
subjective view and conscious openness to new horizons is reflected in her search for
truth in theory and practice.
So what might an ethic that combined scholasticism and phenomenology look
like? We go to Stein for a glimpse of such an ethic, reconstructing her moral plan from
her philosophical, autobiographical, and personal writings. The “maxim” or rule of
conduct61 for Stein’s Christian, phenomenological ethic might well be the passage from
the Gospel of John (8:32): “. . . you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.”62
This search for truth is the foundation of Stein’s ethic. In addition to this ever-present
search for truth, I posit that Stein’s ethic would contain four intertwining elements: 1) a
perceiving of the phenomenon of truth; 2) an honoring of relationships; 3) a
responsibility to unfold one’s ontic blueprint; and 4) openness to new horizons.
These components of Stein’s ethic take place as the life stream moves toward
truth. Before exploring these four components, we will consider Stein’s “being toward
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truth” — her allowance for the subjective search for universal truth. Three concepts
regarding truth are intertwined: 1) human beings naturally seek truth; 2) truth is
accessible to human beings; and 3) human beings search for truth in a subjective way.
First, we consider the universality of the search for truth.

Allowance for Universal Truth
Stein’s blending of scholasticism and phenomenology allowed for universals, that
is, laws that hold for all people, at all times, in all circumstances. The ultimate universal,
for which Stein searched, was truth. She pursued truth intellectually and experientially.
This quest brought Stein to the study of psychology, to philosophy, and eventually to
faith. She was so sure of the reality of truth, accessible to rational human beings living in
the life world, that she claimed: “God is truth. All who seek truth seek God, whether this
is clear to them or not.”63
Initially, Stein thought that Husserl and phenomenology answered her search for
truth. We have already mentioned her response after being introduced to Husserl, being
immersed in phenomenological literature and the Göttingen Circle: “[W]hat I had
learned about phenomenology . . . fascinated me tremendously because it consisted
precisely of such a labor of clarification and because, here, one forged one’s own mental
tools for the task at hand.”64 Stein was impressed by Husserl’s search for truth and his
manner of approaching it. As Husserl’s student and assistant, she must have heard and
observed many times the move to greater clarity in search of truth.
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Stein found fellow searchers for truth in Max Scheler, Adolf Reinach, and Teresa
of Avila. Scheler’s sharing of his theories on ethics, the hierarchy of values, and the
primacy of the human person moved Stein toward truth. She claims that because of
Scheler’s influence “the barriers of rationalistic prejudices with which I had unwittingly
grown up fell and the world of faith unfolded before me.”65 In her colleague Adolf
Reinach, Stein found a kindred searcher for truth, a person who, as Hildebrand described
him, was known for his “unconditional love of truth.”66 In Teresa of Avila, Stein
recognized a religious woman who also called this universal truth “God.” Stein studied
with and was attracted by people whose search for truth gave irrefutable evidence that
universal truth existed and that human beings sought truth.
This search for and dedication to universal truth was also familiar to Thomas
Aquinas. In his treatise, On Truth (Questiones diputatae de veritate, 1256-1259), a work
that Stein translated from Latin into German, Aquinas confirms this universal truth as he
states: “The first truth must be one for all things.”67 Stein agreed with Aquinas that the
first truth is God. Stein also found truth especially in two of Aquinas’ concepts: the
natural purpose of all of creation, and the natural law. Thomas, crediting Aristotle in his
“Treatise on Happiness” in Contra Gentiles, explains the idea of natural desire: “Natural
desire cannot be empty, since nature does nothing in vain. But nature’s desire would be
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empty if it could never be fulfilled. Therefore man’s natural desire can be fulfilled.”68
Stein also agreed with Thomas’ adherence to natural law in his Treatise on Law. Natural
law, based on divine law which orders the universe, is written in every human heart.
Aquinas is characteristically succinct: “Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is
to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided.”69 Stein seems especially drawn to
the ordering of our natural inclinations as rational human beings, who, Aquinas explains
have a “natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society.”70 Stein’s
natural inclination and desire for truth, according to natural law, cannot and should not be
thwarted. Her desire for harmony, for the redeemed order, is also in keeping with natural
law. Stein’s search for truth and her desire for harmony are not passing fancies; they are
written in her heart and they seek expression.
Stein came to the realization of universal truth gradually, but once she embraced
this truth, it set into motion the rest of her philosophical and theological queries. She
joined her mentors in the search for universal truths, but she forged her own way in
discovering and expressing this truth.

Recognition of the Subjective Search for Universal Truth
Aquinas, Teresa of Avila, Husserl, Reinach, and Scheler searched for universal
truth and Stein realized that each person’s path to that universal truth was relative to the
individual person. This acceptance of the subjective search for universal truth is
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especially in keeping with Husserl’s phenomenological privileging of the subjective point
of view. While Husserl is not a subjectivist or relativist, he does allow for the experience
of the individual as a threshold to consciousness. His project remains the elucidation of
the essential structures of consciousness.71
In allowing for the subjective search for truth, Stein also incorporates the thinking
of Max Scheler. In Chapter Two, we considered Scheler’s “ethical absolutism” whereby
there is an ordered hierarchy of values given a priori in immediate intuition to the human
person via the emotive sphere. Scheler allows for personal and communal moralities
whereby a person or community’s choices and actions show a preference for certain
values. For Stein, as for Scheler, the truth is universal, but each person’s path to the truth
is relative to that person. Rather than promoting Scheler’s concepts of personal and
communal moralities though, Stein stresses that universal laws (do good; avoid evil)
exist, but that the psychophysical person is capable of acquiring and acting in accordance
with this truth, despite the milieu. Knowledge of truth is influenced by time, history,
culture, and other circumstances — but truth remains universal and universally
accessible. Stein searches for truth in the given world with the confidence that this truth
exists and is accessible to the human person.
For example, Stein accepts the universal truth of a higher power. She personally
refers to God as Pure Essence; she refers to God as “Truth.” But in her writings and in
her lived experience, as exemplified in her acceptance of the beliefs of others, Stein
allows for a broader definition of God. As mentioned in the first chapter of this work,
when Stein was informed of Husserl’s death, she wrote to Sister Adelgundis
Jaegerschmid who had tried to bring Husserl into the Catholic faith: “I am not at all
71

I am grateful to Dr. Eleanore Holveck for this distinction.

145
worried about my dear Master. It has always been far from me to think that God’s mercy
allows itself to be circumscribed by the visible church’s boundaries. God is truth. All
who seek truth seek God, whether this is clear to them or not.”72 When her mother, Frau
Augusta Stein, died in 1936, Stein, again showing her broad definition of God, allows for
different expressions of faith as she rejects resoundingly her mother’s rumored
conversion from Judaism to Catholicism:
The faith and firm confidence she [Frau Augusta Stein] had in her God
from her earliest childhood until her 87th year remained steadfast, and
were the last things that stayed alive in her during the final difficult agony.
Therefore, I have the firm belief that she found a very merciful judge and
is now my most faithful helper on my way, so that I, too, may reach my
goal.73
For Stein, the search for universal truth is the privilege and dignity of each
psychophysical person. Access to these universals is relative.
Thus, the relative search for universal truth forms the foundation and motivating
force in Stein’s Christian, phenomenological method to action. In the combined
traditions of Aquinas and Husserl, Stein allows universal truths to be searched for
relatively, acquired, and applied. Stein’s ethic reflects this “being toward truth” as the
psychophysical person experiences a perceiving of the phenomenon of truth, honors
relationships, unfolds his/her ontic core, and is open to new horizons. We will consider
each of these components of Stein’s ethic.
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A Perceiving of a Phenomenon of Truth
As Stein describes significant events in her life, she often begins by stating that
there is a phenomenon of something “new.” For instance, when Stein describes a
colleague’s words of farewell that indicate her condescending attitude toward others, (as
noted in Chapter Two), she explains: “The words stunned me. [. . .] these words of
farewell from a man whom I esteemed and loved caused me acute distress. I was not
angry with him for saying them. Nor did I shrug them off as an undeserved reproach.
They were for me a first alert to which I gave much reflection.”74 In another example of
this component of perceiving a phenomenon of truth, Stein describes Scheler’s influence
on her: “This was my first encounter with this hitherto totally unknown world. It did not
lead me as yet to the Faith. But it did open for me a region of “phenomena” which I
could then no longer bypass blindly.”75 Stein uses similar language in describing her
faith encounter with the grieving widow Anna Reinach and her words, “This is the truth”
after reading the life of Teresa of Avila indicate a similar “perceiving of the phenomenon
of truth.” These “first alerts” can involve a new idea, a new realization, a new approach.
Stein’s ethical choices involve a “first alert” by which she perceives the phenomenon of
truth in a new or clearer way. This first alert or perceiving of the phenomenon of truth
augments Stein’s foundational search for truth. This discreet moment of truth confirms
Stein’s confidence that truth exists and is accessible to the psychophysical person.
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An Honoring of Relationships
In Stein’s ethical system that is reconstructed here, relationship to self, with God,
and with others fosters an attendant threefold responsibility. It is not enough to recognize
or to be alerted to truth: truth must be sought and expressed in self, with God, and with
others. Before considering how relationship fosters responsibility, we will look at how
relationships, for Stein, help to disclose truth.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Stein described the human person in terms of
the physical and living body. She saw no separation between body and soul and she
defined soul as a sharing in the “pure essence” — that essence that comes from “Pure
Essence,” God, and animates the physical body into a living body. Through her exposure
to Christian ideas, especially through Scheler, Reinach, and Teresa of Avila, Stein
realized that God was more than animator, more than distant Pure Essence. Stein came to
know God as a personal God.
A phenomenon from Stein’s life world impressed this personal relationship with
God at her core. We recall Stein’s chance visit to the Frankfurt cathedral wherein she
witnessed the woman who “stopped in” as if to have a personal conversation with God.
Stein’s words signal the perceiving of a phenomenon of truth and illuminate this need for
a personal relationship: “[H]ere was someone interrupting her everyday shopping
errands to come into this church, although no other person was in it, as though she were
here for an intimate conversation. I could never forget that.”76 In witnessing this
woman’s personal relationship with God, as well as observing Scheler, the Reinachs, and
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Teresa of Avila in relationship with God, Stein began to develop her own personal
relationship with the Lord. Objective truth took on a personal nature.
For Stein, the relationship with God is developed at the psychophysical person’s
core level and is the provenance of the individual person and God. Stein fostered her
own relationship with God through prayer, silence, scholarship, and sacrifice. She
encourages others to take time, to make time, to foster this relationship with God. To
Sister Callista Kopf, OP, Stein offers this advice:
The only essential is that one finds, first of all, a quiet corner in which one
can communicate with God as though there were nothing else, and that
must be done daily. It seems to me the best time is in the early morning
hours before we begin our daily work; furthermore, [it is also essential]
that one accepts one’s particular mission there, preferably for each day,
and does not make one’s own choice. Finally, one is to consider oneself
totally as an instrument, especially with regard to the abilities one uses to
perform one’s special tasks, in our case, e.g., intellectual ones. We are to
see them as something used, not by us, but by God in us.77
In addition to establishing contact with God, Stein also fostered relationships with
others and thought that being with others disclosed truth to the person in a new way.
Recall her dissertation, in which she treats empathy as a way of knowing others at the
sentient and mental levels. In her work on empathy she writes: “The ‘I’ does not become
individualized because another faces it, but its individuality . . . its selfness is brought
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into relief in contrast with the otherness of the other.”78 Through another person, an
individual learns about self as a new world perspective is gained and feedback is given to
the person about him/herself.
There is a hindrance to looking at another person in order to define self, though.
In Immanuel Kant’s terms, to use another human being for self knowledge would be to
treat a person as a means to an end (self knowledge), not as an end in him/herself.79
Stein’s concept of the psychophysical person prevents this error, however. Each human
person has a personal core and is uniquely responsible for unfolding one’s ontic destiny.80
Realization of each human being’s personality and ontic destiny reflects Stein’s
adherence to scholasticism which defines human beings as made in the image and
likeness of God. Stein allows another human being to disclose truth about self, but this is
not the primary focus or function of the other. In relationship with God and knowing self
as a physical, emotive, mental, and personal being, a psychophysical person contributes
his own gifts to the building up of community. In agreement with Kant, Stein’s
psychophysical person may never be used merely as an object. In agreement with
Aquinas and Husserl, another psychophysical person is not an object for self knowledge
but a unique rational being, a subject in the world.
Stein envisions this relationship with others as flowing from the relationship with
God. Stein, in the same letter to Sister Callista, states:
78

Stein, On The Problem of Empathy 38.

79

Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Macmillan P, 1990)
46. Kant expresses the categorical imperative: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.”
80

Dr. Fred Evans makes the point that in terms of Kant’s maxim, God would be unethical
(seemingly) as he uses persons who unfold their ontic cores to bring about the redeemed order. Stein
asserts that God is Creator who makes all things good. God is creator; God is good. He who makes all
things good, and who is himself good, would not use another person as a means to an end.

150
Immediately before, and for a good while after my conversion, I was of
the opinion that to lead a religious life meant one had to give up all that
was secular and to live totally immersed in thoughts of the Divine. But
gradually I realized that something else is asked of us in this connection to
the world. I even believe that the deeper one is drawn into God, the more
one must “go out of oneself”; that is, one must go to the world in order to
carry the divine life into it.81
The truth, revealed by God and/or through another human person, is not a private affair.
In going “out of oneself,” the person carries truth to others.
For Stein, recognizing our relationship to God, self, and others helps us to see the
significance of the harmony that belonged to the created order and is promised in the
redeemed order. Stein posits that the redeemed order is realized when psychophysical
persons honor their relationships by developing their own natural gifts and sharing them
with the world.

A Responsibility to Unfold One’s Ontic Blueprint
Stein posits that within each psychophysical person, there is an ontic blueprint, a
specific, individualized plan, known to God but revealed to the individual. This ontic
plan needs to be discovered and unfolded through a process that takes place naturally,
through the development and growth of the physical, emotional, and mental levels of the
human being. However, it is especially at the personal core, in silent reflection, where
this ontic blueprint is recognized and revealed. It is for this reason that Stein, in her later
years, advocated spending time with God, as evidenced in her letter to Sister Callista.
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When a person becomes aware of his or her natural gifts; when this person sees
difference and sameness in other human beings; when this person succeeds and fails
through experiences in the life world — then the ontic blueprint unfolds.
Stein deems the human person capable of recognizing and developing one’s
natural gifts. She also regards the human person capable of developing relationships with
God and other human beings, thereby deepening one’s self awareness. Stein therefore
holds the individual responsible to unfold his/her ontic blueprint. Personal selfexamination, reflection, and interaction with others reveal the truth about oneself. Aware
of “fallen” human nature, though, Stein also knows the possibility of atrophy and the
squandering of human gifts. Reflecting the influence of Aquinas and the scholastics,
Stein allows human efforts to be enhanced by God’s intervention as “Grace perfects
nature.”82
A story bears out Stein’s understanding of how the ontic blueprint unfolds. When
Stein and her older sister, Erna, were invited to their uncle’s house after Erna’s
graduation from high school, Edith knew that their relative would try to impose a
profession on both of them, but especially on Erna. Stein explains that her uncle “hoped
to prevail on both of us to choose the medical profession; and in his mind’s eye, he
already saw us, each with a different specialty, working hand in hand in a joint private
clinic.”83 When the sisters were alone at night, Edith would challenge Erna: “Don’t let
yourself be influenced. Do what you, yourself, consider right!”84 Erna acquiesced to her
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uncle’s wishes however, and she began to study medicine. Two years later, Edith, now
the graduate, was again invited to visit her uncle’s house in Chemnitz. She recounts:
I accepted with joyful thanks but immediately added that my profession
had already been chosen85 and that the matter was no longer open for
discussion. Uncle capitulated in the face of this declaration. He refrained
from making even the slightest attempt to change my decision. Several
months later he remarked to my sister that, possibly in his old age, he
might have to doff his hat to me but for the present it was beyond him how
one could choose a profession solely according to one’s personal talent
and inclination.86
Choosing a profession solely according to one’s personal talent and inclination is
precisely what Stein has in mind when she advocates the unfolding of one’s own ontic
blueprint.
In her work on empathy, Stein posits that a human being can unfold his/her
personal core, or kernel. Stein is sure that this unfolding is visible in others and she
comments: “As my own person is constituted in primordial spiritual acts, so the foreign
person is constituted in empathically experienced acts.”87 Stein adds: “Accordingly, a
single action and also a single bodily expression, such as a look or a laugh, can give me a
glimpse into the kernel of the person.”88 Erna’s action, then, gives Edith a glimpse into
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her sister’s soul. Edith’s strong recommendation to Erna to choose for herself went
unheeded, lending credence to Edith Stein’s conviction that the personal core is the
provenance of the individual and God. Erna’s actions manifest her personal core — an
area known to Erna and God alone — and an area, thinks Stein, wherein God respects the
person’s free will.
Like God, Stein concedes that persons should respect one another’s free will, too.
For example, Stein clearly disagrees with her sister Erna’s decision but recognizes her
free will. The younger Stein writes:
I do not believe that Erna ever regretted her decision. She finished the
strenuous program of studies, under varying trying physical difficulties at
times; and she became thoroughly familiar with her profession. Later,
when I assisted her occasionally during her office hours, I was quietly
happy to note with what calm assurance she conducted her practice. (She
in no way displayed this calm and assurance to the same degree in her
personal life. That demonstrated to me for the first time in my experience
the effectiveness of a thorough educational foundation.)89
This anecdotal story highlights the last component of Stein’s ethic: “an openness to new
horizons.”

Openness to New Horizons
In unfolding the ontic blueprint, a person must be open to new truths as they are
discovered and encountered. A newly perceived phenomenon of truth and the unfolding
of the ontic core bring about a new horizon, a new perspective from which the
89
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psychophysical person now views the world. Attention to one’s gifts, the development of
the psychophysical levels throughout time, and human and divine interaction facilitate the
unfolding of the ontic core and of a new horizon.
Education, for example, provides a way by which new horizons are broached. In
the story recounted earlier, Erna, while not naturally suited (in Edith’s opinion) to the
study of medicine, learns to be a capable and caring physician through education and
training. Erna’s newfound profession unfolds on the human level as she develops new
skills and latent talents. Although she did not make the decision that Edith wanted, Erna
nevertheless moved forward in her pursuit of her new profession: her decision brought
about a new landscape, a new view of the world. Erna carries her talents, temperament,
and past experiences with her as she acquires new knowledge and develops new skills.
But her decision to study medicine ushers in a new set of experiences and possibilities.
In Edith Stein’s schema, the moral person, moving toward truth, recognizes all
levels of the psychophysical person and exercises free will. Stein’s uncle imposes his
will on Erna, no doubt looking out for her best interests, which included financial
security: Erna capitulates. Edith does not condemn her sister; she allows Erna the
exercise of her free will, though compromised by their uncle. However, faced with a
similar situation, Edith Stein foregoes financial security to develop the gifts she has by
nature. Edith Stein’s decision to forego her uncle’s influence and follow her own
inclinations brings her to a new horizon. Stein’s choice of a career based on her gifts and
desires better defines some of the possibilities open to her; at the same time it diminishes
other courses of action. For instance, Edith’s decision to study philosophy rather than
pharmacology precludes a joint private clinic with Erna. The perception of a
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phenomenon of truth, an attendant action that honors relationships and unfolds a person’s
ontic core, brings about a range of possibilities, a new horizon from which new
phenomenon of truth may be experienced.
For Stein, the quest for truth is universal, real, and in keeping with the capability
and possibilities of the psychophysical person. An attendant decision based on this newly
perceived truth, honoring of relationships, and unfolding of one’s ontic core brings with it
a new horizon. But Stein allows for a divine unfolding of horizons, too. Stein writes:
The believer knows that One exists whose vision is not limited by any
horizon. There is one who embraces and is present in everything. He who
lives in the certainty of this faith, honestly feels that his own knowledge
can no longer satisfy him, however vast that knowledge may be. He must
necessarily strive to know what is just in the eyes of God.90
Erna, for example, makes a decision that honors her uncle’s will more than it develops
her own gifts and desires. This mistake, in Edith Stein’s opinion, bears fruit in Erna’s life
— she becomes a well-qualified and compassionate doctor. God, “whose vision is not
limited by any horizon” and “who embraces and is present in everything” is able to help
Erna unfold new or perhaps latent gifts. The movement toward truth, however halting,
ushers in new possibilities, new occasions for greater truth and growth.

CONCLUSION
According to Stein’s schema, the ontic blueprint is from God and its unfolding
contributes to His plan for the natural ordering of the world. With a vested interest in the
90
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unfolding of each person’s potential, God can intervene and bring harmony, even when
decisions wreck havoc and stunt a person’s natural unfolding. In a talk to women in
Switzerland, delivered in 1932, Stein speaks of a “life in which all faculties come to
development.”91 In another essay, the “Spirituality of the Christian Woman,” (1932)
Stein reiterates this point: “I believe . . . we will always find fundamentally the
compulsion to become what the soul should be, the drive to allow the latent humanity, set
precisely in its individual stamp, to ripen to the greatest possible perfect development.”92
An openness to new horizons, human and divine, allows the psychophysical person to
continue to search for truth.
The process of living the ethical life is ongoing and requires a willingness to
change, despite the personal cost. In the next chapter, we will see how ongoing growth
and adherence to truth cost Stein physically, emotionally, and mentally — ultimately
demanding a rendering of her total self. Three events from Stein’s life will be used to
substantiate my claim that Stein’s ethic would have included a search for truth, in
relationship, responsibility, and openness to new horizons — a stance that meshes
phenomenology and faith. We will consider whether the ethical choices that Stein faced
in 1933 helped her to know the truth—and whether that truth set her free.
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CHAPTER FOUR: EVIDENCE OF AN ETHIC

INTRODUCTION
Stein’s awareness of Hitler’s rise to power and the inevitable demise of the Jews,
as well as the effect on Catholics, then all Germans, and ultimately the wider world
population was gradual but definite. Having been elected Chancellor of Germany on
January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler immediately began enacting the first wave of his Aryan
policies. On April 1, 1933, two months after Hitler took control of Germany, Stein
witnessed the boycott of Jewish-owned businesses.1 On April 5, 1933, she wrote to her
friend and fellow philosopher, Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Part of the letter reads:
My relatives in Breslau are obviously very upset and depressed. Sad to
say, as far as the family [lumber] business is concerned, it has not
mattered for some time now whether it is open or not. Also, my brotherin-law expects his dismissal any day. . . . Every letter contains more bad
news. My relatives in Hamburg do not seem to have been affected so far.
I, personally, have been assured by everyone that I need not fear for my
position. . . . Tomorrow I will travel to Beuron and remain over Easter,
returning here again about the 19th [of April].2
It became increasingly clear to Stein that she must respond to the changes within her life
world in some way. In this response, Stein will perceive a phenomenon of truth; honor
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relationships with God, self, and others; unfold her ontic blueprint; and remain open to
future phenomena of truth, new possibilities — new horizons. Stein’s ethic enables her
to respond to the life world as it changes around her.
In the nineteen months between January 1932 and October 1933, Stein initiated
three actions by which she personally responded to Hitler’s move to power. These
actions had no effect on Hitler and National Socialism, but they reflected Stein’s attempt
to seek truth while honoring her relationships and responsibilities. These three actions,
Stein’s writing of a letter to Pope Pius XI, her decision to enter the Carmelite Order, and
her authorship of a personal description of Jewish life — were all reasoned attempts to
match her thoughts and beliefs with her actions. These phenomena give evidence of
Stein’s ethic which drew from a life-stream that mingled reason and faith.
Some background information will help to situate Stein before these events are
described. From 1925-1933, Stein taught high school girls in Saint Magdalena Teacher’s
School in Speyer. Despite her doctoral degree and eighteen-month internship as
Husserl’s assistant, Stein had been denied access to any university teaching position,
presumably because women were then restricted in the world of higher education. By
1933, Stein had been a practicing Catholic for eleven years. Ever since reading the life of
Teresa of Avila in the summer of 1921 and her conversion to Catholicism in 1922, Stein
had yearned to enter the religious Order of Discalced Carmelites. Her spiritual advisers
thought that Stein’s offerings as a lecturer were more important, however, and they
discouraged her entrance into Carmel. Stein’s success as a speaker for the Catholic
Women’s Movement had earned her prestige and had precipitated her moving from
Speyer to Münster, where she accepted a post at the Catholic Pedagogical Institute.
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While teaching at the Institute in Münster, Stein continued her speaking engagements and
collaborated with other professionals on a curriculum specifically designed for Catholic
women.
An incident that made Stein consciously and irrevocably aware of the fate of the
Jewish people and of herself under Hitler’s new regime occurred in 1933 while she was
living at the Collegium Marianum (a dormitory for religious sisters who were studying at
the Institute). Stein was locked out after attending a conference.3 A Catholic teacher and
his wife, recognizing Stein’s predicament, invited her to their home for the evening and
she accepted. While the professor’s wife prepared Stein’s room, the host “related what
American newspapers had reported concerning cruelty to which Jews had been
subjected.”4 Stein, who usually apprised people of her Jewish heritage, refrains in this
case: “It would have seemed to me like a breach of their hospitality if I had disturbed
their night’s rest by such a revelation.” Stein’s inward response, though purposely
concealed, was immediate: “True, I had heard of rigorous measures against the Jews
before. But now a light dawned in my brain that once again God had put a heavy hand
upon His people and that the fate of this people would also be mine.”5
Some commentators take exception to Stein’s refusal to claim her Jewish heritage
in this encounter. Stein’s reference to God putting a “heavy hand upon His people” is
3
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also troublesome because it implies that the persecution of the Jews is God’s action or at
least God’s permissive will. Stein’s critics stress that it was predominantly Christians
who promulgated the Aryan laws against the Jews,6 and they accuse Stein of accepting
the Catholic Church’s thinly-veiled anti-Semitism that once held that the Jews were
responsible for the death of Jesus.7 These debates are important but are better left to
other studies. What is critical in the retelling of Stein’s story here is the “first alert”
wherein she became acutely aware of the insidious evil and breadth of Hitler’s plan and
of her need to act in some way against it.
Stein’s wording, “a light dawned in my brain,” signals a coming to consciousness,
the awareness of a new phenomenon. She was faced with a concrete ethical dilemma:
How would she, a Catholic of Jewish descent, soon to be deprived of any livelihood as a
teacher or lecturer, live an ethical life within the confines of the Third Reich? How
would she continue to develop her relationship to God, self, and others while unfolding
her own ontic blueprint in these newly-revealed life situations? This chapter will focus
on Stein’s ethical response to this problem as seen in three actions: 1) the writing of a
letter to Pope Pius XI; 2) the decision to enter the Carmelite Order, which prompted her
visit to Breslau to inform her mother and family of her decision; and 3) the writing of
Life in a Jewish Family. These actions, mentioned in Stein’s essay, “How I Came to the
Cologne Carmel,” testify to Stein’s struggle to live in a way true to her reasoned beliefs.8
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THE EVENTS OF 1933
As she mentioned in her April 5, 1933, letter to Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Stein
planned to visit Beuron for retreat (a time of prayer and quiet) during Holy Week, the
week leading up to Easter. Since 1928, Stein had been traveling each year to the
Benedictine Abbey at Beuron to participate in the Holy Week liturgies and spend time
alone in silent prayer. But the events of 1933 brought an added sense of urgency to her
time of retreat. In her autobiographical sketch, Stein relates: “This time a special reason
drew me there. During the past weeks I had constantly given thought to whether I could
do something about the plight of the Jews. Finally I had made a plan to travel to Rome
and ask the Holy Father in a private audience for an encyclical.”9 Stein decided to travel
to Rome to speak with the head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Pius XI,10 and to
tell him in person about the worsening conditions in Germany, but first she sought the
permission of her spiritual director.
Stein’s plans for the Holy Week retreat in Beuron and the occasion to speak to her
spiritual director about a visit to the Pope were postponed, however. She traveled to
Cologne overnight to instruct a former student, Hedwig Spiegel, née Hess, who was
preparing to be baptized in the Catholic Church. The two women attended a Holy Hour

her entrance into Carmel, Neyer writes: “It [this essay] is the moving testimony of a human being who has
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commemorating the Passion of the Lord at the Carmel in Cologne-Lindenthal. Stein
wrote of the occasion:
He [the priest] spoke beautifully and movingly, but something other than
his words occupied me more intensely. I talked with the Savior and told
Him that I knew that it was His cross that was now being placed upon the
Jewish people; that most of them did not understand this, but that those
that did, would have to take it up willingly in the name of all. I would do
that. He should only show me how. At the end of the service, I was
certain that I had been heard. But what this carrying of the cross was to
consist in, that I did not yet know.11
Stein traveled to Beuron on Holy Saturday and inquired about the feasibility of her
planned trip to Rome to speak with Pope Pius XI. Further consideration rendered the trip
impractical, however, since 1933 had been declared a Holy Year, honoring the nineteenth
centennial of the death of Jesus Christ.12 Stein writes: “Through my inquiries in Rome I
ascertained that because of the tremendous crowds I would have no chance for a private
audience. At best I might be admitted to a ‘semi-private audience,’ i.e. an audience in a
small group. That did not serve my purpose.”13
Stein adjusted her plans and on April 12, she wrote a letter to Pope Pius XI urging
him to write an encyclical, a letter to the world, denouncing Hitler and the National

11

Stein, “Carmel” 17.

12

A Holy Year is a time of celebration and prayer designated by the Pope to commemorate a
special occasion within the Roman Catholic Church.
13

Stein, “Carmel” 17.

163
Socialist regime.14 Following papal protocol, Stein sent her letter to the Pope via her
spiritual director, Archabbot Raphael Walzer.

1933: Stein’s Letter to Pope Pius XI
In her letter to Pope Pius XI, Edith Stein describes herself first as “a child of the
Jewish people who, by the grace of God, for the past eleven years has also been a child of
the Catholic Church.” She expresses her intent: “I dare to speak to the Father of
Christendom about that which oppresses millions of Germans.” Stein, as a
phenomenologist, knows the importance of words and descriptions; she is exact in her
word usage. Her use of descriptors is therefore fully intended: she is Jewish, Catholic,
German, and as a “daughter” of all three groups, Stein knows of what she speaks. She
highlights, however, not the plight of the Jews but the oppression of millions of Germans,
specifically Catholic Germans, for whom the Pope is responsible. As the contents of the
letter unfold, Stein focuses first on the Pope’s duty to Catholics and then broadens the
scope of his responsibility to embrace all of humanity.
Early in Stein’s letter she describes the conditions in Germany:
For weeks we have seen deeds perpetrated in Germany which mock any
sense of justice and humanity, not to mention love of neighbor. For years
the leaders of National Socialism have been preaching hatred of the Jews.
14
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Now that they have seized the power of the government and armed their
followers, among them proven criminal elements, this seed of hatred has
germinated. The government has only recently admitted that excesses
have occurred. To what extent, we cannot tell, because public opinion is
being gagged. However, judging by what I have learned from personal
relations, it is in no way a matter of singular exceptional cases. Under
pressure from reactions abroad, the government has turned to “milder”
methods. It has issued the watchword, “no Jew shall have even one hair
on his head harmed.”15
After describing the conditions within Germany and mentioning that pressure from
foreign countries has imposed some restraint on the Nazis, Stein emphasizes the despair
of the people, evidenced in the growing number of suicides.
But through boycott measures — by robbing people of their livelihood,
civic honor and fatherland — it drives many to desperation; within the last
week, through private reports I was informed of five cases of suicide as a
consequence of these hostilities. I am convinced that this is a general
condition which will claim many more victims. One may regret that these
unhappy people do not have greater inner strength to bear their
misfortune.16
Through candid description, Stein has alerted the Holy Father to the deteriorating
conditions within Germany. While it seems as though Stein barely mentions the
sufferings of the Jewish people, I propose that her purpose was not to minimize the ill
15
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treatment of the Jews but to emphasize the Pontiff’s responsibility. Stein appeals to Pope
Pius XI by stressing the sufferings of the Catholics so that he, as head of the Roman
Catholic Church, might publicly and legitimately denounce Hitler. Ultimately, the Nazi
regime would deprive Catholic Germans of livelihood, civic honor, and fatherland:
denouncing Hitler for these imminent injustices would be within the Pope’s domain.

Analysis of Stein’s Letter
Evidence of Stein’s four-fold movement toward an ethic can be seen in her
composition of a letter to Pope Pius XI. Stein seeks to live ethically, that is, she works to
match her internal thoughts and beliefs with her external actions. This ethical movement
toward truth, this expression of internal thoughts and beliefs through concrete actions,
provides the underpinning and motive of her attempt to see the Pope in person, and later,
to write a letter to him. As evidenced by her autobiographical sketch, Stein recognizes
Hitler’s rise to power on an emotive as well as on a mental level, and she wills to act
against this evil.
If Stein’s movement toward an ethical response is to be valid for her, if her
movement against Hitler and evil is to be authentic, she must incorporate the truth of her
personal core. She has grown in awareness of her gifts of nature and grace through
prayer, self-examination, and trial and error in life circumstances. Stein realizes that she
must respond in a manner that reflects her unique gifts as scholar, phenomenologist, and
Catholic of Jewish descent. She relies on written communication — a vehicle that she
has learned to respect — to express her perspective of the situation in Germany. In this
letter, Stein acknowledges her relationship with God and others while signaling her
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relationship with her own personal core. She reflects an understanding of self as she
writes: “During the past weeks I had constantly given thought to whether I could do
something [. . .].”17 Aware of her inherent gifts and having ascertained the most effective
use of these gifts, she addresses Pope Pius XI as an intercessor for Jews, Catholics,
Germans, and in reality, for all members of society.
In her personal letter to Pope Pius XI, Stein, hoping to elicit a reply, presents her
points as questions. The ultimate response she hopes for is papal renunciation of
National Socialism. Through a series of questions, Stein reminds the Holy Father of his
duty to all of Christendom, to the Jewish people, and to the world. She questions the
appropriation of Christian terms to serve Nazi needs. She wonders with alarm at the
flagrantly heretical Nazi policies that idolize the Aryan race and the National Socialist
government. She confronts the Catholic thinking of the time that holds the Jewish people
responsible for the death of Christ by calling attention to Jesus’ forgiving of his
persecutors from the cross. Stein’s presentation of the facts reveals signs of deep
reflection on truth; her manner of presentation is consistent with an unfolding of her
personal core as she uses her unique gifts as a philosopher, a phenomenologist, a
Catholic:
Everything that happened and continues to happen on a daily basis
originates with a government that calls itself “Christian.” For weeks not
only Jews but also thousands of faithful Catholics in Germany, and I
believe, all over the world, have been waiting and hoping for the Church
of Christ to raise its voice to put a stop to this abuse of Christ’s name. Is
not this idolization of race and governmental power which is being
17
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pounded into the public consciousness by the radio open heresy? Isn’t the
effort to destroy Jewish blood an abuse of the holiest humanity of our
Savior, of the most blessed Virgin and the apostles? Is not all this
diametrically opposed to the conduct of our Lord and Savior, who, even
on the cross, still prayed for his persecutors? And isn’t this a black mark
on the record of this Holy Year which was intended to be a year of peace
and reconciliation?18
Stein’s questions are meant to promote thought and provoke action. She reports to the
Holy Father from her vantage point, clearly and forcibly describing the truth as she sees
it. The neutral position that the Vatican has taken will not serve the purposes of God, His
people, His Church, or His creation. Possibly projecting her own ethical decision to do
something, Stein states a truth she has discovered personally: silence is no longer a viable
option.
On a less lofty plane, the reputation of the Church is at stake, and Stein stresses
that Catholics as well as those of other faiths know fully, “with open eyes,” what is taking
place. She writes:
We all, who are faithful children of the Church and who see the conditions
in Germany with open eyes, fear the worst for the prestige of the Church,
if the silence continues any longer. We are convinced that this silence will
not be able in the long run to purchase peace with the present German
government.19
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Stein’s letter takes on an urgency that John Sullivan refers to as “prophetic
intervention”20 as she predicts the course of action that the Nazis will take:
For the time being, the fight against Catholicism will be conducted quietly
and less brutally than against Jewry, but no less systematically. It won’t
take long before no Catholic will be able to hold office in Germany unless
he dedicates himself unconditionally to the new course of action.21
Stein has stated the facts: Hitler’s National Socialism has overtaken the German
government and is slowly but surely winning the minds, hearts, and consciences of the
German people. The new government, under the guise of being “Christian,” has gained
respect and support from the people. Jews are openly attacked and Catholics will become
the next target of hatred.
Stein’s advice as to the action that Pope Pius XI needs to initiate is both precise
and pointed: he must speak out publicly against Hitler and National Socialism. Since
public opinion was being gagged in Germany through the Nazis’ control of the radio and
press, the German people were easily hoodwinked into believing the propaganda. Stein
indirectly provides the Pope with a way to get his message to the people — via radio.
In her work, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family and Nazi Politics,
historian Claudia Koonz deems Hitler a mastermind of modern technology and
communication. Koonz explains that “to enable all citizens to hear their Führer's magic
voice, the government subsidized the production of radios (called volksempfanger —
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literally, ‘people’s receivers’).”22 Stein mentions the radio as the means by which the
“idolization of race and governmental power” is “being pounded into the public
consciousness.”23 Although it is speculation on my part, I believe that Stein’s mention
of the radio is no accident, as it hints at one means of communicating a papal
pronouncement. The German people would be forbidden, under punishment of death,24
to listen to foreign government broadcasts; nevertheless, occasional BBC reports did get
through. Even if the Pope’s message were not transmitted but merely denounced by Nazi
officials during the approved broadcasts, a public denouncement of it would signal to the
people that the Pope had spoken. Stein was convinced that “this silence will not be able
in the long run to purchase peace with the present German government.”25 A
pronouncement from the Pope via radio — be it via BBC or via a denunciation of the
Pope’s message by the Nazi government — would have been one way of ending the
papal silence.
Stein used the gifts at her disposal: she unfolded her personal core in addressing
Pope Pius XI. While Stein referred to herself as a German, a child of the Jewish people,
and now a member of the Catholic Church, she communicated with the Pope as a
daughter of phenomenology and of faith. She alerted the Holy Father to the phenomenon
of Hitler; she described conditions in Germany clearly and in great detail; she prompted
22
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reflection and dialogue and attempted to effect a change in the Pope’s silence through
questions. Finally, she reminded the Pontiff of the truth that “the responsibility must fall,
after all, on those who brought them [the victims] to this point and it also falls on those
who keep silent in the face of such happenings.”26
Another facet of Stein’s ethical movement is her honoring of relationships.
Stein’s identification of herself in the letter to the Pope as a Jew, Catholic, German, and
instructor indicates her relationships with and her qualifications to speak on behalf of
these various groups. However, Stein signals a deeper relationship as she exercises her
right as an individual person within the cosmic community. In her treatise, On the State,
Stein draws a connection between the individual, the community, and the state, insisting
that the state is at the service of the individuals who comprise the community. According
to Hitler’s scheme, as seen by his demands, (such as sworn allegiance to the Führer,
compulsory participation in rallies and groups), the people were at the service and
disposal of the Nazi state. Knowing that her words would be ineffectual to Hitler or to
his government, Stein appeals to the legitimate head of another group to which she
belongs. She reminds the Pope that he is the Servant of the People, responsible for
individuals in this life and as Christ’s mediator on earth, for life after death. Stein’s
reference to suicide is powerful because at that time, taking one’s own life was
considered a grave sin that merited the loss of salvation. To attest to the gravity the
Catholic Church ascribed to this act, those who committed suicide were denied burial in a
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Catholic cemetery.27 Stein reminds the Pope of the responsibility he bears to the people
entrusted to his care:
[. . .] within the last week, through private reports I was informed of five
cases of suicide as a consequence of these hostilities. I am convinced that
this is a general condition which will claim many more victims.28
Stein knew her place in the Jewish community, in the German community, and in the
Catholic community. She reminds the Pope of his responsibility only after she had
realized and accepted her responsibility as an individual person within the cosmic
community.
A new horizon presents itself for Stein as she faces Hitler and the evil he
perpetuates. Stein breaks her own silence and there is no turning back. Her action of
writing to the Pope attests to the truth, new to her, that to be silent is to share guilt.
Whether Pope Pius XI issues an encyclical or not, Stein can no longer retreat in silence.
She will continue her practices of prayer and sacrifice, but her life stream takes on new
urgency and new direction as she voices a truth that poses new possibilities — even
death. We witness Stein’s encounter with a new horizon in her determination to move
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forward despite the Holy Year, the lack of a personal audience with the Pope, etc. Stein
is no longer content to await the approval and consent of her spiritual directors. She sets
out, with God, into uncharted waters.
Stein’s letter to Pope Pius XI regarding the evil of Hitler and National Socialism
was futile in spurring him to speak. The silence of Pope Pius XI is well-documented and
will be debated into the future. What is important to this study is that Stein uses reason
and faith, incorporating her four-fold movement toward an ethic, as she writes to Pope
Pius XI. Stein recognizes multiple truths: Hitler is on the rise to power and threatens
human life; she must give expression to this truth that she has come to realize; and to
remain silent in the face of evil would be to deny the truth. Unwilling and unable to be
silent any longer, Stein unfolds her personal core and shares her skills as a philosopher,
writer, and teacher in urging the Pope to act. Stein honors the relationships that she has
forged as a Jew, German, Catholic, and scholar. Above all, she honors her relationship
and responsibility as a member of the cosmic community. She carries her newly
expressed truths and her willingness to stand up for the safety of others as she moves
forward in her life world. Later, Stein would tell a friend about this letter to Pope Pius
XI:
I know that my letter was delivered to the Holy Father [Pope Pius XI]
unopened; sometime thereafter I received his blessing for myself and for
my relatives. Nothing else happened. Later on I often wondered whether
this letter might have come to his mind once in a while. For in the years

173
that followed, that which I had predicted for the future of the Catholics in
Germany came true step by step.29
That Stein’s letter went unnoticed is regrettable, but her act of writing evidences
an ethic — a meshing of thought and belief with action. Aware of the truth of the rise of
Hitler to power and of her need to do something, Stein uses her gifts and unfolds her
unique personal core. She honors the relationships she has been given and which she has
fostered throughout her life. The Pope’s response or lack thereof signals a new horizon
that calls for another ethical response.

1933: To Carmel
After retreat and before returning to her job in Münster, Stein asked her spiritual
director, Archabbot Walzer, what she should do if her job were terminated. Walzer’s
reply indicated the level of incomprehension that some people had regarding Hitler’s
intentions. Stein records: “He [Walzer] found it totally unbelievable that that could
happen.”30
On the train back from retreat in Beuron to Münster, Stein read a newspaper
article about a recent National Socialist convention which members of religious teachers’
organizations were compelled to attend. Stein records her sense of impending doom:
“The Institute in which I worked was purely Catholic, co-founded and supported by the
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Catholic Teachers’ Organization. Thus its days were probably numbered. All the more I
would have to reckon with the termination of my short career as a college instructor.”31
On April 19, 1933, an administrator at the Institute advised Stein to do some quiet
research during the summer months, instead of planning any lectures. He assured Stein
that the situation would be over by autumn when she could resume her teaching
activities, and he commended her for taking the news so well. The chairwoman of the
Catholic Teachers’ Organization suggested a similar course of action and apprised Stein
of a teaching position in South America.
When Stein’s job at the Pedagogical Institute was terminated because of her
Jewish origins, she interpreted her dismissal as permission from God to enter Carmel.
Certain of this permission at her personal core, Stein did not wait for the consent of her
spiritual director. She broached a new horizon and began the process to enter the
Discalced Carmelite Order.
When Stein had been baptized in 1922, she had refrained from telling her mother
of a desire to enter religious life, since it would have been too hard on Frau Stein.
Reflecting on this delay and on her current situation, Stein writes:
It [entrance into Carmel] was denied me with reference to my mother and
because of the effectiveness which my work had had in Catholic circles in
recent years. I had yielded. But now the walls that had stood in my way
had crumbled. My effectiveness was at an end. And surely my mother

31

Stein, “Carmel” 18.

175
would prefer me to be in a convent in Germany rather than a school in
South America.32
Two weeks after writing her letter to Pope Pius XI and having been dismissed
from the Pedagogical Institute for reasons of race, Stein sought more time for reflection
on her situation. On April 30, 1933, celebrated as Good Shepherd Sunday, Stein went to
Saint Ludgar Church. At the Mass the Gospel account of Jesus laying down his life for
his sheep was read. Thirteen hours of prayer had been specially planned for this
important Church feast. “I went there late in the afternoon and said to myself, ‘I’m not
leaving here until I have a clearcut assurance whether I may now enter Carmel.’ After
the concluding blessing had been pronounced, I had the assurance of the Good
Shepherd.”33
Stein wrote to Archabbot Walzer for the required permission to enter Carmel, but
she knew that her letter would sit unopened in Beuron until his return from Rome. Stein
proceeded, without his permission. One week later she met with Dr. Cosack, a colleague
who was connected with the Cologne Carmel. Stein describes their honest dialogue:
I told her what I had in mind. I immediately added what might be held
against me: my age (42), my Jewish descent,34 my lack of means. She did
not consider any of it important. I told Miss Cosack enough about my
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background for her to form an opinion about my vocation as a Carmelite.
She then proposed on her own that we should pay a visit to the Carmel.35
Stein then met with the Carmelite Subprioress and the Mistress of Novices. Her
written account shows that once again, description and dialogue were integral parts of her
approach. Stein’s account tells of her affection for and affiliation with other religious
orders but of her inability to join them because of an apparent lack of inner harmony:
I explained once more by what road I had reached this point, how the
thought of Carmel had never left me; I spent eight years as a teacher with
the Dominican nuns in Speyer, was intimately connected with the entire
convent, and yet was unable to enter; I considered Beuron the
antechamber of heaven, yet it never entered my mind to become a
Benedictine nun; it always seemed to me that the Lord was saving
something for me in Carmel which I could find there and nowhere else.36
Stein returned to Münster and spent much time in that city’s cathedral. She
needed a reply from the Carmelites: “Encouraged by the Holy Spirit, I wrote to Mother
Josepha and pleaded urgently for a prompt answer, because in my uncertain situation I
had to find out what exactly I had to reckon with.”37 After another meeting with the
Carmelite authorities, a conference with the Vicar for Religious, and an interview with
the Chapter Sisters who would vote on Stein’s acceptance, a telegram arrived reading:
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“Joyful assent. Regards, Carmel.” With the consent of the Carmelites, the formal
application process was complete.
Stein proceeded in the discernment process as she spent a month in the extern
quarters of the Cologne Carmel, learning the Carmelite customs, and participating in the
daily schedule. Discussion continued to be part of the discernment process for the
Carmelites as well as for the new aspirant. Stein writes: “All questions that came up I
submitted to Mother Josepha; her decision always coincided with what I would have
done on my own. This inner agreement made me very happy.”38 Stein’s personal core
resonated with life as a Carmelite. She prepared to make permanent arrangements to
enter Carmel while the Carmelites prepared to receive her. But there was one group that
Stein needed to face who would not agree with her decision to enter Carmel. She
traveled home to Breslau to explain her decision to her family.
Stein is deliberately vague about her decision to enter Carmel in her message to
her family in Breslau: “To my family I had only written that I had found a place to stay
in Cologne with a group of nuns and would move there for good in October. They
wished me good luck as one would for a new job.”39 As she gradually told her relatives
that her new job included her permanent entrance into Carmel, she met with a gamut of
reactions. Her sister Rosa, herself desiring to convert to Catholicism, accepted Stein’s
decision easily. Stein’s sister Erna did not dissuade her but was visibly shaken by her
younger sister’s decision. Erna offered Edith a place to live and a share in whatever her
family had for as long as they would have it, as did her sister Else. Stein’s mother tried
to deny the reality of her daughter’s apparent defection at a time when the family needed
38
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her most. Her brother-in-law (Hans Biberstein) tried to reason with Edith two days
before her departure. Stein recalls: “What I was planning appeared to him to draw the
line between myself and the Jewish people more sharply than before, and that just now,
when they were so sorely oppressed. The fact that I saw it very differently he could not
understand.”40 No one, not even her mother, could persuade Stein not to enter Carmel.

Analysis of Stein’s Decision to Enter Carmel. Visit to Breslau.
Initially, Stein’s ethic seems effective in discerning whether the action of entering
Carmel represents authentically her thoughts and beliefs. Stein’s ethic with its
components of truth, relationships, personal core, and new horizons knits together and
seems coherent. But when Stein informs her family of this decision to enter Carmel, her
ethic seems to unravel. She can not, truthfully, tell her relatives of her plans to enter
cloistered life. First, we consider how Stein’s ethic seems to work.
Stein experiences positive and negative “first alerts” of truth as she discerns her
next ethical move. The negative alerts or denials of truth (Walzer’s assurance that Stein
would not lose her job; the administrator’s advice that the threatening situation would be
over by autumn) confirm Stein’s accurate perception of the phenomenon of truth. When
she reads about the mandatory attendance of Catholic Teachers at the National Socialist
convention, she experiences a positive first alert or confirmation of her initial intuition
that “days were probably numbered.”41 Despite Archabbot Walzer’s incomprehension of
Stein’s precarious situation as well as the Münster administrator’s assurance that Stein’s
loss of a teaching position was a temporary measure, Stein accurately accesses the truth
40
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of her life world. With her dismissal from the Münster Pedagogical Institute, Stein
realizes that she, a Jewish convert to Catholicism, is without a job and without any
promise of livelihood in Germany where Hitler and his philosophy are gaining ground.
She has long been drawn to the Carmelite way of life and now that her effectiveness as an
instructor and a speaker of the Catholic Women’s Movement is ended, she actively
considers the feasibility of life as a Carmelite.
Stein has kept her desire to enter Carmel hidden from all but her spiritual
directors. She recognized this desire to be a Carmelite within her personal core at the
time of her conversion in 1922. Eleven years later, prodded by life circumstances, and
affirmed by personal dialogue with God and others, Stein continues to unfold her
personal core, her ontic blueprint, but now in a more overt way. She discerns the truth of
her decision to enter the Carmelites through hours of reflective prayer at St. Ludgar’s
Church, evidencing a personal relationship with God, wherein she has confidence that she
speaks directly to Him and He with her: “‘I’m not leaving here until I have a clearcut
assurance whether I may now enter Carmel.’ After the concluding blessing had been
pronounced, I had the assurance of the Good Shepherd.”42 Through her relationship with
God, Stein is able to ascertain that her perception of truth is correct: she proceeds in
confidence and applies formally to become a Carmelite.
Stein tests her action toward truth in dialogue with Dr. Cosack and the Carmelite
authorities. She clearly and honestly lays before them the reasons that she is a dubious
candidate for Carmel: her Jewish ancestry, her age, and her lack of a dowry to help
support Carmel. Again, Stein seeks harmony between her personal core and her decision
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to unfold it. For example, she reports that the inner agreement between herself and
Mother Josepha made her very happy.43 By her own admission, Stein feels confirmed in
her truth as Dr. Cosack and Mother Josepha work with her to make her entrance into
Carmel a reality.
When Stein travels to Breslau to inform her family of her decision, however, her
ethic seems to break down: she is unable to tell her relatives that she is entering the
cloister. She withholds the full truth and allows them to think that she has obtained a job
with the Sisters in Cologne: “To my family I had only written that I had found a place to
stay in Cologne with a group of nuns and would move there for good in October. They
wished me good luck as one would for a new job.”44 An ethic characterized by a
perceiving of the phenomenon of truth, an honoring of relationships, an unfolding of
one’s personal core, and openness to new horizons seems breached by this apparent
deception.
Stein returns to Breslau on August 15, 1933, two months before her departure for
the Cologne Carmel. Her confidence that her action to enter Carmel rightly reflects her
inner thoughts and beliefs seems to founder. Stein does not seem to honor her familial
relationships either; she does not confirm her movement to truth with her mother and
siblings as she did with Dr. Cosack and Mother Josepha. Stein describes her own
awareness of her miscommunication:
When she [my mother] got home from work, she liked to sit down next to
my desk with her knitting and to talk about all her domestic and business
worries. I also let her tell me again her reminiscences of the past, as a
43
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foundation for a family history which I started at that time. This cozy
togetherness was really good for her. As for me, I kept thinking: If only
you knew!45
Stein knows that she is withholding important information and she deliberately continues
to do so, not seeking the input of her family.
Whether for fear of facing her already disappointed mother or of being labeled a
“defector” at a time when her family needs her most, Stein does not disclose her intention
to enter Carmel. Initially, this apparent deception signals avoidance of conflict with her
family. Stein knows that by entering Carmel she will lose her family’s (especially her
mother’s) love, acceptance, and support, at least for a while. Her decision exacts a toll on
her physically, emotionally, mentally, and spiritually and she aptly refers to this time of
her life as a “dark night of the soul” — a phrase she is familiar with from reading the
works of the sixteenth century mystic and poet, St. John of the Cross. On a deeper level,
however, Stein’s inability to tell her family indicates an ethical dilemma at Stein’s
personal core. She must choose between two apparent and valid truths: her truth that
Carmel is an authentic expression of her ontic blueprint, and her family’s truth, that Edith
is abandoning them at their time of greatest need.
Stein’s decision to enter Carmel indicates three tensions within her ethical
structure. First, there seems to be a tension in Stein’s component of honoring
relationships as she privileges her relationship with God over her familial relationships.
Second, Stein’s choice privileges the unfolding of her ontic core over her honoring of
relationships. Third, Stein’s choice highlights a problem of relativism: if truth is
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universal but subjectively acquired, are Frau Stein and Edith Stein both in possession of
truth and if so, is truth relative to each person?
Concerning the first tension between relationships, Stein seems to privilege her
relationship with God over her familial relationships. Scheler’s influence is seen in
Stein’s decision as she perceives a hierarchy of values. She does not take the separation
from her family, especially her mother, lightly. Rather, she sees in her consecration to
God a relationship that supercedes, yet incorporates, all relationships. She “abandons”
her family to live fully her relationship with God, a relationship that she privileges and
guards above all others.
The second tension exists as Stein seems to privilege the unfolding of her ontic
core over her action of honoring relationships: she seems determined to do what she
wants; ignoring the heartache and misunderstanding she is evidently causing her family.
Stein’s respect for the psychophysical person and her insistence that each person must
develop or unfold his/her ontic core is at work in her choice. We recall that Stein
postponed her pursuit of a life in Carmel for eleven years because she was unwilling to
add to her mother’s sadness over her conversion from Judaism to Catholicism. Stein’s
decision to enter Carmel truly reflects the matching of her personal core with the life
world, despite the fact that her family would think her wrong.
The third tension, the question of relativism, indicates, I think, the most important
aspect of Stein’s ethic, one that reflects both the influence of Aquinas’ scholasticism and
Husserl’s phenomenology: the subjective access to universal truth. According to
Aquinas, truth is universal; in Husserl’s phenomenology, the subjective view is
privileged. Reflecting both influences, Stein posits truth as accessible to all people, in all
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times, but access to that truth is subjective. Each person must search for and approach
truth on his/her own and in his/her unique manner. If Stein understands truth as
accessible to all people, yet subjectively acquired, she must allow for her mother’s
understanding of truth in this circumstance. In recognizing subjective access to truth,
Stein attests to the reality of disharmony, conflict, and tension.
Stein is partially right; she is called to Carmel and must respond in an effort to
unfold her ontic core. Frau Stein is partially right; she is being abandoned at a time of
great need. Believing that complete knowledge of truth is available only in heaven, Stein
allows opposite subjective truths to exist and to develop. Almost three years after
entering Carmel, Stein confirms the tension that still exists between her mother and
herself. While Stein, as a Carmelite, would write to her mother each week, as was the
mother and daughter’s custom, Frau Stein refused to write to her daughter. In a letter to
Mother Petra Brüning, OSU, Stein gives evidence of her belief that acquisition of truth is
gradual; dialogue aids truth; and total truth is attained only in heaven. Stein writes:
[. . .] I was never able to make Mother comprehend either my conversion
or my entrance into the Order. And so, once more, she is suffering greatly
because of our separation, and I am unable to say anything significant. I
can only build on the childlike confidence she has had in God all her life
long, and on the fact that it was a life of sacrifice. And precisely this
separation from her youngest child, whom she has always loved
especially, and the small indications that I dare to make sometimes, will
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bring about some debate in the depth of her soul of which nothing
surfaces.46
Stein’s acceptance of her mother’s perspective reflects her confidence in the
phenomenological method. Stein grants the validity of Frau Stein’s subjective view; her
daughter is deserting her. Stein nonetheless speaks her truth, opposed as it is to her
mother’s viewpoint. Dialogue had positive effects for Stein earlier, when she conversed
with Dr. Cossack and presented all the obstacles to entering. Dr. Cossack’s response
allayed Stein’s concerns. Frau Stein’s stony silence does not lend itself to dialogue, but
Stein allows the essence of this situation — conflict — to exist.
This decision to leave Breslau for Cologne also reflects Stein’s belief, mentioned
in Chapter Three, that there is a redeemed order to creation. The fallen order,
characterized by misunderstanding and discord, is reflected in Stein’s disagreement with
her mother. Stein abides the misunderstanding of her mother and family members,
knowing that in the redeemed order, all will be rejoined in harmony.
Just as the outcome of her letter to Pope Pius XI affects no results, Stein’s ethical
action of entering Carmel brings no solace to her family. God, Dr. Cosack, and the
Carmelite authorities agree that Stein should enter Carmel; Stein’s mother and relatives
disagree. Stein chooses Carmel. While Stein awaits the day of her departure for
Cologne, she makes another ethical move, perhaps in response to her family’s claim that
she is abandoning them. She will use her gifts as a writer and phenomenologist to tell the
truth of life in a Jewish family as she has experienced it.
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1933: Life in a Jewish Family
While Stein made the necessary arrangements and waited to enter Carmel on
October 14, she thought of another action that she could take to help the Jewish people.
A priest had once suggested that she write down her memories of childhood as a way of
explaining, first-hand, life in a Jewish family. Recalling this project and taking
advantage of the time with her mother, Stein began to record Frau Augusta Stein’s
reminiscences of the past.
The first line of the memoir describes the phenomenon that prompted Stein to
undertake this endeavor: “Recent months have catapulted German Jews out of the
peaceful existence they had come to take for granted.”47 Stein explains that an
opportunity to form relationships with Jews, to enter into friendship with them, to attempt
to understand them and their customs had been denied by the racial hatred being
promoted by the National Socialist government. The youth of Germany, Stein maintains,
were particularly deprived since they were especially vulnerable to Nazi propaganda.
Stein underscores the responsibility she felt to counteract this deliberately distorted
portrayal of the Jewish people and urges others to consider their responsibility: “To all
who have been thus deprived, we who grew up in Judaism have an obligation to give our
testimony.”48 In the Foreword to the book which became Life in a Jewish Family when it
was published posthumously, another glimpse of Stein the phenomenologist is seen: “I
would like to give a straightforward account of my own experience of Jewish life as one
testimony to be placed alongside others. . . . It is intended as information for anyone
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wishing to pursue an unprejudiced study from original sources.”49 National Socialist
laws banning the publication of Jewish works would have inevitably thwarted Stein’s
plan to disseminate her message to the German public. Undaunted, she worked on these
reminiscences until May 1935 when she discontinued the project to work on her
philosophical publication, Finite and Eternal Being.
Leah Hargis, O.C.D, posits that Stein deliberately concluded Life in a Jewish
Family with a description of her life as it was in 1916. Disagreeing that the work is
incomplete and that Stein had no time to finish it given her busy schedule in Carmel,
Hargis explains that in 1916 at age twenty-five, Stein had effectively stopped living a
Jewish life. Stein writes no more beyond 1916, thinks Hargis, because she no longer
believed or acted as a Jewish woman at that time.
I subscribe to Hargis’ theory as it lends credence to the idea that Stein tried to
harmonize her thoughts and beliefs with her actions. Between 1906 and 1916, Stein’s
religious beliefs and practices were in flux. In 1906,50 after spending time away from
school and having lived with her married sister, Stein makes a conscious decision to stop
praying; she declares herself an atheist. This proclamation is in agreement with Stein’s
steadfast determination to speak and live the truth as she perceives it. In the ten year
period between 1906 and 1916, however, Stein meets people who profess various beliefs
and who practice their respective faiths in differing degrees. As a phenomenologist,
Stein respects her colleagues’ viewpoints and does not try to influence them by her
perception of truth as she experiences it.
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This respect for other faiths is seen, for example, in her relationship with her
friend, Eduard Metis. Stein writes: “Metis had one attribute which set him apart from all
my other companions: he was an orthodox and observant Jew. We spoke little about it:
I let him have his own way; and he made no attempt to influence me.”51 While Stein did
not try to influence Metis, she did, however, draw some conclusions from his religious
observances. For example, she is critical in her judgment when she hands Metis her
suitcase to hold one Sabbath, and he stands, immobilized, in the doorway. When,
remembering the Jewish practice of doing no work on the Sabbath, Stein apologizes for
her thoughtlessness, Metis replied: “I haven’t done anything forbidden . . . only on the
street is one not to carry anything; it’s allowed in the house.”52 In her memoirs, Stein
writes: “For that reason he had remained in the entrance-hall, taking care not to put even
one foot into the street. This was an example of the Talmudic sophistry which I found so
repugnant. But I made no comment.”53 Observing the actions of others, Stein
reformulates her thoughts on the practice of religion.
While Stein had distaste for the perceived sophistry of Metis, she was inspired by
the religious convictions of others. Of Max Scheler, for example, Stein writes:
His influence in those years affected me, as it did many others, far beyond
the subject of philosophy. I do not know in which year Scheler returned to
the Catholic Church. It could not have been long before I met him. In any
case, he was quite full of Catholic ideas at the time and employed all the
brilliance of his spirit and his eloquence to plead them. This was my first
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encounter with this hitherto totally unknown world. It did not lead me as
yet to the Faith. But it did open for me a region of “phenomenon” which I
could then no longer bypass blindly.54
Reflecting on the same time period wherein she met Scheler (1913-1914), Stein writes of
the transformative power of the example of some of her associates:
Persons with whom I associated daily, whom I esteemed and admired,
lived in it [this world of faith.] At the least, they deserved my giving it
some serious reflection. For the time being, I did not embark on a
systematic investigation of the questions of faith; I was far too busy with
other matters. I was content to accept without resistance the stimuli
coming from my surroundings, and so, almost without noticing it, became
gradually transformed.55
Based on these written accounts, I support Hargis’ theory that Stein concluded
Life with her account of her life as it was in 1916. The question can be raised as to
whether Stein should have ended Life with a description of personal events in 1906 when
she publicly voiced her atheism. But in 1906, at age fifteen, Stein was still living in a
Jewish household and was strongly influenced by her mother and relatives. Stein is an
atheist by her own admission but still an adolescent in her mother’s Jewish household. If
Hargas’ theory is correct, then from 1906 until 1916, Stein still considers her testimony
of Jewish life as authentic, despite the crisis of faith that she is undergoing. Six years
before her formal conversion and baptism as a Catholic in 1922, Stein experiences newly
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founded belief through her encounters with Christians at the University of Göttingen.
Her ending of her account of Jewish life in 1916 reflects authentically this reality. Stein
never shuns her Jewish heritage, indeed, she builds on it. To Fritz Kaufmann she
explains: “Whoever enters Carmel is not lost to his own, but is theirs fully for the first
time; it is our vocation to stand before God for all.”56
While Stein urges all Jewish people to give testimony to offset the rise of National
Socialism,57 she gives testimony only as far as she can.58 Her personal account of Jewish
life stopped because in 1916, Stein stopped living life as a Jewish believer.

Analysis of Stein’s Ethic in Life
Stein’s writing of Life is valuable to this study because it gives evidence of the
author’s ethic. First, Stein evidences her conviction that there must be a movement
toward truth. Stein realizes that Nazi propaganda is distorting the truth of Jewish life; she
confronts this distortion of Jewish life by writing her own account. As her letter to Pope
Pius XI shows and as she came to realize in her final visit to Breslau, the truth of the
goodness and ordinariness of Jewish life must be communicated in some way, whether in
writing, speech, or in action. It is not enough to perceive the truth and to feel one’s
movement toward that truth; one must act in truth. Clearly, criticism can be leveled at
Stein by all those Jews who claim her to be a defector to the faith. Despite this criticism
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(a criticism she knew first-hand), she describes her experience of Jewish life up to 1916,
when she moved toward Christianity; and then she is silent.
Second, Stein honors her relationships in the writing of Life, even though she
does not always favorably portray her family and friends. She offers one perspective of
life in a Jewish family but she honors other Jewish people and their unique perspectives
by reminding them of their dignity as searchers and proclaimers of truth. Always aware
of her relationship to God, self, and other persons, Stein appeals to other Jewish people to
write their memories and to speak of life as Jews in Germany. She appeals to other Jews
to contribute their truth to the cosmic community that is vastly out of kilter. This sharing
of personal experiences may contribute to a greater harmony among all people and build
that harmony reflective of the redeemed world.
Third, in writing Life, Stein unfolds her personal core by using her gifts as
scholar, phenomenologist, and teacher. Through vignettes, she is “teaching” others how
life in a Jewish family is like life in most German families of the time. In her
descriptions, she approaches essences, reminders that life in any family has similarities
and differences that are readily identifiable by all human beings. In addition to moving
toward truth and enunciating that truth, honoring relationships, and unfolding her
personal core, Stein is open to new horizons and the very real possibility that her work
might never be published. What is important is that she has spoken truth as she has
known it as a Jew, for as long as she was a practicing Jew. While she would hope for
publication, the act of writing, not of publishing, bears the mark of Stein’s ethic.
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CONCLUSION
Stein writes these memoirs as she awaits her entrance into Carmel. On October
14, 1933, Edith Stein bade farewell to her mother and family in Breslau and boarded a
train for Cologne. Her decision to enter the Carmelite Order saddened many of her
family members and friends, particularly her mother. In a letter from the Cologne
Carmel to her friend and colleague Fritz Kaufmann, Stein succinctly outlines the
nineteen-month period between January 1932 and October 1933 wherein she struggled to
ascertain what she “could do. . .about the plight of the Jews.”59 Recounting the steps that
brought her to Carmel, she writes:
The Umsturz [Hitler’s coup] was for me a sign from heaven that I might
now go the way that I had long considered as mine. After a final visit with
my relatives in Breslau and a difficult farewell from my dear Mother, I
entered the monastery of the [Discalced] Carmelite nuns here last Saturday
and thus became a daughter of St. Teresa, who earlier inspired me to
conversion.60
While the Stein family certainly interprets Edith’s entrance into Carmel as defection,
Stein does not. Calling the explanation of this decision her “secret,” Stein enters Carmel
to stand with the Carmelites in intercession for all people before God. She did not expect
her family to agree or to understand, but she felt she must express truth as she found it at
her personal core. In the actions of writing to Pope Pius XI requesting an encyclical
against National Socialism, in deciding to enter Carmel, and in writing her memoirs,
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Edith Stein gives evidence of her ethic that privileges truth, relationships, responsibility,
and new horizons.
When, in 1933, Edith Stein became aware of the escalating persecution of the
Jews by the Nazis, she moved to act. She thought that the Holy Father needed a personal
account of the sufferings of the Jewish people in Germany and a warning about the effect
that the Catholic Church’s silence would have on people throughout the world.
Recognizing her relationships and attendant responsibilities as a daughter of Judaism,
Germany, Catholicism, and of the cosmic community, she wrote a letter urging the Pope
to speak out against the evils of National Socialism. She used her gifts as a
phenomenologist, writer, and teacher but when that action proved futile, Stein broached
the next horizon.
Dismissed from her job at the Pedagogical Institute because of her Jewish
ancestry, Stein sought to enter the Carmelite Order. This move to Carmel would fully
express Stein’s ontic core as, relieved of her responsibilities as a teacher and speaker for
the Catholic Women’s Movement, she could now wholeheartedly abandon herself to life
with Christ — a desire that she had harbored for eleven years. Her action was seen by
her relatives as an act of abandonment of them. Stein was convinced, however, that in
serving God, she would honor her relationships to all humankind by interceding with God
for the needs of the world.
While Stein waited for the day of her entrance into the Carmelite Order, she
began writing her reminiscences, meant as a true account of Jewish life to counter the
anti-Semitic propaganda of the National Socialists. Again, she used her gifts as a
daughter of Judaism and as a writer to tell the truth of Jewish life from her perspective.
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This work would not have been published in Nazi Germany, but it evidences a movement
toward truth and action.
By many accounts, Stein’s efforts against National Socialism failed: her letter to
Pope Pius XI was ineffectual, her entrance into Carmel was interpreted by her family as
an act of abandonment, and her memoirs were unpublished. What is critical for Stein’s
ethical stance, though, is that motivated by a perceiving of a phenomenon of truth, she
acted according to her own gifts in honoring her relationships. She used the natural gifts
and abilities at her disposal — and then rendered the outcome to God.
In a letter sent to her friend Sister Adelgundis in 1931, Stein writes: “God knows
what is in store for me. I do not need to concern myself about it.” In the same letter she
adds: “Basically, it is always a small, simple truth that I have to express: How to go
about living at the Lord’s hand.”61 This “living at the Lord’s hand” was not a pious
refrain on Stein’s part but the “simple truth” by which she lived the ethical life. As a
result of certain relationships in her life to which she paid heed, especially with Husserl,
Scheler, and the Reinachs, as well as through the influential writings of Thomas Aquinas
and Teresa of Avila, Stein became aware of her search for truth and her intimate
connection with God. This relationship with God placed her in relationship with all
creation. She felt herself responsible, not only for Jews, Germans, and Catholics, but for
all people.
Stein placed great emphasis on the natural ability of human beings to come to
know and use their innate gifts. In a lecture given in 1931,62 Stein specifically spoke of
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the vocation of men but her speech encompassed the vocation of all human beings. She
pointed to the need for each person to find him/herself in the sense of recognizing his/her
own gifts and using them for the good of all. She explains this unfolding of the ontic
core: “Now a man’s vocation, i.e., the work which he is destined to accomplish, is
indicated by his nature. It will mature and become obvious to others in the course of his
life, so they can speak of his ‘vocation’ in the happy case that he has found ‘his place in
life.’”63 Stein reiterates this theme elsewhere:
God leads each one by a particular way; one person arrives more easily
and sooner at the goal than another. What we can do, in comparison with
what we are given, is always little. But that little we must do: that is, we
must pray insistently so that when the way does happen to be indicated,
we will be able to follow the grace without resisting.64
Stein stresses that these gifts flow from the Creator God, a God whom she had
come to know through reason and faith. It is therefore the natural ability to reason that
Stein relies on first, as is evidenced by her phenomenological approach to action. As a
scholar and as an influential speaker within the German Catholic community, Stein felt
that it was her responsibility to address Pope Pius XI. Later, when she began her
memoirs of life in a Jewish family, it was her responsibility and that of all those who
grew up in Judaism to render testimony against the slanderous propaganda being
manufactured by the Nazis. When she told her mother of her baptism in the Catholic
Church, Stein deliberately postponed mentioning her desire to become a Carmelite nun:
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“[I]t became clear to me that she [Stein’s mother] would not be able to withstand this
second blow for the time being. She would not die of it, but it would fill her with such
bitterness that I could not take the responsibility for that.”65 In 1933, however, when
there was no option left, Stein did not spare her mother’s feelings. After listening to the
arguments for why she should not enter the cloistered religious life, Stein commented: “I
had to take that step in the complete darkness of faith.” 66 She entered Carmel knowing
that her mother would reject her. Stein was continuing her movement toward truth as she
responsibly unfolded her personal core in relationship with God, self, and others.
In her autobiographical sketch that she completed on December 18, 1938, Stein
remarked: “Perhaps I shall leave this house soon after Christmas. The circumstances
which have forced us67 to initiate my transfer to Echt (Holland) are strikingly reminiscent
of the situation at the time of my entrance into Carmel. It is likely that there is a subtle
connection between the two.”68 Perhaps Stein alludes to the danger posed by the Nazis in
1933 and again in 1938. I propose the subtle connection between the two events was
Stein’s movement toward truth and her need to act. Stein acted according to her own
ethical stance which she had honed using reason and faith. Always in search of truth,
65
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always moving toward truth, Stein acted as a woman in relationship with God and others
— a woman who used her own natural gifts and was ever open to the possibilities of new
horizons. The events of 1933 tested the truth of Stein’s ethical stance.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE PROBLEM AND PROMISE OF A STEINIAN ETHIC

INTRODUCTION
This study, Edith Stein: Toward an Ethic of Relationship and Responsibility
began with the eye-witness account of Jewish businessman-turned-Nazi-collaborator,
Julius Marcan, in which he describes Edith Stein’s caring for others in the DrenteWesterbork Detention Camp, days before her extermination on August 9, 1942.
Marcan’s comment: “Everyone wondered at her goodness,” caused me to wonder at
Stein’s actions — and the motivation behind those actions. Prompted by wonder, a
catalyst to philosophy, this study began with the premise that Stein’s action of comforting
others signaled a characteristic stance on her part toward the life world. This stance, in
turn, suggested an ethic, a system, a manner of acting in the life world. Using Stein’s
thoughts and actions, as recorded in her professional and personal texts, I defined “ethic”
as a harmonious matching of internal thoughts and beliefs with external actions. In my
search through Stein’s philosophical, personal, and autobiographical works for
manifestation of an ethic, I sought evidence of how Stein attempted to match her thoughts
and beliefs with her lived actions and whether she did so in a systematic way. It became
clear that an examination of Stein’s internal thoughts and beliefs would necessitate my
including her use of reason as well as faith. In this final chapter, I will summarize how
this study was conducted, consider the results, make connections to other research, and
recommend possible areas for future research.
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SUMMARY OF THE STUDY
Convinced that Stein evidenced an ethic in her actions and wanting to determine
the essence of that ethic, I searched Stein’s writings for ways in which others influenced
her thought, essential characteristics that comprised her ethic, and examples of how she
employed an ethic. These three factors — influences, essences, and evidence — form the
body of my research.

Influences on Stein’s Ethic
To understand better Stein’s thought as expressed in her writings, I looked at six
people whom Stein indicated had influenced her thoughts, beliefs, and actions. Chapter
Two focuses on Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Adolf and Anna Reinach, and Saint
Teresa of Avila, all of whom had a profound impact on the formation of Stein’s ethical
stance. Chapter Three incorporates the influence of Saint Thomas Aquinas.
Having been impressed by the phenomenological methodology of Edmund
Husserl, in 1913 Stein began to apply her intellectual energies to the study of
phenomenology. She eagerly approached the search for truth using a method that
privileged the subjective viewpoint and made allowances for consciousness of the world
as it unfolded in everyday life. A confirmed realist, Stein did not agree with Husserl’s
later turn to idealism, but she always honored Husserl’s rigorous attention to objects as
they appeared to consciousness and the mind’s manner of coming to meaning. Husserl
impressed upon Stein the importance and value of both description and discourse.
Furthermore, Husserl influenced Stein by honoring subjective experience and recognizing
the role of intuition in the search for truth. Stein agreed with Husserl’s vision of
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philosophy and readily made the love of wisdom and the search for truth her own “quite
personal affair.”1
While studying at the University of Göttingen, Stein came into contact with the
brilliant and somewhat flamboyant Max Scheler. Even though she disagreed with his
apparent disregard for Husserl, Stein was mesmerized by Scheler and his thoughts. She
took note of Scheler’s new-found Catholicism and was intrigued by his study of ethics.
In particular, Stein seems to have employed Scheler’s idea of an inherent movement
toward love (ordo amoris) and his hierarchy of values in her own system of thought.
While she agrees with Scheler’s movement toward love, Stein also posits a constant
movement toward truth that motivates the human person to act in accordance with truth.
Stein welcomed Scheler’s enthusiasm for the anthropology of the human person,
considering in her dissertation the sharing of experiences between persons. She later
broadened her investigation of empathy by studying the makeup of the psychophysical
person and the person’s importance in the formation of community. Stein participated in
Scheler’s interest in the psychophysical person, and his a priori emotionalism, an idea
that feeling is experienced prior to thought, resonated with Stein’s experience.
In Stein’s encounters with Adolf Reinach, for instance, she “felt” the passion that
this fellow student of Husserl had for truth and phenomenology before she understood
this new manner of philosophizing. Adolf Reinach expressed his passion concretely in
his tireless preparation for class and his insistence that the material be clearly presented in
order to be understood — characteristics that Stein incorporated in her own writing and
teaching.
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In Anna Reinach, Stein experienced the “feeling” of faith long before she
understood faith in a cognitive way. The example of Stein’s visit to the widow Reinach
illustrates Scheler’s influence in two ways. First, Anna Reinach gave external expression
to an internal belief — Scheler and Stein strongly posited the interconnectedness of the
physical, emotive, mental, and personal levels. Second, the grieving woman evidenced a
vibrant and personal relationship with God that Stein had earlier abandoned. Once seeing
this higher value embodied in Anna Reinach, Stein sought to attain that value. Adolf
Reinach broadened Stein’s understanding of phenomenology with discussion and debate,
and Anna Reinach introduced her to faith as a lived reality.
Stein made the acquaintance of Teresa of Avila and Thomas Aquinas by reading
their works and while she first (chronologically) experienced these saints through the
mental exercise of reading, she felt them more powerfully on the emotive level. After
reading Saint Teresa of Avila’s autobiography, Stein was convinced that she had found a
fellow searcher for truth.2 This conviction lends credence to Scheler’s theory of
emotional a priorism, for Stein experienced Teresa of Avila on an emotional level before
comprehending the saint or her teachings theoretically. Moreover, Teresa of Avila
appealed to Stein, I think, because the sixteenth century mystic sought to match her
internal thoughts and beliefs with her external actions. Teresa of Avila was authentically
both searching for truth and striving to live the truth as she experienced it in her life
world: this resonated with Stein’s definition of truth.
Stein’s study of the works of Thomas Aquinas began as a scholarly pursuit when
she translated the Latin De Veritate into German. At first stymied by the formal
argumentation of Aquinas, Stein grew in appreciation of the scholar as she found a clarity
2
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and rigor reminiscent of Husserl and Reinach. Stein’s search for truth found resonance in
the works of the scholastic; she later tried to combine the teachings of Aquinas with those
of Husserl, as is seen by her final philosophical work, Finite and Eternal Being.
With the aid of philosophy and faith, Stein continued her theoretical search for
truth while striving to reflect the truth in her words and actions. As exemplified by the
teachings and example of Husserl, Scheler, and Adolf Reinach, Stein used the methods of
phenomenology to help her intuit and describe essences in her search for truth. In the
faith of Anna Reinach and Teresa of Avila, Stein found companions, models of higher
values, in her search for truth. In Thomas Aquinas, Stein found a scholar convinced of
the power of reason and faith — and she too embraced both.

The Essence of Stein’s Ethic
Stein died before formalizing her ethic in writing, but in her philosophical and
personal works, there are indications of an ethic, references to a personal search for truth
that harmonizes inner thoughts and beliefs with external actions. In Chapter Three, “A
Phenomenological Method to Action,” I describe essential elements of Stein’s ethic.
These elements reflect the varied influences on Stein’s thoughts and beliefs, and reveal
something of Stein’s own stance toward the life world. Elements of phenomenology
(such as intentionality, intuition, essences, and new horizons) and of faith, (namely
Stein’s use of the creation story and her understanding of God as Creator and as pure
essence) contribute significantly to Stein’s ethical framework.
Stein defines God as pure existence and pure essence who imparts Himself in and
through the act of creation. God, who is fullness of existence and essence, imbues each
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human person with a soul. The ensouled person thus participates in God’s pure essence,
but in a less perfect way than God, the Creator.
Stein’s concept of creation plays heavily in her ethic as she sees creation in three
orders: original, fallen, and redeemed. In the original order of creation, Stein thinks,
human beings shared in a threefold harmony that reflected the right order that existed
between God and human beings. First, a harmonious relationship existed between
Creator and creature. Second, the human person was in harmony with him/herself as the
four levels of which he/she was composed (physical, emotive, mental, and personal) were
in right order and balance. Third, human beings existed peacefully with each other.
Stein also accepts a threefold charge placed upon human beings by God. Human beings
are to reflect the image and likeness of God; are to procreate (physically and spiritually);
and are to be stewards who care for the earth. These principals of God as creator, the
three orders of creation, and the three tasks of human beings are tenets of the Catholic
faith that informed Stein’s ethic.
Through sin, a turning from God, Stein believes that human beings disrupted the
original order of creation and ushered in a disjointed and unharmonious fallen order
characterized by conflict and resentment on three levels. In the relationship between God
and the human person, human beings, thinks Stein, manifest an age-old disharmony with
God, which evidences itself in the desire to be creator and ruler of creation. Instead of
stewards of the world, responsible to procreate and to care for creation, human beings use
(and abuse) creation for their own needs and wants. Moreover, some human beings
express an autonomy that denies the existence of God as creator or sustainer. At the
interpersonal level of relationships, human beings are no longer companions with each
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other but are competitors instead. Competition and supremacy have displaced
cooperation and care. Third, the individual person experiences inner turmoil and conflict
because he/she fails to integrate the physical, emotional, mental, and personal layers of
which he/she is made. Consequently, individual persons are unaware of or unwilling to
use the gifts they possess by nature and grace. Stein adduces that the cosmic community,
comprised of individual persons who are in personal, social, and spiritual disharmony,
reflect the fallen nature of creation.
Stein envisions a return to the harmony that existed in the original order, though,
and it is the responsibility of human beings to co-create this redeemed order through
living in truth. Each besouled person, possessing a unique ontic blueprint, has the ability
to use his/her physical body, emotions, and mental power to unfold his/her own unique
personal core. Stein believes that individuals who reflect on their thoughts and actions
are aware of and are in possession of their personal cores, and thereby contribute to the
redeemed order wherein relationships and responsibilities are righted. A person aware of
and willing to share his/her gifts of nature and grace (Stein does not discount God’s
intervention) contributes to a universal harmony, a redeemed order that restores the
original order of creation.
I believe that Stein’s ethic is her personal contribution to restoring the original
order of creation. First, Stein taps into her insatiable search for truth and discovers that
this search is not unique to her but shared by all human beings. Stein finds this quest for
truth supported within the writings of Thomas Aquinas and in the person of Saint Teresa
of Avila. The search for truth is universal; however, the access to truth is subjective and
depends on the life world, the situation within which the individual person finds
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him/herself. This phenomenological approach that honors the subjective acquisition of
universal truth reflects the influences of Husserl and Adolf Reinach.
But Stein’s search for truth is not carried out alone; God and others help her to
know truth. Stein’s work on empathy reflects the importance Stein places on others in
revealing the truth about self and the life world. Max Scheler’s influence is seen in
Stein’s hierarchy of values and persons who fulfill certain value types. Thus, Stein
allows for others to show us higher and lower values, leaving the individual person to
choose the greater truth. The human person may fulfill obligations of higher values and
contribute to the redeemed order, or deny truth, thus contributing to an embodiment of
lesser values and the spreading of resentment. Here, Stein’s explanation of the personal
core is instructive: the person not in touch with his/her personal core does not understand
his/her place in the cosmic community and is unable to contribute to bringing about the
redeemed order.
Thus, the search for truth is not carried out in a vacuum; it has social implications.
The human person deals with others physically, emotionally, and mentally and by virtue
of his//her humanness, has a responsibility to others with whom he/she inhabits the earth.
But the social aspect of Stein’s ethic is interwoven with the search for truth and the
responsibility to unfold one’s personal core. Through self-examination, reflection, and
life experiences, the human person, in interaction with God and others, learns the truth
about him/herself. This is why Stein’s notion of empathy is so important. According to
her idea of empathy, Stein posits that the human person is able to enter into the
experiences of another, not primordially, but in a way that brings new meaning, new truth
to the individual. So, for example, Stein cannot enter into the sorrow of the widowed
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Anna Reinach, but she can learn form Anna’s experience. That Anna finds solace and
comfort in Christ’s cross instructs Stein.
But the ontic blueprint that resides in the personal core is under God’s province
alone and Stein allows for interaction between God and the human person in unfolding
this personal core. Stein is silent about her own entrance to Carmel, designating the
decision as her secret — just as she is silent after Erna makes her decision regarding her
choice of profession. The relationship between God and each person is sacred and not to
be violated by third parties.
Stein posits that the search for truth is universal and is reflected in the natural
quest of the psychophysical person who, as a reasoning individual, inherently seeks truth
and strives to live in harmony with other human beings. Supporting Thomas Aquinas’
natural law theory,3 Stein identifies the search for truth as the ontic destiny of human
beings. This inherent search for truth, because it is given to all rational human beings, is
universal, but it is lived out individually, and thus manifests a phenomenological theme
of subjective access to universal truth. Thus each person is responsible for unfolding
his/her ontic blueprint, that is, each person must come to know and use his/her natural
gifts for the development of self. The person who develops and shares his/her gifts,
contributes in a concrete way to the harmony of family, the neighborhood, the state, and
ultimately, to the cosmic community. Thus, individuals who exercise their ontic core,
help to bring about the redeemed order.
The movement toward truth and the subsequent unfolding of personal cores never
remains static and ushers in new possibilities — new horizons. The person who knows of
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and unfolds his/her personal core continues to develop on all psychophysical levels.
Those persons who share their personal gifts of nature and grace are, however, in
relationship with other individuals who embrace different truths, different values. Stein’s
ethic allows for the acquisition of new truths in relationship with other individuals who
are searching for truth.
Stein’s concepts of the besouled psychophysical person, the order of creation, and
a universal search for truth, subjectively achieved, shape her ethic. In this study, I
characterize Stein’s ethic as having four intertwining aspects: a perceiving of the
phenomenon of truth, an honoring of relationships, an unfolding of one’s personal core,
and openness to new horizons. These aspects form the essence of Stein’s ethical stance.

Evidence of Stein’s Ethic
In Chapter Four, “Evidence of Stein’s Ethic,” the proposal that Stein’s ethic
consists of four essential aspects is put to the test as I examine a period of Stein’s life that
she described as “strikingly reminiscent” to another period that involved ethical choices
and which she felt contained “a subtle connection.”4 I propose that the subtle connection
that Stein intuited between the events of 1933, when she entered Carmel, and 1938, when
she fled Germany for the Netherlands, was a need to act ethically. She needed to
acknowledge a newly perceived truth, unfold her personal core, honor relationships, and
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remain open to new horizons. In this way, her outward actions would reflect her inner
thoughts and beliefs.
In Chapter Four, “Evidence of an Ethic,” I review the events of 1933, wherein
Stein faced two truths: first, that Hitler and National Socialism were on the rise and
second, that Stein needed to respond to this threatening rise to power in a personal way.
To this end, she wrote a letter to Pope Pius XI, asking for an official denunciation of
Hitler and his policies. She also initiated the writing of her mother’s memoirs which later
became her own reminiscences, by which she gave witness to the truth of Jewish life as
she experienced it. Finally, Stein unfolded her personal core by entering Carmel, offering
her life as a sacrifice to “stand before the face of God” for all people.
The decisions that Stein made in 1933 had little if no impact on Hitler, or the
situation in Germany. In seeking universal truth through subjective action, Stein
emphasizes not the outcome of her actions, but the motivation — the movement toward
truth. Like Kant’s “duty,” which is a priori, two factors are universal and necessary in
Stein’s ethical stance: an intending toward truth and openness to new horizons. These
natural movements toward truth and new horizons, coupled with the honoring of
relationships and the responsible unfolding of her personal core, motivate Stein to act.
In the first example of Stein’s ethical response, the letter to Pope Pius XI, Stein is
ineffectual in prompting the Pontiff to write an encyclical; however, the inaction of the
Pope does not diminish nor negate Stein’s ethical action. Stein’s movement toward truth
according to her gifts of nature and grace provides critical evidence of an ethic. This
movement toward truth is a continuation of previous decisions, actions, and movements
as Stein has been speaking publicly to German Catholic women’s organizations and
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teachers’ groups since 1928. With the termination of her job because of her Jewish
heritage, Stein is no longer able to use a public forum in urging women to match their
internal thoughts and beliefs with their actions. Instead, Stein personally urges a
prominent public figure, the Pope, to “make the match,” that is, to act ethically. She is
adamant in expressing her thought that the Pope’s silence in the face of Nazi practices
does not convey the truths of the Catholic Church. The action of writing the letter honors
Stein’s natural abilities as a writer, teacher, and phenomenologist, but it signals a new
horizon as Stein uses these natural gifts in a different way and in a new circumstance.
Stein speaks from her subjective vantage point — as a woman of Catholic, Jewish, and
German background — as she calls attention to a grave situation. In doing so, she
unfolds not only her ontic core through her unique gifts, but she also honors her
relationship to God and others while contributing to the redemptive order. She is
responsible for her gifts of heritage, faith, and intellect — and, she uses them, as is her
responsibility. Stein’s dismissal from the Münster Pedagogical Institute signals a new
horizon which leads Stein to yet another; the action of writing to Pope Pius. Stein
broaches a new horizon and voices her new perspective, that is, her unwillingness to be
silent in the face of evil.
In the second example of evidence of Stein’s ethical stance, her entrance into
Carmel, she discloses a truth that she has kept hidden for almost eleven years: her desire
to live as a religious in the spirit of Saint Teresa of Avila. Stein has deliberately followed
the wishes of her spiritual advisors in postponing this personal desire but now, she can no
longer deny this truth. Waiting neither for her spiritual adviser’s permission nor blessing,
Stein begins the preliminary inquiries and fulfills the necessary requirements. In addition
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to moving toward truth, Stein further unfolds her personal gifts of nature and grace.
Stein’s prayerfulness, renunciation of self, and confidence in truth find fullest expression
in life within the cloister.
Rather than showing evidence of an honoring of relationships, Stein’s entrance
into Carmel seemingly severs the relationship with others, particularly with her mother
and siblings who accuse her of abandoning them. I propose that this apparent severing of
filial relationships evidences Stein’s attention to Scheler’s hierarchy of values. While
Stein knew that she had a responsibility to her family as well as to God, she privileges her
relationship to God, which she believes includes all other relationships. Stein’s action of
entering Carmel exemplifies, too, the prominence she gives to unfolding one’s ontic core
and the respect she affords to the process of coming to full truth.
Stein reflects Scheler’s influence in a second way as, in entering Carmel, she
offers herself as a sacrifice for all people. At first consideration, Stein’s becoming a
Carmelite seems in keeping with her religious fervor and her determination to intercede
for the people of the world. But in addition to expressing religious self-sacrifice and zeal,
Stein’s entering Carmel (as well as her speaking to the Pope about the sufferings of the
people) reflects Scheler’s influence, as well. In his essay, “The Rehabilitation of Virtue,”
(1913) Scheler contrasts the Greeks’ understanding and appreciation of virtue with what
Scheler perceives to be “modern bourgeois philosophers’” [for Scheler, Kant’s]
privileging of duty over virtue. Scheler writes:
In contrast, virtue [to the Greeks] was not yet an empty word for them;
rather it was first the nobility of virtue, dwelling within, that “obliged.”
This is what determines the extent and the weight of responsibility for
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one’s possible actions; yet no one bore responsibility for its possession or
nonpossession. Its inward weight impelled one to an ever widening
extension of responsibility, so the person who possessed it to its highest
degree, that of holiness, quietly felt himself responsible for everything that
happened in the entire world.”5
Stein’s decision to leave her family is in keeping with Scheler’s theories of the hierarchy
of value and the nobility of virtue. Her decision is also reflective of her religious belief in
redemption. Just as Jesus suffered and died in expiation for the sins of humankind, Stein
believes that her “dying to self” will have positive effects for the cosmic community.
Embracing these Schelerian ideas and the concept of the redemptive power of suffering
taught by the Catholic Church, Stein is willing to enter Carmel, offering herself as a
sacrifice for the needs of all humankind.
Stein’s entrance into Carmel also attests to her characteristic confidence in an
individual human person’s access to universal truths, which incorporates her adherence to
realism and phenomenology. In concrete terms, Stein realizes that her understanding of
truth is not her mother’s perspective of truth: their difference is irreconcilable. But Stein
allows both perspectives of truth to stand as she and her mother move forward in search
of a greater understanding or clarity of truth. The movement toward truth is universal.
Perhaps Frau Stein will someday understand her daughter’s decision or perhaps Edith
Stein will regret her entrance into cloistered life. Whatever the many possible outcomes
to this action, the decision to enter Carmel best expresses Stein’s past, and it most
authentically reflects Stein’s movement toward truth as she then perceives it. Stein’s
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decision to enter Carmel now becomes the landscape upon which she builds and moves to
see the world from a new perspective, a new horizon. Seen from her mother’s
perspective, her daughter’s entrance into Carmel is unethical as Edith renounces family to
save herself. From Stein’s view, she acts ethically as she brings to Carmel a
wholehearted renunciation of self and love of God, family, and humankind.
In the third example, Stein’s authorship of reminiscences of Jewish life, she again
offers evidence of her ethical stance. According to her standard of harmonizing inner
thoughts and beliefs with outer actions, Stein intends toward truth as she describes Jewish
life. While Stein knew, given Nazi laws against publication of works by Jewish authors,
that the book, Life in a Jewish Family, would never be published, it was important for
Stein to express her truth in writing. As the Nazis spread lies about the Jewish people,
Stein uses her talents as a teacher, writer, storyteller, and phenomenologist to disseminate
the truth that she has experienced as a Jewish woman. Stein challenges other people of
Jewish descent to transcend their sufferings and to dare to tell their stories, as well. Thus,
Stein acknowledges her connectedness to all humanity, honors her relationships, and
contributes, albeit in a small way, to the cosmic community. Stein reaches back into the
past, using reminiscences of past family experiences, and counters the then-present
propaganda, ultimately trying to improve the future.
By writing to Pope Pius XI, authoring Life in a Jewish Family, and entering
Carmel, Stein moves toward truth as she perceives it. She uses gifts of nature and grace
while unfolding her personal core and honoring her relationships to God, self, and others.
In faith, Stein lives at the “hand of the Lord”6 and remains open to new possibilities as
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she leaves the outcome of these ethical actions to God. Stein employs faith and reason as
her ethical decisions help to shape her new horizon. In terms of impeding the rise of
National Socialism, Stein’s actions are potentially worthless. To do nothing, though, is
unethical as it denies the reality of Hitler, the reality of each person’s dignity and value,
and the reality that “the responsibility must fall . . . on those who keep silent in the face of
such happenings.”7

SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
As a result of this study, I conclude that: 1) Stein had an ethic, that is, she strove
to integrate her internal thoughts and beliefs with her external actions; 2) Stein’s ethic
was informed by reason and faith; and 3) Stein’s ethic is characterized by a perceiving of
a phenomenon of truth, an honoring of relationships, an unfolding of one’s personal core,
and openness to new horizons. I will consider each of these results in turn.

Stein Had an Ethic
While Stein never committed her ethic to writing, it became increasingly clear in
this study that she actively pursued the study of ethics and was fascinated by how she and
others made ethical decisions. In a letter to Roman Ingarden, Stein refers goodhumoredly to her “bad habit of seeing ethical conflicts everywhere.”8 When her older
sister, Erna, who was being coerced by a persuasive uncle, struggled in deciding which
profession to choose, Edith Stein upbraided Erna, saying: “Don’t let yourself be
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influenced. Do what you, yourself, consider right!”9 This confidence in a person’s
natural ability to consider what was right and to do it was clearly transmitted to Edith
Stein through her mother, Augusta Stein. Stein testifies to her mother’s ethical influence
as she recounts: “Once [during a time of deliberation], I presented all the pros and cons
to my mother. ‘My dear child,’ she said, ‘unfortunately, I can’t advise you. Do whatever
you consider right; you are the best judge of what you should do.’”10 In her
reminiscences, Stein explains this right to choose in more depth:
I could not act unless I had an inner compulsion to do so. My decisions
arose out of a depth that was unknown even to myself. Once a matter was
bathed in the full light of consciousness and had acquired a definite form
in my thoughts, I was no longer to be deterred by anything.”11
That Stein’s “decisions arose out of a depth that was unknown” even to herself was a
conditional phase. Stein went on to explore this unknown depth in her personal research.
Stein’s penchant for ethical discussions, combined with her interest in
psychology, history, and philosophy, are reflected especially in her works on empathy
and the human person. After describing the process of empathy, Stein considered the
levels of the psychophysical person more fully. She defined the human person as an
individual comprised of physical, emotional, mental and personal levels. Using her own
experiences as well as her understanding of the psychophysical person, Stein would later
describe the “unknown depth” that she mentioned as the personal core of the human
person — a level to which the person and God alone had access. Knowing from
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experience that she could tap into her personal core made Stein confident that each
human person had the ability to know him/herself at the level of the personal core. This
confidence in the human person’s ability to reason and act informs Stein’s ethic.
Stein’s study of Schelerian ethics confirms her idea that external actions represent
inner thoughts and beliefs. Stein returns repeatedly to this internal/external reflection in
her dissertation on empathy, in her treatises dealing with the exposition of the
psychophysical human being, and in her personal writings. In the events of 1933, for
example, and as described in this research, Stein gives evidence of an ethic whereby she
matches internal thoughts and beliefs with external actions. Her actions, namely, writing
a letter to Pope Pius XI, writing her reminiscences of Jewish life, and entering a
Carmelite monastery, reflect her personal core. Stein’s actions match her internal
thoughts and belief that something must be done to point to the truth of Hitler’s plans.

Stein’s Ethic is Informed by Reason and Faith
In some of her philosophical works, Stein attempted to create a dialogue between
the scholasticism of Saint Thomas Aquinas and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl
but she never synthesized the two styles. She intuited a connection between these two
approaches to philosophy and thus, reason and faith inform her ethic. Stein credits
Thomas Aquinas’ writings for many of her ideas, but three concepts are reflected
particularly in her ethical stance: Aquinas’ idea of God as Creator, his realism, and his
acceptance of natural law.

215
First, following Aquinas’ lead, Stein adheres to God as Creator. In citing
common characteristics that determine Thomists, Aquinas scholar Romanus Cessario
explains:
Thomists defend the reality of creation, and hold the conviction that from
the visible things of the universe the human mind can know the existence
of God. God enjoys his own subsistent fullness of pure actual being and
possesses no limitation of any kind, because nothing of potential is to be
found in him. No creature enjoys this status of pure act.12
The acceptance of God as Creator and of human beings as limited creatures informs
Stein’s ethic in three specific ways. First, Stein defines the human person as made in the
image and likeness of God, the Creator, thus affording the human person a dignity that
honors the Creator God who is Pure Act and Pure Essence. This Pure Essence, shared in
each human person’s soul, leads to a second point that Stein draws from Thomas. Stein
posits that by unfolding one’s personal core, each human person develops his/her
potential, thus moving toward plentitude or fullness. This plentitude is realized when a
human person cooperates with God in recognizing his/her gifts of nature and grace. Stein
develops this concept in her treatment of the personal core and the human person’s need
to integrate the four psychophysical dimensions (physical, emotive, mental, and personal)
in achieving “fullness.” Third, acknowledging God as Creator also substantiates Stein’s
claim that there are three orders of humanity, which she calls the original, fallen, and
redeemed orders. These orders help to explain Stein’s adherence to Thomas’s idea of
divine and natural law. Cessario explains this characteristic of Thomists:
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In moral philosophy, Thomists agree that by nature man enjoys the right to
dwell in community and to pursue personal happiness within the common
good, and that the right conduct of human beings is best described by
appeal to the virtues of human life, although laws, both natural and
positive, also legitimately direct human action.13
Stein insists, in her personal experience and in her philosophical writings, that human
beings search naturally for truth. She is confident that God-given desires (given by the
Creator God) will not be thwarted. Thus the natural search for truth will yield truth, and
this truth will allow development of one’s personal core as well as contribute to the
reintegration that characterizes the redeemed order.
When Stein first read Husserl’s work, she was immediately impressed by his
method of getting to the truth via subjective description of experience and the discovery
of essences. She expresses her disappointment with Husserl when he turns toward
idealism, abandoning his earlier support of realism. Despite her agreements and
disagreements with Husserl, Stein employed the phenomenological method in her work
and in her everyday experiences.
With Scheler, Stein accepts that the human person can intuit values prior to
understanding them. Also reflecting Scheler’s influence, Stein knows from her
encounters with Anna Reinach and through literature, with St. Teresa of Avila, that there
are individuals who personify certain values and virtues. Stein knows, too, that these
persons of value can inspire a person to seek a higher level of values.
From Husserl, Stein learns the importance of attention to subjective experience in
coming to truth as well as the certainty that the broaching of one horizon brings yet
13
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another horizon. From the phenomenologist Scheler, Stein incorporates the hierarchy of
values and the ability of human beings to intuit, or feel, before they know. Stein is not
the person who synthesizes scholasticism and phenomenology but she respects these
different approaches. Stein allows the teachings of Aquinas on creation, realism, and
natural law to coexist alongside Husserl’s privileging of the subjective viewpoint and the
discovering of essences. She allows room, too, for Scheler’s hierarchy of values and
emotional a priorism. Stein allows scholasticism and phenomenology, faith and reason,
to inform her ethic.

Characteristics of Stein’s Ethic
This study claims, too, that Stein’s ethic is characterized by a perceiving of a
phenomenon of truth, an honoring of relationships, an unfolding of one’s personal core,
and openness to new horizons. It is important to see these four characteristics as strands
that intertwine and are fluid.
Like her description of the life world, Stein’s ethic is fluid and in motion. Past
events and memories inform the present and stretch into the future, forming a continuum.
The human person, according to Aquinas and also to Stein, is in motion, naturally in
search of truth and able to recognize it. While Stein affords truth universal status (truth is
available to all people in all times), she reflects Husserl’s privileging of the subjective
viewpoint and echoes Aquinas’ belief in the realism and dignity afforded the ensouled
person in her confidence that each person can come to know truth at his/her personal
core. Thus Stein conceives of the human person as capable of knowing the truth after
finding that truth through his/her gifts of nature and grace and through the life world.
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The search for truth constantly motivates Stein, and I consider this movement
toward truth the hallmark of Stein’s ethic. The search for truth is enhanced by the
responsible unfolding of one’s own personal core. We recall that in Stein’s life, she
gradually became cognizant of her intellectual abilities, her need for God, her ambitious
nature, etc. By means of self-examination throughout the various fluctuations in her life
world, through encounters with others, and by her personal relationship with God, Stein
learns about herself. Armed with this self-knowledge, Stein shares her gifts with others,
placing them at the disposal of the cosmic community.
This concept of the cosmic community reveals Stein’s belief that persons are
interconnected. She writes to her contemporary, Fritz Kaufmann: “The formation of an
unshakable bond with all whom life brings in my way, a bond in no way dependent on
day-to-day contact, is a significant element in my life.”14 Maintaining this bond, Stein
feels, is also her responsibility, part of the development of her personal core as a human
being. Thus, acknowledging her relationship to the cosmic community, Stein is able to
write to her friend, Sister Adelgundis: “Of course, it is hardly possible to think
individually of every intention that is commended to me from so many different sides.
All one can do is try to live the life one has chosen with ever greater fidelity and purity in
order to offer it up as an acceptable sacrifice for all one is connected with.”15
Lastly, Stein’s fluid movement toward truth presumes openness to new horizons.
The search for truth is ongoing as gifts of nature and grace manifest ever new
responsibilities and new relationships. Each new realized truth, each recognized and
utilized gift of nature and grace changes Stein’s horizon and adds to her perspective on
14
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the life world. These characteristics contribute to an ethic because they reveal Stein’s
thoughts and beliefs. Stein tries to live in truth, cognizant of her abilities as well as of her
limitations. This sharing of her capabilities contributes to the cosmic community which
Stein believes is part of her responsibility.
This study concludes that Stein’s ethic, her self-conscious project of matching
internal thoughts and beliefs with external actions, is informed by reason and faith.
Stein’s ethic is characterized by a fluid and ongoing search for truth while unfolding
one’s personal core and honoring relationships. Stein’s ethic allows for the possibility of
new horizons — new truths — to be discovered and lived.

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER RESEARCH
This research contributes to existing Steinian research because it adds to the
growing body of research about the philosopher, Edith Stein.
Research to date has emphasized Stein’s personal life,16 her contributions as a
woman philosopher,17 and her canonization as a Catholic saint.18 Philosophical research
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has focused on her study of empathy,19 her interpretation and use of scholasticism,20 and
her phenomenological treatment of the psychophysical person.21 This dissertation makes
use of works by Stein and about Stein to broach a new horizon as it reconstructs Stein’s
ethic. Although Stein never set down formally an ethical maxim, plan, or formula, she
does make references to ethics -- its importance and application in her own life -throughout her written works. Without Stein’s having formalized an ethic, this project is
speculative, but well within the boundaries of phenomenological research, as it seeks the
essence of Stein’s ethic. This study considers Stein’s ethical stance and, based on
essential aspects of her philosophy and distinct experiences in her personal life, adds a
new perspective to the growing body of research about Stein.
This research also connects Stein’s thought on the unfolding of one’s personal
core with the responsibility to share these gifts with the cosmic community. Stein’s
concept of the ontic blueprint includes Aquinas’ theory of the fulfillment of God’s plan
for a particular person and Scheler’s concept of the unfolding personal core. Potency and
act are important to Stein’s understanding of the psychophysical person. In Stein’s
schema, the soul, specifically the personal core, individuates the human person. It is at
this personal core that God’s gifts of nature and grace are found; a person must recognize
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and use these gifts if his/her potential is to become a reality. It is only when these gifts
are used and shared with the cosmic community that human beings move toward the
redeemed order wherein all is in right relationship.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A project for possible further study is an examination of Stein’s influence on Pope
John Paul II,22 who knew of Edith Stein and canonized her in 1998 as Saint Teresa
Benedicta of the Cross, OCD. Karol Jόsef Wojtyla (John Paul II), a student of both
phenomenology and scholasticism, completed his doctoral work on the philosophy of
Max Scheler.23 While Wojtyla knew first-hand the tension that exists between
philosophy and theology, his writings celebrate the dialogue that can exist between
reason and faith. In John Paul II’s writings, we see strands of thought that are
reminiscent of Stein. An analysis of Wojtyla’s writings, particularly on the dignity of the
human person, and Stein’s writings on the psychophysical person would continue the
dialogue between faith and reason.
While teaching ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin, Wojtyla and other
scholars initiated “The Lublin Project.” In this project Wojtyla and his colleagues
adhered to realism about the world and the human capacity to know it and focused on the
human person and his/her experiences. The group was committed to the power of reason
and practiced an ecumenism of time by which they respected the history of philosophy as
22
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well as contemporary philosophy.24 Biographer George Weigel explains Wojtyla’s
philosophical perspective, but his words could be describing Stein’s project as well:
It was Scheler’s personalism, which rescued moral philosophy from the
dry abstractions of Kantian ethics and restored the pathos, ecstasy, and
indeed ethos to human life, that Wojtyla found most attractive. Wojtyla
also agreed with Scheler’s claim that human intuitions into the truth of
things included moral intuitions, a certain “knowledge of the heart” that
was, nonetheless, real knowledge. Scheler’s careful analysis of moral
sentiments, especially empathy and sympathy, was also important, for it
helped break modern philosophy out of the prison of solipsism —
empathy and sympathy necessarily involved an encounter with another.
Perhaps above all, Wojtyla appreciated Scheler’s attempt to ground morals
in an analysis of the realities of moral choosing, rather than in a formal,
abstract system like Kant’s. The question Wojtyla posed in his
habilitation thesis was whether Scheler (and by extension, the
phenomenological method) could do for contemporary Christian
philosophy and theology what Aristotle had done for Thomas Aquinas.25
Stein would have found herself at home in “The Lublin Project” as well as in the writings
of John Paul II. Research on how Scheler influenced Stein and Wojtyla would be
fruitful. An analysis of Stein’s influence on John Paul II would enrich scholarship about
each of these philosophers.
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CONCLUSION
This study began with the eyewitness account of Julian Marcan who noted Edith
Stein’s calm presence and her practice of comforting a child in the Drente-Westerbork
Detention camp. Whether the account is true or not can be debated. The account
triggered a question however: Did Stein have an ethic and if she did, what was the
essence of this ethic?
In this study, the “ethical life” refers to a human being’s conscious existence in
the physical world and an ongoing reflection on his or her actions, attitudes, and beliefs
in that world. It designates the manner in which a person conducts his/her affairs within
that person’s given life world. Life world, as used in this study, means “[t]he world
inhabited by the self . . . within which [one] immediately experience[s] the things around
[him/her].”26
As a result of her philosophical and faith developments, Stein sees self as
possessing pure essence and made not merely of body, but of emotions, intellect, and
personality. Stein knows she must unfold her unique ontic blueprint; she must become
fully herself in the life world in which she finds herself. She must develop on all levels,
especially conscious of her own unique personality and gifts of nature. She is responsible
for her subjective view of the world and must be willing to share that view with the
cosmic community, for Stein, like all other human beings, is not an isolated individual.
As a rational human being she searches for truth in the midst of a society, and she is also
responsible, in some way at least, to contribute to that society through the use of her
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unique gifts. In knowing and using her gifts of nature and grace, Stein forges a
relationship with God, self, and others — she allows for the possibility of new horizons.
Whether or not Edith Stein comforted a child in the Drente-Westerbork camp,
she had an ethic. This ethic was characterized by a perceiving of a phenomenon of truth,
an honoring of relationships, an unfolding of her personal core, and openness to new
horizons. As a philosopher, Stein allowed reason and faith to inform her ethic that
privileged relationship and responsibility.
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ABSTRACT

Edith Stein: Toward an Ethic of Relationship and Responsibility

The philosopher Edith Stein (1891-1942) never set down formally an ethical plan.
However, in Stein’s professional and personal texts, “ethic” is defined as a harmonious
matching of internal thoughts and beliefs with external actions, while always moving
toward truth. This dissertation seeks to identify the essential components of Stein’s ethic.
A search of Stein’s philosophical, personal, and autobiographical works suggests
that Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Adolf and Anna Reinach, Teresa of Avila, and
Thomas Aquinas had profound impact on the formation of Stein’s ethical stance that
included her use of reason as well as faith. Elements of phenomenology and of faith
contribute significantly to Stein’s ethical framework.
Informed by reason and faith, Stein’s ethic is characterized by a fluid and ongoing
search for truth that combines a perceiving of a phenomenon of truth, an honoring of
relationships, an unfolding of one’s personal core, and openness to new horizons.
According to Stein’s schema, the psychophysical person is comprised of physical,
emotional, and mental levels which he/she uses in unfolding his/her personal core or
ontic blueprint. The soul, specifically the personal core, individuates the human person.
It is at this personal core that God’s gifts of nature and grace are found; a person must
recognize and use these gifts if his/her potential is to become a reality. It is only when
these gifts are used and shared with the cosmic community that human beings move
toward the redeemed order wherein all is in right relationship.
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In 1933 Stein wrote a letter to Pope Pius XI, asking for an official denunciation of
Hitler. She initiated the writing of her mother’s memoirs, which later became her own
reminiscences; here she gave witness to the truth of Jewish life as she experienced it.
Finally, Stein unfolded her personal core by entering Carmel and offering her life as a
sacrifice for all people. These actions are evidence that Stein had an ethic by which she
strove to integrate her internal thoughts and beliefs with her external actions.
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